1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MAURICIO BERNAL, Case No.: 24-CV-1668 W (DEB)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S 14 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; KELLY FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT MARTINEZ; and DOES 1–100, 15 [DOC. 13]. Defendants. 16 17 18 Defendants, the County of San Diego and Kelly Martinez, move to dismiss 19 Plaintiff’s, Mauricio Bernal, First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). [Doc. 13]. Mr. Bernal 20 opposes. [Doc. 14]. The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without 21 oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons discussed below, 22 the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss [Doc. 13]. 23 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 This lawsuit arises out of events that allegedly took place at the San Diego Central 26 Jail. (FAC at 3, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff, Mauricio Bernal, an inmate at the jail, alleges that on July 27 25, 2023, he and other inmates were ordered to line up against a wall for a pat down 28 search. (Id. at 5, ¶ 20.) Mr. Bernal alleges that he was ordered to line up against a metal 1 sliding door, past a visible red line demarcating a safety boundary. (Id. at ¶ 21.) He then 2 alleges that DOES 1–5 “forcefully and aggressively” directed him to stand past the red 3 line. (Id. at 6, ¶ 22.) Complying with orders, Mr. Bernal stood past the red line, and 4 while waiting to be patted down, DOES 6–10 shut the sliding metal door on his right 5 hand. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Having the door shut on his hand required Mr. Bernal to amputate his 6 thumb and resulted in permanent injury to his index finger. (Id.) Mr. Bernal claims that 7 DOES 1–10 ignored his cries for help as he stood in agonizing pain and shock, 8 downplaying the incident by saying “it’s not so bad.” (Id. at ¶ 24.) 9 The Complaint then asserts that after the metal door incident, DOES 1–20 refused 10 to allow Mr. Bernal daily infirmary treatments for his finger, as well as medical 11 documents and updates. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Further, he alleges that after the incident, DOES 12 1–20 harassed him about his injury by making him take out the trash with the exposed 13 wound on his thumb, giving him a “thumbs up” as a reference to his missing amputated 14 thumb, and using a marker to draw a severed thumb on the sliding metal door. (Id. at 15 ¶¶ 25–28.) 16 On September 18, 2024, Mr. Bernal filed this suit asserting federal and state law 17 claims based on the alleged incident and subsequent harassment. [Doc. 1]. On January 18 3, 2025, Mr. Bernal amended the Complaint. (FAC [Doc. 9].) Defendants then moved to 19 dismiss the FAC. [Doc. 13]. Mr. Bernal opposes. [Doc. 14]. 20 21 II. LEGAL STANDARD 22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a 23 claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “A pleading that 24 states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing 25 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal under Rule 26 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient 27 facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pac. Police Depot, 901 F.2d 28 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 1 “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle [ment] to relief’ 2 requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 3 cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 4 When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all “well-pleaded 5 factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). However, a court is not 6 “required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted 7 deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 8 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, 9 the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be 10 plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 11 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court “may order stricken 13 from any pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the 15 expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by 16 dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . . .” Sidney–Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 17 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). “‘Immaterial’ matter is that which has no essential or 18 important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” 5 Charles A. 19 Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382, at 706–07 (1990). 20 “‘Impertinent’ matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to 21 the issues in question.” Id. at 711; Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th 22 Cir. 1993). 23 24 III. DISCUSSION 25 Defendants have moved to dismiss all the claims against them and strike 26 allegations in the FAC. (Mtn. [Doc. 13].) Each argument will be taken in turn. 27 /// 28 /// 1 A. CLAIMS AGAINST SHERIFF KELLY MARTINEZ 2 1. Rule 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim 3 (i) Claims I through III (42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourth Amendment, Eighth 4 Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process) 5 Claims I through III are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of 6 Mr. Bernal’s Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (FAC at 10, ¶¶ 48–56.) 7 Defendants move to dismiss these claims under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing they are 8 insufficiently pled. (Mtn. at 5:8–16.) The Court agrees that the claims against Sheriff 9 Martinez must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. While none of the allegations 10 suggest that Sheriff Martinez directly violated Mr. Bernal’s constitutional rights, he 11 appears to argue that she acquiesced to the alleged unconstitutional conduct of her 12 subordinates and was deliberately indifferent to “constant complaints and notices from 13 inmates, their families, and other County employees themselves.” (Opp’n at 8:12–17.) 