CHIPMAN, Judge.
Following a jury trial in the Lake Superi- or Court appellant Lester Bergner was convicted of sodomizing1 his four-year old daughter. His appeal challenges the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of photographs depicting the act of fellatio and the applicability of the marital privilege to the testimony of his ex-wife. Appellant also argues the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We have extensively reviewed and researched these issues and affirm appellant’s conviction.
FACTS
The principal evidence in this case consisted of State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 which are photographs depicting the act of fellatio by a female child on an adult male. The photographs show the child lying between the man’s legs with her face, head, and upper body clearly visible. Only the lower body of the male — from the chest to the knee— can be seen, however. The man is partially clothed in a bathrobe.
In May, 1977 appellant’s ex-wife, X, went to appellant’s home to look for these photographs after having been told of their existence by appellant’s son, W. Although appellant was not home at the time, X apparently searched the darkroom located in the home and discovered the photographs in a box on a shelf. The photographs were later turned over to Detective Mitchell of the Highland Police Department.
At trial X identified her four-year old daughter, Y, and appellant as the persons depicted in the photographs. Her identification of appellant was based upon her recognition of appellant’s lower body, a hernia scar on his abdomen, and his bathrobe. She [1014]*1014also was able to recognize a portion of the living room of the home they shared during their marriage. She established October 1976 as the approximate date the photographs were taken; Y’s teenage brother had attempted to cut her hair shortly before and a distinctly unprofessional haircut resulted.
Detective Mitchell verified having received the photographs from X. He subsequently arrested appellant, and during booking procedures requested appellant lower his trousers far enough to reveal the hernia scar. Mitchell stated the scar he observed was “consistent with” the one depicted in the photographs.
Barry Mones was qualified as an expert photograph examiner for the F.B.I. His analysis of the photographs revealed they were “authentic and . . not composites or altered.” He also testified the photographs and their respective negatives were taken on Polaroid black and white film.
The only witness called by the defense was Carol Bergner, appellant’s current wife. She noted a number of physical discrepancies between appellant and the male in the photographs and stated, in her opinion, the photographs were not of her husband.
At the close of the testimony the State moved to have appellant examined by a doctor, presumably to secure impartial identification evidence. The trial court denied this motion but suggested an even more novel procedure: the court ordered appellant to lower his pants and display his lower abdomen and thighs to the jury. Neither prosecution nor defense objected to this procedure which the trial judge characterized as “a rather unusual thing for the court to do.” The jury convicted appellant of the crime of sodomy and this appeal followed.
ISSUES
I.Were two photographs erroneously admitted on improper foundation evidence where no witness testified the photographs were true and accurate representations of what they purported to depict?
II. Did the trial court err in permitting appellant’s ex-wife to testify in violation of the marital privilege?
III. Was the evidence sufficient to support the verdict?
I. PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
Whether the two photographs depicting the sexual act were properly admitted into evidence presents a novel question and a case of first impression for Indiana courts. Appellant argues the photographs were inadmissible because the State failed to establish the proper foundation for their admission as required by existing Indiana law. This assertion is patently correct, but the State contends the photographs were admissible under the so-called “silent witness theory” of photographic evidence and urges us to adopt this theory.
A. CURRENT INDIANA LAW
Indiana courts traditionally have stressed three requirements for the admission of photographic evidence. First, an adequate foundation must be laid. Our courts have consistently held this requires the testimony of a witness who can state the photograph is “a true and accurate representation of the things it is intended to depict.” Wilson v. State, (1978) Ind., 374 N.E.2d 45; Boone v. State, (1978) Ind., 371 N.E.2d 708; Green v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 16, 349 N.E.2d 147; Murry v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 469. See McCurdy v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 66, 324 N.E.2d 489 (photos properly excluded for failure to satisfy this requirement); Johnson v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 648, 283 N.E.2d 532 (same).
Relevancy is the second requirement for the admission of photographic evidence in Indiana. Like all evidence, a photograph must meet the usual relevancy standard, i. e., it must tend to prove or disprove a material fact. Smith v. Crouse-Hinds Company, (1978) Ind.App., 373 N.E.2d 923. In applying this standard to photographic evidence, our courts ask whether a witness would be permitted to testify as to the subject matter portrayed in the photograph. Simpson v. State, (1978) Ind., 381 N.E.2d 1229; Crane v. State, (1978) Ind., 380 [1015]*1015N.E.2d 89. If so, the photograph is deemed relevant.
Finally, some Indiana cases require the photographs aid jurors’ understanding of other evidence. See Whitfield v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 629, 366 N.E.2d 173; Patterson v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482; McPherson v. State, (1978) Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 403. Whether this is truly a requirement for the admission of photographs in Indiana is not totally clear. Some cases seem to elevate it to the level of a requirement, McPherson, supra, while others merely recite it as a part of the relevancy test, Whitfield, supra.
