Berkowitz v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Berkowitz v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp.

29 A.D.2d 859, 288 N.Y.S.2d 488, 1968 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4368

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 26, 1968

StatusPublished

This text of 29 A.D.2d 859 (Berkowitz v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Berkowitz v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 29 A.D.2d 859, 288 N.Y.S.2d 488, 1968 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4368 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1968).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, entered January 25, 1967, directing appellant MVAIC to accept the infant’s claim, unanimously affirmed, without costs or disbursements. In October, 1966, more than three years after the filing with the appellant of a notice of intention to make claim by virtue of a disclaimer of liability (Insurance Law, § 608, subd. [c]), the appellant purported to reiterate its rejection of the claim on the grounds of late notice. If indeed the “ original ” notice of claim was filed some two days after the 10-day limitation period, a calculation based on conjecture by the appellant as to the date of mailing by the insurer of the disclaimer letter and the date of its receipt by the parents of the injured infant, the record nevertheless is devoid of proper or convincing proof that such alleged untimely filing was rejected hy the appellant. In the absence of any rejection of the initial filing, the limitation apposite to initiation of a motion to compel acceptance of a claim is of course not applicable. Concur — Stevens, J. P., Eager, Steuer, Tilzer and Rabin, JJ.

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Order, entered January 25, 1967, directing appellant MVAIC to accept the infant’s claim, unanimously affirmed, without costs or disbursements. In October, 1966, more than three years after the filing with the appellant of a notice of intention to make claim by virtue of a disclaimer of liability (Insurance Law, § 608, subd. [c]), the appellant purported to reiterate its rejection of the claim on the grounds of late notice. If indeed the “ original ” notice of claim was filed some two days after the 10-day limitation period, a calculation based on conjecture by the appellant as to the date of mailing by the insurer of the disclaimer letter and the date of its receipt by the parents of the injured infant, the record nevertheless is devoid of proper or convincing proof that such alleged untimely filing was rejected hy the appellant. In the absence of any rejection of the initial filing, the limitation apposite to initiation of a motion to compel acceptance of a claim is of course not applicable. Concur — Stevens, J. P., Eager, Steuer, Tilzer and Rabin, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

29 A.D.2d 859, 288 N.Y.S.2d 488, 1968 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4368, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/berkowitz-v-motor-vehicle-accident-indemnification-corp-nyappdiv-1968.