14 The allegations against Sheriff Martinez are as follows: 15 • “Defendant COUNTY, also acted through and is liable by virtue of its final 16 policymakers, such as MARTINEZ . . . who had been delegated final 17 policymaking authority. . . . The COUNTY’S final policymakers, including 18 MARTINEZ . . . were acting under color of state law.” (FAC at 4, ¶ 12.) 19 • “SHERIFF MARTINEZ had de facto policies or widespread, long standing 20 deficient policies . . . .” (Id. at 8, ¶ 38; 17, ¶ 89; 19, ¶ 103.) 21 o The FAC later asserts those policies are: “failure to properly house 22 individuals to ensure their safety and well being; [l]eaving individuals 23 unattended in their cells for extended periods despite signs of medical or 24 mental distress; failing to summon medical or mental health care when 25 obviously necessary; [f]ailing to coordinate, share, or update internal 26 information systems with critical medical or mental health information; 27 [f]ailing to adequately staff the medical services division.” (Id. at 20, 28 ¶ 103.) 1 • “[T]he COUNTY and SHERIFF MARTINEZ, have repeatedly failed to investigate 2 incidents of deaths in jail, medical neglect, in custody injuries, and staff 3 misconduct, despite the numerous complaints.” (Id. at ¶ 40.) 4 • “[T]he failure of Sheriff Martinez . . . to discipline deputies after having been 5 informed of the above-noted deficient and unconstitutional policies and practices 6 amounts to municipal policies, ratified by those final, decisionmakers as well.” 7 (Id. at 12, ¶ 67; 14, ¶ 77; 17, ¶ 93; 20, ¶ 109.) 8 Although Mr. Bernal asserts that Sheriff Martinez received “numerous 9 complaints,” he fails to specify what those complaints were about and which 10 “unconstitutional policies and practices” were ratified. He also asserts that the County 11 and Sheriff Martinez have de facto policies that fail to ensure proper inmate housing and 12 safety and leave them unattended in their cells when they need medical or mental health 13 care. See (FAC at 19, ¶ 103.) However, the FAC fails to plead facts that substantiate 14 those claims. 15 Additionally, the FAC fails to relate the allegations against Sheriff Martinez and 16 the injury Mr. Bernal suffered. For example, the FAC cites the California State Auditor 17 report, but fails to explain how that report’s findings are analogous to this case. For 18 example, the FAC cites the report’s finding that there are “[d]eficiencies in medical and 19 mental health care system[s].” (FAC at 17, ¶ 88(e).) However, the FAC does not cite 20 what deficiencies the report specifically found and compare them to deficiencies Mr. 21 Bernal alleges. Similarly, Mr. Bernal does not specify the circumstances of the vague 22 references to “jail deaths” and “complaints.” Without more, these conclusory allegations 23 fail to state a claim. See Moss, 572 F.3d at 969 (“In sum, for a complaint to survive a 24 motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from 25 that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”). 26 Accordingly, Mr. Bernal has failed to state a claim that Sheriff Martinez directly 27 violated or was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights under the Fourth, 28 1 Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, Claims I through III against her must be 2 dismissed. 3 4 (ii) Claims IV and V (Monell Claims) 5 Mr. Bernal asserts two Monell claims against Sheriff Martinez. Defendants argue 6 that Monell claims brought against individual defendants are improper. (Mtn. at 7:20– 7 25.) Defendants are correct that “[a] Monell claim is, by definition, one brought against a 8 public entity alone.” Hernandez v. San Bernadino County, 2023 WL 3432206, at *5 9 (C.D. Cal. January 26, 2023) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 689 n. 55); see also Spriggs v. 10 City of San Diego, No. 24-CV-01006-W-KSC, 2024 WL 4469218, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 11 9, 2024). Therefore, the Monell claims against Sheriff Martinez will be dismissed 12 without leave to amend. 13 14 (iii) Claims VI and VII (Tort Claims) 15 Mr. Bernal also asserts two tort claims against Sheriff Martinez for Intentional 16 Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) and Battery. To establish a claim for IIED in 17 California, a plaintiff must show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant 18 with the intent of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional 19 distress; (2) severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) that the defendant was the 20 actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 21 1035, 1050–51 (2009). To establish a claim for battery in California, a plaintiff must 22 show a nonconsensual, intentional, unlawful, and harmful contact by one person with the 23 person of another. See Ashcroft v. King, 228 Cal. App. 3d 604, 611–12 (1991). 24 As explained above, there are no allegations that Sheriff Martinez directly 25 participated in any of the events alleged in the FAC. Therefore, Mr. Bernal cannot 26 prevail on either tort theory against Sheriff Martinez. Put simply, there are no facts in the 27 FAC, nor could Mr. Bernal allege any facts with leave to amend, that would show Sheriff 28 Martinez intentionally caused Mr. Bernal extreme emotional distress or harmed him 1 through physical contact because there are no allegations that she participated directly in 2 any of the allegations in the FAC. Therefore, the tort claims must be dismissed against 3 Sheriff Martinez without leave to amend. 