B. THE SILENT WITNESS THEORY
Although all three requirements for the admission of photographic evidence are important, in this case we are singularly concerned with the foundation requirement. Indiana’s approach to the admission of photographs, as guided by the current foundation requirement, falls within what has been characterized as the “pictorial testimony theory” of photographic evidence. Ill J. Wigmore, Evidence § 790 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). This theory categorizes photographs with maps, models and diagrams, and thus treats photographs purely as demonstrative evidence. As such, a photograph is not evidence in itself, but is used merely as a nonverbal method of expressing a witness’ testimony and is admissible only when a witness can testify it is a true and accurate representation of a scene personally viewed by that witness. McCormick, Evidence § 214 (1972); 2 C. Scott, Photographic Evidence § 1001 (1969).
The “silent witness theory” for the admission of photographic evidence permits the use of photographs at trial as substantive evidence, as opposed to merely demonstrative evidence. Thus, under the silent witness theory there is no need for a witness to testify a photograph accurately represents what he or she observed; the photograph “speaks for itself.” Ill J. Wigmore, Evidence § 790 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). The theory may be best explained by examining some of the contexts in which it is commonly applied.
One of the most frequent, and often unintentional, utilizations of the silent witness theory occurs when X-rays are admitted into evidence. Obviously, no witness can testify he or she saw what an X-ray depicts, thus rendering the pictorial testimony theory logically inapplicable.2 3 C. Scott, Photographic Evidence § 1262 (1969). Nevertheless, every jurisdiction admits X-ray photographs as substantive evidence upon a sufficient showing of authentication. This usually entails the establishment of the reliability and trustworthiness of the X-ray machine, the operator or technician, the procedure used in exposing and processing the X-ray plate, and record keeping techniques so as to establish the identity and condition of the patient. See, e. g., Slow Development Company v. Coulter, (1960) 88 Ariz. 122, 353 P.2d 890; Sinz v. Owens, (1949) 33 Cal.2d 749, 205 P.2d 3; Field, Uses and Limitations of X-ray Pictures as Evidence, 2 Forum 219 (1967).
A context in which the silent witness theory has been expressly employed involves cases in which Regiscope photographs are introduced into evidence. A Regiscope is simply an automatic camera which takes a simultaneous picture of a check being offered for cashing and of the person presenting it. Regiscope photographs are often admitted as substantive evidence in forgery prosecutions despite the inability of the clerk who cashed the check to remember the particular transaction or individual. Typically, the courts require a showing of authenticity which includes an identification of the defendant as the individual depicted and a showing of the proper functioning of the camera and processing of [1016]*1016the photograph. United States v. Gray, (1976 8th Cir.) 531 F.2d 933; Barker v. People, (1965) 158 Colo. 381, 407 P.2d 34; Sisk v. State, (1964) 236 Md. 589, 204 A.2d 684 (expressly adopting silent witness theory for first time); State v. Tatum, (1961) 58 Wash.2d 73, 360 P.2d 754.
The silent witness theory has also been adopted in cases involving bank robbery photographs. These are photographs taken during the course of a robbery by automatic or hidden cameras and are admitted as substantive evidence upon a sufficient showing of the reliability of the procedures used in taking and developing the photographs. E. g., United States v. Taylor, (1976 5th Cir.), 530 F.2d 639 (photographs taken after defendant locked all bank personnel in safe held admissible as substantive evidence). See Murry v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 469, in which Judge Shields stated a photograph taken during a robbery could have been properly admitted had there been testimony indicating when the film was installed, when the pictures were taken, or whether the camera was activated at any other times.
We have presented the above cases and their foundation requirements because we think it important to note how these various courts have stressed the need for authentication or verification of the photographs. We think it equally important to note the courts have recognized that the verification requirement should be understood in a relative sense. See generally Annot. 9 A.L.R.2d 899 (1950). In other words, these courts have not blindly followed the formal, traditional requirement of admitting photographs solely as demonstrative evidence. Instead, these jurisdictions have analyzed the theory behind the traditional requirements, and have recognized the probative potential of photographic evidence. As a result, these courts view photographic evidence in a modern, realistic light and admit photographs where their authenticity can be sufficiently established in view of the context in which the photographs are sought to be admitted. We think this creative analysis and refusal to follow traditional standards merely because such standards exist is laudable as the highest form of a progressive judiciary.
Our consideration of the authorities and the arguments in both the State’s and the appellant’s excellent briefs leads us to an inescapable conclusion. We hereby accept the State’s invitation and adopt the silent witness theory for the admission of photographic evidence as the law in Indiana.
