Berlin Iron Bridge Co. v. Board of Commissioners

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Berlin Iron Bridge Co. v. Board of Commissioners

16 S.E. 314, 111 N.C. 317

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedSeptember 5, 1892

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 16 S.E. 314 (Berlin Iron Bridge Co. v. Board of Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Berlin Iron Bridge Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 16 S.E. 314, 111 N.C. 317 (N.C. 1892).

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Opinion

Shepherd, C. J.:

The agreement upon which this action is founded was for the purchase and construction of a bridge exceeding in cost the sum of five hundred dollars. Such an agreement on the part of the Board of Commissioners, without the concurrence of a majority of the Justices of the Peace, has been decided by this Court to be invalid, and imposes no constructual obligation upon the county. The Code, §§ 707 2014, 2035. The Justices expressly refused to concur, and it. *318 appears that they did not authorize any of the payments made bo the plaintiff. Neither did they ratify the contract by levying taxes for its performance, as was done in Cotton Mills v. Commissioners of Cleveland, 108 N. C., 678. Whatever may be the effect of retaining the consideration of an ultra vires contract in the case’of a private corporation, it is plain that under the foregoing decision it can impose no contractual liability upon a municipal corporation of' this character. There being, then, no contract, either expressed or implied, there is nothing to sustain a lien under the statute. Weir v. Page, 109 N. C., 220.

The plaintiff, however, insists that the Court should at least have given him a judgment for the possession of the bridge. As to this, it is only sufficient to say that this action is based upon the special contract, which, we have seen, cannot be enforced against the county. There is no allegation that the plaintiff has demanded possession of the bridge, or that ■defendant has refused to surrender the same.

Whether the defendant is excepted from the general principle, which forbids one to retain the fruits of a contract, and at the same time repudiate its obligation (Skinner v. Maxwell, 66 N. C., 45, and Burns v. McGreggor, 90 N. C., 222), is a question not presented in .the record, and therefore need not be •considered in this appeal. ‘ Affirmed.

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Shepherd, C. J.:

The agreement upon which this action is founded was for the purchase and construction of a bridge exceeding in cost the sum of five hundred dollars. Such an agreement on the part of the Board of Commissioners, without the concurrence of a majority of the Justices of the Peace, has been decided by this Court to be invalid, and imposes no constructual obligation upon the county. The Code, §§ 707 2014, 2035. The Justices expressly refused to concur, and it. *318 appears that they did not authorize any of the payments made bo the plaintiff. Neither did they ratify the contract by levying taxes for its performance, as was done in Cotton Mills v. Commissioners of Cleveland, 108 N. C., 678. Whatever may be the effect of retaining the consideration of an ultra vires contract in the case’of a private corporation, it is plain that under the foregoing decision it can impose no contractual liability upon a municipal corporation of' this character. There being, then, no contract, either expressed or implied, there is nothing to sustain a lien under the statute. Weir v. Page, 109 N. C., 220.

The plaintiff, however, insists that the Court should at least have given him a judgment for the possession of the bridge. As to this, it is only sufficient to say that this action is based upon the special contract, which, we have seen, cannot be enforced against the county. There is no allegation that the plaintiff has demanded possession of the bridge, or that ■defendant has refused to surrender the same.

Whether the defendant is excepted from the general principle, which forbids one to retain the fruits of a contract, and at the same time repudiate its obligation (Skinner v. Maxwell, 66 N. C., 45, and Burns v. McGreggor, 90 N. C., 222), is a question not presented in .the record, and therefore need not be •considered in this appeal. ‘ Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

16 S.E. 314, 111 N.C. 317, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/berlin-iron-bridge-co-v-board-of-commissioners-nc-1892.

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