4 5 (iv) Claim VIII (California Bane Act) 6 Mr. Bernal has also alleged a claim under California’s Bane Act statute against 7 Sheriff Martinez. The Bane Act creates civil liability for anyone who “interferes by 8 threat, intimidation, or coercion . . . with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or 9 individuals or rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the 10 rights secured by the Constitution or laws of [California].” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. To 11 successfully plead a claim under the Act, a plaintiff must show (1) interference with or 12 attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) that the 13 interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation, or coercion. Sanchez 14 v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV201146DSFPVCX, 2020 WL 9074714, at *9 (C.D. Cal. 15 Apr. 28, 2020). 16 As explained above, Mr. Bernal has failed to state a claim that Sheriff Martinez 17 either directly violated or was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights. Supra 18 Sect. A(1)(i). Mr. Bernal also asserts that his California constitutional rights were 19 violated, but fails to plead any facts about what those rights were or how they were 20 violated. Therefore, the Bane Act claims against Sheriff Martinez will be dismissed 21 without leave to amend. 22 23 2. Mr. Bernal Has Failed to Oppose Sheriff Martinez’s Qualified Immunity Defense 24
25 Defendants argue that all claims against Sheriff Martinez must be dismissed 26 without leave to amend because she is entitled to qualified immunity. (Mtn. at 6:4–11.) 27 Government officers sued under Section 1983 may be immune from civil liability under 28 the doctrine of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity precludes liability if the officer’s 1 “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 2 reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 3 The purpose of this doctrine is to balance two important interests: “the need to hold 4 public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to 5 shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 6 reasonably.” O’Doan v. Sanford, 991 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pearson 7 v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). 8 To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the court 9 considers two independent questions: (1) whether the officer’s conduct violated a 10 statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the 11 time of the incident. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018). Stated 12 another way, qualified immunity bars Section 1983 suits against a government officer 13 when “either no deprivation of rights was alleged or the law dictating that specific 14 constitutional [or statutory] right was not yet clearly established.” Cates v. Stroud, 976 15 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). Although qualified 16 immunity is a two-step analysis, the court may analyze just the second step “when no 17 clearly established law shows that the officers’ conduct was unconstitutional.” O’Doan, 18 991 F.3d at 1036. As to statutory rights, courts also look to whether “existing precedent 19 must have placed the statutory[] question beyond debate.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 20 79 (2017). 21 As explained above, Mr. Bernal has failed to state a claim that Sheriff Martinez 22 either directly violated or was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights. Supra 23 Sect. A(1)(i). Therefore, Sheriff Martinez is entitled to qualified immunity. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. CLAIMS AGAINST THE COUNTY 2 a. The Direct Claims Against the County Must be Dismissed (Claims 1 3 through III) 4 The County of San Diego, as a local government unit, may be considered a 5 “person” and therefore, a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. 6 Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Hammond v. County of 7 Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1988). However, the local government units may be 8 held liable under Section 1983 only where the Plaintiff alleges facts to show that a 9 constitutional deprivation was caused by the implementation or execution of “a policy 10 statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the 11 County, or a “final decision maker” for the County. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Board of 12 the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402–04 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 13 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). 14 In other words, “respondeat superior and vicarious liability are not cognizable 15 theories of recovery against a municipality.” Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 279 F.3d 16 1102, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2002). “Instead, a Monell claim exists only where the alleged 17 constitutional deprivation was inflicted in ‘execution of a government’s policy or 18 custom.’” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 19 Mr. Bernal includes the County as a defendant on the first three claims. However, 20 those claims do not allege a policy, practice, or custom as required under Monell. See 21 (FAC at 10–14.) Therefore, Claims I through III will be dismissed against the County 22 without leave to amend. 