Berlou Joe Barnard v. State of Iowa
This text of Berlou Joe Barnard v. State of Iowa (Berlou Joe Barnard v. State of Iowa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-2053 Filed August 21, 2024
BERLOU JOE BARNARD, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Charles C. Sinnard,
Judge.
An applicant appeals the dismissal of his application for postconviction
relief. AFFIRMED.
Daniel M. Northfield, Urbandale, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ. 2
BULLER, Judge.
Berlou Barnard appeals the dismissal of his application for postconviction
relief, filed six months past the three-year statute of limitations codified at Iowa
Code section 822.3 (2023). The postconviction court found Barnard had not
adequately pled any exception to the statute of limitations, such as newly
discovered evidence. We affirm.
A Jasper County jury found Barnard guilty of four counts of sexual abuse in
the second degree, class “B” felonies in violation of Iowa Code section 709.3(1)(b)
(2018), for offenses against his granddaughter; and one count of obstructing
prosecution for destroying evidence related to those offenses, an aggravated
misdemeanor in violation of section 719.3. This court affirmed his convictions on
direct appeal. See State v. Barnard, No. 18-0757, 2019 WL 5792578, at *4, *6
(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2019) (rejecting evidentiary challenges concerning the
forensic interview and what Barnard claimed was a prior false allegation).
Procedendo issued on February 4, 2020.
More than three years later—on August 14, 2023—Barnard applied for
postconviction relief, asserting among other claims “actual innocence” and “newly
discovered evidence.” The application did not offer any specific facts on either
issue, nor was it supported by affidavits or attachments. The State moved to
dismiss the application as time-barred. Barnard amended his application but still
did not offer any details.
At a hearing on the State’s motion, Barnard’s counsel offered no evidence
and declined to elaborate beyond what the postconviction court called the
application’s “generic allegation that there is new evidence”—except to say the 3
new evidence “relates to testimony of the victim from trial.” The court found
Barnard offered “[n]othing of substance that could support an actionable claim” and
instead “ma[d]e general and vague allegations to buy time to engage in a fishing
expedition.” The court concluded the statute of limitations barred the application
and dismissed it.
Barnard appeals, and we review the application of chapter 822’s time bar
for correction of errors at law. See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519
(Iowa 2003). “A party claiming an exception to a normal limitations period must
plead and prove the exception.” Cornell v. State, 529 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1994). Even claims of actual innocence must satisfy the statute of limitations
or an exception (like newly discovered evidence). See Quinn v. State, 954
N.W.2d 75, 77 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020).
We agree with the postconviction court that Barnard’s claim was barred by
the statute of limitations and that he failed to adequately plead any exception. As
we have said before, “At minimum, [a postconviction applicant] ha[s] to plead at
least some evidence that would let a reasonable fact-finder conclude his claim
involved a new ground of fact that could not have been discovered within the
limitations period, and . . . failure to do so warrant[s] dismissal.” McGinnis v. State,
No. 23-0309, 2024 WL 3291805, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 3, 2024). In other words,
a generic allegation of newly discovered evidence is not enough to survive a
motion to dismiss in postconviction proceedings. Since Barnard relies solely on
such a generic allegation, the postconviction court correctly dismissed his
application.
AFFIRMED.
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