In so doing, we cannot help but note the good company in which we find ourselves. The following jurisdictions, when presented with the issue we now decide, have also adopted the silent witness theory: United States v. Gray, (1976 8th Cir.) 531 F.2d 933; United States v. Taylor, (1976 5th Cir.) 530 F.2d 639; Watkins v. Reinhart, (1942) 243 Ala. 243, 9 So.2d 113; State v. Kasold, (1974) 110 Ariz. 558, 521 P.2d 990; People v. Bowley, (1963) 59 Cal.2d.855, 31 Cal.Rptr. 471, 382 P.2d 591; People v. Doggett, (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 405, 188 P.2d 792; Oja v. State, (1974) Fla.App., 292 So.2d 71; Franklin v. State, (1882) 69 Ga. 36; Cook v. Clark, (1971) Iowa, 186 N.W.2d 645; State v. Young, (1973) Me., 303 A.2d 113; Sisk v. State, (1964) 236 Md. 589, 204 A.2d 684; Hartley v. A.I. Rodd Lumber Co., (1937) 282 Mich. 652, 276 N.W.2d 712; People v. Withers, (1961) Mo., 347 S.W.2d 146; King v. State, (1922) 108 Neb. 428, 187 N.W. 934; People v. Byrnes, (1974) 33 N.Y.2d 343, 352 N.Y.S.2d 913, 308 N.E.2d 435; State v. Hunt, (1979) 297 N.C. 447, 255 S.E.2d 182; 3 State v. Brown, (1970) 4 Or.App. 219, 475 P.2d 973; State v. Goyet, (1957) 120 Vt. 12, 132 A.2d 623; Ferguson v. Commonwealth, (1972) 212 Va. 745, 187 S.E.2d 189, cert. denied 409 U.S. 861, 93 S.Ct. 150, 34 L.Ed.2d 108. But see Casson v. Nash, (1977) 54 Ill.App.3d 783, 12 Ill.Dec. 760, 370 N.E.2d 564, 573 n. 3; Foster v. Bilbruck, (1959) 20 Ill.App.2d 173, 155 N.E.2d 366, 372.
[1017]*1017We recognize our adoption of the silent witness theory permits the admission of photographs as substantive or demonstrative evidence. We stress we are not changing existing Indiana law; we are adding a second basis for the admissibility of photographic evidence. Thus, our holding in no way affects the use of photographs as demonstrative evidence; the traditional requirements for admissibility as laid down in numerous Indiana cases remain wholly effective.
Likewise, the relevancy requirement must be met when photographs are admitted as substantive evidence. The requirement that a photograph aid the jury in understanding other evidence remains effective, if at all, only when photographs are used for demonstrative purposes. By its nature, this requirement relates only to demonstrative evidence and has no logical applicability when photographs are used substantively.
The foundation requirements for the admission of photographs as substantive evidence under the silent witness theory are obviously vastly different from the foundation required for demonstrative evidence. However, we feel it would be wrong to lay down extensive, absolute foundation requirements. Every photograph, the context in which it was taken, and its use at trial will be different in some respect. We therefore hold only that a strong showing of the photograph’s competency and authenticity must be established. Whether a sufficiently strong foundation has been laid is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, reviewable only for abuse. However, we stress our use of the adjective “strong.” Photographs tend to have great probative weight and should not be admitted unless the trial court is convinced of their competency and authenticity to a relative certainty-
Despite our reluctance to formulate absolute standards for the admissibility of photographs as substantive evidence, we feel compelled to require proof the photograph has not been altered in any significant respect. This is necessary to avoid the dangers of misrepresentation or manufactured evidence which are possible through composite or retouched photographs. Additionally, we suggest a few non-mandatory guidelines for the admission of photographs under the silent witness theory. The date the photograph was taken should be established in certain cases, especially where the statute of limitations or the identity and alibi of the defendant are in question. In cases involving photographs taken by automatic cameras, such as Regiscopes or those found in banks, there should be evidence as to how and when the camera was loaded, how frequently the camera was activated, when the photographs were taken, and the processing and chain of custody of the film after its removal from the camera. See Murry v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 469.
In adopting the silent witness theory we are cognizant of two problems which arise when photographs are used as substantive evidence. The first involves the potential for distortive and misrepresentative images present in any photograph. The second concerns the inability to “cross-examine” a photograph being used as a silent witness.