23 24 b. Monell Claims (Claims Four and Five) 25 Mr. Bernal asserts two Monell claims against the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 26 for allegedly violating his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (FAC at 27 15–21.) “Section 1983 provides a cause of action for ‘the deprivation of any rights, 28 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” 1 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 2 Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method 3 for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 4 393–94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A 5 government entity, like the County, cannot be held vicariously liable for the action of its 6 employees under Section 1983 unless a plaintiff can show that the entity’s policy, 7 practice, or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Monell, 8 436 U.S. at 694. 9 Under Monell, municipalities may be liable under Section 1983 when: (1) “the acts 10 in question were undertaken pursuant to official policy or custom.” Hopper v. City of 11 Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001); (2) a municipality has a “policy of inaction 12 and such inaction amounts to a failure to protect constitutional rights.” Oviatt v. Pearce, 13 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 14 (1989)); or (3) when a municipality’s failure to train its employees “amounts to deliberate 15 indifference to the rights of persons with whom those employees are likely to come into 16 contact.” Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting City of Canton, 17 489 U.S. at 388–89) (quotation marks omitted). 18 19 1. Fourth Amendment 20 Mr. Bernal first asserts that the pat down was a search that violated his Fourth 21 Amendment rights. (FAC at 10, ¶¶ 49–56.) Defendant argues that Mr. Bernal has failed 22 to plead a claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. (Mtn. at 9:2–13.) The 23 Court agrees that Mr. Bernal has failed to plead facts showing that the search was 24 unreasonable. 25 The FAC asserts “Plaintiff was strip searched in a vindictive, harassing way . . . 26 that required [him] to stand past the clearly delineated line indicating safety . . . . 27 Moreover, Plaintiff was pushed passed [sic] the clearly delineated line in an aggressive 28 way . . . .” (FAC at 10, ¶ 53.) Additionally, “the unlawful, unwanted, and harmful 1 touching of Plaintiff by the Defendants constituting a battery and excessive force, was 2 without lawful basis, reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or any recognized exceptions 3 thereto, or justification or excuse . . . .” (Id. at 10, ¶ 52.) These allegations are 4 insufficient to support Mr. Bernal’s claim because they are too conclusory to state a claim 5 for relief. 6 Mr. Bernal alleges that the search was “vindicative,” “harassing,” and “unrelated to 7 any legitimate penological interest, because [Mr. Bernal was required] to stand past the 8 clearly delineated line indicating safety,” but these are only conclusions unsupported by 9 the factual pleadings. (FAC at 10, ¶ 52.) Importantly, strip-searches are not inherently 10 unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and due to the unique security concerns and 11 problems that arise in detention facilities, “[p]rison administrators should be accorded 12 wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in 13 their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain 14 institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547–58 (1979). 15 In response, Mr. Bernal cites Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2018) for 16 the proposition that “[t]he Ninth Circuit has held that deference to jail officials is 17 unwarranted where search methods are unreasonable.” (Opp’n at 10:1–2.) However, 18 Shorter held that a plaintiff could overcome deference to a detention search by showing 19 “they have been subjected to search procedures that are an unnecessary, unjustified, or 20 exaggerated response to concerns about jail safety . . . .” Shorter, 895 F.3d at 1191. 21 Here, there are no facts suggesting that the search methods Mr. Bernal asserts were 22 unreasonable. Mr. Bernal argues that the search was unreasonable because “a strip 23 search that required Plaintiff to stand past the clearly delineated line indicating safety, is 24 non other than a noncompliant and invasive search procedure.” (FAC at 10, ¶ 53.) The 25 FAC alleges that Mr. Bernal, along with other inmates, was ordered to line up against a 26 wall for a pat down search. (FAC at 5, ¶ 20.) While conducting the search, Mr. Bernal 27 was told to stand past a red line, and when he did, a metal door shut on his hand, 28 amputating his thumb. (Id. at 6, ¶ 23.) Even so, these facts as alleged do not make the 1 pat down search unreasonable. Mr. Bernal does not assert that the metal door was shut 2 on his hand intentionally, nor does he provide any facts showing that being forced to line 3 up past the red line was an obvious danger. 4 In fact, Mr. Bernal alleges that just one day after the accident, inmates were 5 ordered to stand “in the exact spot where Plaintiff’s thumb was amputated, even past the 6 clearly delineated red line.” (FAC at 6, ¶ 30.) However, the FAC does not allege that 7 any of those inmates were harmed or otherwise injured during that pat down search. 8 Additionally, other than the line’s “red” color, there are no facts alleged in the FAC that 9 suggest the line was intended to block off safe places for detainees to stand. Without 10 more, the FAC fails to show that the search procedure used was unreasonable. 11 Mr. Bernal has failed to state a claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were 12 violated. Monell claims require a plaintiff to have suffered an underlying “constitutional 13 violation.” Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 742 (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of 14 Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63 (2007)) (“[T]here can be no Monell claim . . . without an 15 underlying constitutional violation by the officers, the peace officer's conduct in violation 16 of the Constitution here becomes the ‘necessary logical condition’ to formulating a 17 Monell claim.”); Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Exoneration of 18 [the officer] of the charge of excessive force precludes municipal liability for the alleged 19 unconstitutional use of such force.”). Therefore, Mr. Bernal’s Monell claim based on an 20 unlawful search fails. 21 22 2. Eighth Amendment Claim 23 Mr. Bernal also asserts a Monell claim against the County for allegedly violating 24 his Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, Mr. Bernal alleges that he “was physically 25 abused and battered when he was forcefully pushed to stand in a place past the delineated 26 red line, indicating safety . . . . [and] compelled to stand there through force and 27 intimidation,” and the County failed to “provide medical care . . . and . . . allow him to 28 1 visit the infirmary like he was supposed to and also failed to accommodate his injury and 2 still made him take out trash with an open wound on his hand.” (FAC at 12, ¶¶ 62–63.) 3 4 i. Physical Abuse Allegations 5 Claims of excessive force arising after conviction and sentence are analyzed under 6 the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment” analysis. See Hudson v. 7 McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). The Supreme Court has established that the 8 unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 9 prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. In determining whether prison officials 10 inflicted “unnecessary and wanton pain,” the relevant question is whether “force was 11 applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or was applied maliciously 12 and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 13 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)). 14 Here, Mr. Bernal has failed to allege an Eighth Amendment claim based on the 15 allegations he was “abused and battered” when he was made to stand beyond the red line. 16 The FAC asserts that he was “forcefully and aggressively directed . . . where [he] was to 17 stand . . . .” (FAC at 6, ¶ 22); “physically abused and battered when he was forcefully 18 pushed to stand in a place . . . .” (Id. at 12, ¶ 62); and was “pushed passed [sic] the 19 clearly delineated line in an aggressive way even though he was always compliant with 20 the deputies.” (Id. at 10, ¶ 53.) However, these descriptions are too conclusory and do 21 not adequately describe how the jail officials allegedly “abused and battered” Mr. Bernal. 22 More facts about the physical abuse are necessary to state a claim that his Eighth 23 Amendment rights were violated. 24 Additionally, the Eighth Amendment requires the plaintiff to establish that prison 25 officials inflicted “unnecessary and wanton pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 26 347 (1981). Mr. Bernal alleges that he was pushed aggressively and unnecessarily when 27 ordered to stand in line, but that on its own is not sufficient to amount to an Eighth 28 Amendment violation. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. 312, 327 1 (1986)) (“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments 2 necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, 3 provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”). 4 Although Mr. Bernal alleges that the events led to his thumb being amputated, he does 5 not allege that the force used to push him past the red line caused the amputation. 6 Without that link or other facts, the FAC fails to state a claim under the Eighth 7 Amendment for physical abuse. 8 9 ii. Medical Care 10 Mr. Bernal also asserts his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was 11 denied follow up visits to the infirmary after his thumb was amputated. Under the Eighth 12 Amendment, the government has an “obligation to provide medical care for those whom 13 it is punishing by incarceration . . . .” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 14 2014) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–05 (1976)). 15 The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that involves the “unnecessary and 16 wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. 17 Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 18 2004). The Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause is violated when 19 prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle, 20 429 U.S. at 105. “Medical” needs include a prisoner’s “physical, dental, and mental 21 health.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982); Hunt v. Dental Dept., 22 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989). 23 To show “cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment, the 24 prisoner must point to evidence in the record from which a trier of fact might reasonably 25 conclude that the medical treatment (or lack of) placed Plaintiff at risk of “objectively, 26 sufficiently serious” harm and that Defendants had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” 27 when they either provided or denied him medical care. Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 28 1076 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, there is both an objective and 1 subjective component to an Eighth Amendment claim. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 2 904 (9th Cir. 2002); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 3 744 (9th Cir. 2002)) (“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner ‘must 4 satisfy both the objective and subjective components of a two-part test.’”). 5 Deliberate indifference is a subjective test that looks to whether an official knew 6 and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health and safety. Id. Serious medical needs 7 are conditions that could result in further significant injury or cause unnecessary and 8 wanton pain if left untreated. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 9 Hallmarks of a “serious medical need” include “[t]he existence of an injury that a 10 reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; 11 the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily 12 activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 13 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992). 14 The Court agrees with Mr. Bernal that the serious medical needs element of the 15 Eighth Amendment test is satisfied here. Mr. Bernal claims he was injured when a 16 sliding metal door closed on his hand. (FAC at 6, ¶ 23.) The injury required him to 17 amputate his thumb and injured his index finger. (Id.) Additionally, Mr. Bernal alleges 18 that he was denied follow up visits to the infirmary to accommodate his injury and was 19 not given medical documents describing how to care for his fingers. (Id. at 6, ¶ 25.) 20 Other cases have found similar injuries sufficiently serious to overcome the first prong of 21 the Eighth Amendment analysis. See Brison v. Wellpath, LLC, 662 F. Supp. 3d 67, 73 22 (D. Mass. 2023) (hand fracture and infection qualified as sufficiently serious under the 23 Eighth Amendment); Thompson v. Rodriguez, No. 3:23-CV-00515-RBM-LR, 2023 WL 24 7348482, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2023) (open wound fracture on right hand third index 25 finger found to be a serious medical need); Atkins v. Brewer, No. 26 107CV01027OWWGSA(PC), 2009 WL 29873, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009) 27 (“Plaintiff’s allegations that his finger was broken establishes that he had a serious 28 medical need.”). 1 The Court also agrees that Mr. Bernal has adequately stated a claim that prison 2 officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Mr. Bernal alleges 3 that government officials intentionally denied him the ability to visit the infirmary for 4 follow up visits (FAC at 6, ¶ 25); was ordered to take out the trash despite an exposed 5 wound on the hand where his thumb was amputated (Id. at 6, ¶ 26); and was constantly 6 mocked for his injury, such as other jail officials giving him a “thumbs up” and drawing 7 his severed thumb on the metal door that injured him (Id. at 6, ¶¶ 27–29.) These facts are 8 sufficient to show that jail officials were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Bernal’s medical 9 need for follow up care on his injured hand.
10 However, Mr. Bernal’s claim fails against the County because he has not properly 11 pled a Monell claim based on this constitutional violation. To plead a Monell claim, a 12 plaintiff must assert that a municipality’s practice, policy, custom, failure to train, or 13 supervise led to a constitutional violation and that the County was deliberately indifferent 14 to those violations. See Hopper, 241 F.3d at 1082. Here, Mr. Bernal has not alleged the 15 County had a policy, practice, or custom in place that led to him being denied access to 16 medical care, nor has he alleged that the County’s failure to train or properly supervise 17 led to his inability to access medical care. 18 The only allegation Mr. Bernal makes that the County was on notice of inadequate 19 medical care comes from the California State Auditor report—but as explained above— 20 those allegations fail to draw comparisons between the report’s findings and the facts of 21 this case. Supra Sect. A(1)(i). For example, Mr. Bernal points out that that the report 22 found inconsistencies in follow-up care but does not explain what the report found as 23 inconsistent and how those facts apply to the present case. See (FAC at 8, ¶ 37.) Without 24 those facts, the report does not demonstrate that the County was deliberately indifferent 25 to Mr. Bernal’s medical needs. 26 Although Mr. Bernal’s Eighth Amendment Monell claim will be dismissed, the 27 Court will give him leave to amend on this claim. 28 1 3. Fourteenth Amendment Claims 2 i. Malicious Prosecution 3 The FAC appears to assert a malicious prosecution claim against the defendants 4 but provides no facts or allegations to support that claim. Further, the term “malicious 5 prosecution” is only mentioned in the title of the claim, and Mr. Bernal has not opposed 6 the motion to dismiss the claim. See (FAC at 13.) Therefore, to the extent that the FAC 7 asserts a malicious prosecution claim, it is dismissed without leave to amend against all 8 defendants. 9 10 ii. Substantive Due Process 11 The FAC asserts a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the County 12 on the grounds that the facts alleged “were shocking to the conscience, beyond the 13 bounds of acts tolerable in a civilized society, and so egregious and outrageous that they 14 may be fairly said to shock the contemporary conscience.” (FAC at 13, ¶ 82.) 15 Specifically, Mr. Bernal argues that the events leading up to his finger amputation, as 16 well as the alleged verbal harassment afterwards, violated his due process rights and 17 caused him to suffer hardships atypical and significant to those ordinarily endured by 18 other prisoners. (Id. at 14, ¶¶ 74–76.) Mr. Bernal appears to be alleging two different 19 due process theories: (1) that the government endangered him (leading up to the thumb 20 amputation) and (2) one based on the verbal harassment he endured afterwards. (Id.) 21 As to the first theory, defendants point out that—for a Fourteenth Amendment 22 claim based on putting a plaintiff in a position of danger—a plaintiff must show that (1) 23 the danger was known or obvious and (2) that the state actor acted with deliberate 24 indifference. Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2006). 25 Although Mr. Bernal alleges that his thumb was amputated and his hand was 26 injured, he has failed to allege a due process claim based on that incident. The only 27 allegation that implies there was a “known or obvious” danger was the fact that he was 28 told to stand past a “red line.” (FAC at 6, ¶ 22.) Although Mr. Bernal alleges he was 1 injured after being told to stand past the red line, there are no facts that necessarily 2 suggest that it was intended to prevent injuries. Further, Mr. Bernal asserts the day after 3 his injury, other inmates were made to stand in the same spot with no other injuries 4 alleged. (Id. at 6, ¶ 30.) This allegation is at odds with his claim that the red line was 5 intended as a safety boundary. 6 As to the claim that the alleged verbal harassment violated Mr. Bernal’s due 7 process rights, defendants correctly point out that verbal harassment is generally 8 insufficient to amount to a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 9 Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (collecting cases). Even if 10 Mr. Bernal could demonstrate a constitutional violation based on the alleged verbal 11 harassment, the Monell claim against the County would fail because he has not alleged 12 any policy, custom, practice, or failure to train that led to the due process violation, as 13 required by Monell. See Hopper, 241 F.3d at 1082. 14 Although Mr. Bernal’s due process claims will be dismissed, the Court will give 15 him leave to amend. 16 17 C. THE COUNTY IS NOT SUBJECT TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES 18 Defendants move to dismiss the punitive damages claims against the County, 19 arguing that public entities are not subject to punitive damages awards. (Mtn. at 7:12– 20 16); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (“[W]e hold that a 21 municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Cal. Gov. 22 Code § 818 (“[A] public entity is not liable for . . . other damages imposed primarily for 23 the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”). Mr. Bernal has not cited 24 any contrary authority suggesting that the County can be liable for punitive damages. 25 Therefore, the motion to dismiss punitive damages will be granted. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 D. THE REFERENCE TO KEITH WILL BE STRUCK 2 Defendants move to strike allegations pertaining to “Keith’s death.” (Mtn. at 8:16– 3 18.) The FAC does not explain who “Keith” is, the details of his death, or why he is 4 relevant to this case. Additionally, Mr. Bernal did not explain the “Keith” references in 5 his Opposition. Therefore, the references to “Keith” will be struck from the FAC. See 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 7 8 E. BATTERY CLAIM 9 To establish a claim for battery in California, a plaintiff must show a 10 nonconsensual, intentional, unlawful, and harmful contact by one person with the person 11 of another. See Ashcroft v. King, 228 Cal. App. 3d 604, 611–12 (1991). As defendants 12 point out, a plaintiff must also prove that an officer used unreasonable force. Edson v. 13 City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272 (1998) (“[a] [p]laintiff must prove 14 unreasonable force as an element of the tort [battery].”); see also Yount v. City of 15 Sacramento, 43 Cal. 4th 885, 902 (2008) (“Indeed, Yount’s common law battery cause of 16 action, like his section 1983 claim, requires proof that Officer Shrum used unreasonable 17 force.”). 18 Although Mr. Bernal asserts he was aggressively and forcefully pushed into the 19 lineup, he has failed to plead facts that render that alleged use of force unreasonable. See 20 supra at 15–16. However, the Court will give him leave to amend to plead more facts 21 about the pat down search and lineup. 22 23 F. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM 24 To establish a claim for IIED in California, a plaintiff must show (1) extreme and 25 outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard 26 of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or 27 extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional 28 1 distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050– 2 51 (2009). 3 Defendants assert that the County and its employees are immune from liability for 4 Plaintiff’s emotional distress based on California law providing immunity for state tort 5 claims arising from “[a]n injury to any prisoner.” Cal. Gov. Code § 844.6(b); (Mtn. at 6 19:19–21.) Defendants also assert the County and its employees are immune from the 7 emotional distress claims because California law also provides that “[n]either a public 8 entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the 9 employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody.” Id. at § 845.6; 10 (Mtn. at 19:16–21.) 11 Mr. Bernal failed to oppose these immunity arguments, only reciting the elements 12 of the IIED claim. (Opp’n at 18:10–18.) Because Mr. Bernal did not specify why those 13 California immunity statutes do not apply in this case, the Court will dismiss the IIED 14 claims against all defendants without leave to amend. 15 16 G. CALIFORNIA BANE ACT CLAIMS 17 Mr. Bernal also asserts a claim under the California Bane Act against all 18 defendants. The Bane Act creates civil liability for anyone who “interferes by threat, 19 intimidation, or coercion . . . with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or 20 individuals or rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the 21 rights secured by the Constitution or laws of [California].” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. To 22 successfully plead a claim under the Act, a plaintiff must show (1) interference with or 23 attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) that the 24 interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation, or coercion. Sanchez 25 v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV201146DSFPVCX, 2020 WL 9074714, at *9 (C.D. Cal. 26 Apr. 28, 2020). 27 Of course, a Bane Act claim necessarily requires a plaintiff to show their 28 constitutional rights have been violated. Mr. Bernal asserts that his Bane Act claims 1 encompass violations of his Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth 2 Amendment rights, as well as his Right to Happiness, Privacy, and Due Process under the 3 California Constitution. (FAC at 23, ¶ 130.) As explained earlier in this opinion, Mr. 4 Bernal has failed to state claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment, so the 5 corresponding Bane Act claim fails. Supra at 13–21. Additionally, although he states his 6 rights under the California Constitution were violated, Mr. Bernal has failed to plead how 7 those rights were violated. Therefore, his Bane Act claim under the California 8 Constitution fails. However, having found Mr. Bernal has stated a claim his Eighth 9 Amendment rights were violated, the Bane Act claim survives. 10 Defendants have also moved to dismiss the Bane Act claim on the grounds that Mr. 11 Bernal failed to allege facts that “Defendants acted with the intent necessary for a Bane 12 Act violation.” (Mtn. at 22:21–26.) However, as to his Eighth Amendment claim, 13 Mr. Bernal has alleged facts showing the deprivation of medical care was intentional, 14 such as “DOES 1–20 refus[ing] to allow Plaintiff to get his finger treated by the infirmary 15 every day . . .”; “DOES 1–20 order[ing] Plaintiff to work at the Subject Jail by taking out 16 the trash, all in conscious disregard of the open and exposed wound on Plaintiff’s severed 17 thumb . . .”; and DOES 1–20 allegedly mocking him and his amputated thumb. (FAC at 18 6, ¶¶ 24–29.) As a result, the motion to dismiss Mr. Bernal’s Bane Act claim will be 19 denied. 20 21 H. THE MONELL CLAIMS AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS MUST BE 22 DISMISSED 23 Mr. Bernal has asserted two Monell claims against the unidentified individual DOE 24 defendants. Defendants assert that Monell claims brought against individual defendants 25 are improper. (Mtn. at 7:20–25.) “A Monell claim is, by definition, one brought against 26 a public entity alone.” Hernandez v. San Bernadino County, 2023 WL 3432206, at *5 27 (C.D. Cal. January 26, 2023) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 689 n. 55); see also Spriggs v. 28 City of San Diego, No. 24-CV-01006-W-KSC, 2024 WL 4469218, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1 9, 2024). Accordingly, the Monell claims against the DOE defendants will be dismissed 2 without leave to amend. 3 4 I. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 5 Defendants also move to dismiss the DOE defendants from the suit asserting that 6 Mr. Bernal has failed to allege they are individually liable. (Mtn. at 23:3–4.) Indeed, 7 district courts have dismissed claims against DOE defendants where a plaintiff has failed 8 to adequately plead facts to show that the individual defendants personally violated their 9 constitutional rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). The Court 10 disagrees as to Mr. Bernal’s Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care but 11 agrees for the rest of the constitutional claims. 12 The FAC alleges that “[d]ays after the Subject Incident, DOES 1–20 refused to 13 allow Plaintiff to get his finger treated by the infirmary every day, like he was supposed 14 to. They also refused to give Plaintiff any other medical documents or updates regarding 15 Plaintiff’s medical condition or the needed care for his fingers.” (FAC at 6, ¶ 25.) Mr. 16 Bernal has stated a claim against the DOE defendants 1–20 as he is asserting that they 17 specifically refused him the ability to go to the infirmary. 18 However—as explained above—Mr. Bernal has failed to state constitutional 19 claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, those claims against the 20 DOE defendants will be dismissed. 21 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to 24 dismiss the FAC. The FAC is dismissed as follows: 25 • All claims are dismissed against Sheriff Kelly Martinez WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; 26
27 • The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim (Claim VI) is DISMISSED against all defendants WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 28 I e The Battery Claim (Claim VID) is DISIMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 3 e Mr. Bernal’s direct claims against the County (Claims I-III) are DISMISSED 4 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; 5 e Mr. Bernal’s Monell claims against the County are dismissed as follows: 6 o Fourth Amendment claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; o Eighth Amendment claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; 7 o Fourteenth Amendment claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 9 e The motion to dismiss as to the Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim 10 against the DOE defendants and the Bane Act claim is DENIED. Otherwise, the claims against the DOE defendants are DISMISSED. The claims are dismissed 1 against the DOE defendants as follows: 12 o Fourth Amendment clam DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; o Eighth Amendment claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; 13 o Fourteenth Amendment claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO 14 AMEND. 15 Additionally, the Court grants Defendants’ request and DISMISSES Mr. Bernal’s 16 request for punitive damages from the County and STRIKES all references to “Keith’s 17 || death” in the FAC. 18 IS SO ORDERED. 19 |! Dated: April 25, 2025 \ 20 [TA Julony 21 Hn. 7 omas J. Whelan 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28
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