Photography is not an exact science. The image a camera produces on film can be affected by a variety of things that may lead to distortion and misrepresentation. The quality of the camera and lens, type of film, available light, focal length of the lens, use of lens filters, or even the perspective from which the photograph is taken can play a part in producing a truly representative photograph. See 1 C. Scott Photographic Evidence, §§ 151 — 587 (1969). However, assuming any misleading qualities of a photograph are not so egregious as to result in an inadequate foundation, complaints concerning a photograph’s distortion go only to the weight to which a photograph is entitled, not admissibility. Ill Wigmore, Evidence § 792 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Comment, Photographic Evidence— Is There a Recognized Basis for Admissibility? 8 Hast.L.J. 310, 311 (1957). In addition, we note the testimony of an eyewitness is subject to many failings.. Essentially, a [1018]*1018witness’ testimony is based upon what he thinks he remembers he saw. Although the human eye is capable of perceiving many things and the human brain has an unmatched capacity for the retention of information, neither is infallible. A witness’ perception of an event may be distorted by his other senses, optical illusions, hallucinations, or other simple perception errors. He is also likely to have forgotten some of what he saw or may have difficulty communicating his recollection in words. See 1 C. Scott, Photographic Evidence §§ 41-54 (1969). On the other hand, a photograph sees in more detail, remembers more accurately and transmits its message more clearly than any human witness. Id. Thus, although a witness’ testimony and a photograph suffer from some of the same maladies, the photograph is far superior in many respects.
The second problem posed by our adoption of the silent witness theory concerns the inability to “cross-examine” the photograph.4 We first note that before a photograph can be admitted under the silent witness theory a proper foundation must be laid. The opposing party, therefore, is able to extensively cross-examine the witness whose testimony establishes the foundation. Once a foundation is properly established, the photograph gains a certain degree of authenticity and reliability, and we perceive no compelling need for further cross-examination. The situation is analogous to the exceptions to the hearsay rule where the declarant is unavailable. Once “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” are demonstrated an out-of-court assertion is admissible notwithstanding the inability of the opponent of the evidence to cross-examine the declarant. Fed.R.Evid. 804. In light of the ability to cross-examine those witnesses whose testimony establishes the required foundation, and the authenticity and reliability which attaches to a photograph once a sufficient foundation has been laid, we are unwilling to say the inability to “cross-examine” a photograph is a sufficient basis for the exclusion of photographs as substantive evidence.
C. APPLICATION
Having adopted the silent witness theory, we must now determine whether the photographs involved in this case were properly admitted. There were three main grounds used by the State to establish the foundation. They clearly demonstrate a sufficient degree of authenticity for the admission of the photographs.
First, there was expert testimony to show the photographs had not been altered in any way. Barry Mones, the photographic examiner for the F.B.I., stated his examination and testing of the photographs revealed they were not retouched nor composites.
Second, the approximate date the photographs were taken was shown to be October, 1976. Appellant’s ex-wife, X, testified to this based on her daughter’s haircut in the picture. The haircut was memorable because it had been given, ineptly, by X’s son. This evidence was corroborated by Barry Mones’ testimony regarding the date of manufacture of the film. He stated Exhibit 1 was manufactured in August, 1966 or 1976, and Exhibit 2 was produced in January, 1964 or 1974. He also stated Polaroid film has a relatively short life, thus leaving an inference that the later dates are more likely the actual dates of manufacture.
Finally, there was strong testimony regarding the identification of the two persons in the photographs. X unequivocally identified her daughter, Y, and portions of the living room of the home she shared with appellant during their marriage. She also identified appellant on the basis of a robe she had purchased for him, and her knowledge of the general shape of his lower body and hernia scar. X’s recognition of the scar was reinforced by the testimony of Detective Mitchell who stated appellant’s scar was “consistent with” the one in the photograph.
[1019]*1019Our decision to hold the photographs admissible is buttressed by similar decisions from other jurisdictions. In People v. Doggett, (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 405, 188 P.2d 792, a married couple was charged with sodomy on the basis of a photograph depicting the act. Although there were no eyewitnesses to the sexual activity, a landlord and police officer testified the photograph accurately portrayed the defendant’s living room, and an expert witness stated the photograph was not a composite. In affirming the conviction the court held that as long as the photograph could be “verified or authenticated,” the manner in which the requisite showing was made was unimportant. To the same effect, see People v. Bowley, (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 31 Cal.Rptr. 471, 382 P.2d 591.
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals held admissible photographs depicting sodomy and intercourse between the defendant and his eleven year old daughter. People v. Byrnes, (1974) 33 N.Y.2d 343, 352 N.Y.S.2d 913, 308 N.E.2d 435. The court based its decision on the identification testimony of the child’s mother and an expert opinion that the photographs had not been altered or doctored. “[A] fair conclusion is that the foundation testimony, even excluding that of the complainant, sufficiently authenticated the photographs by showing that they accurately depict what they purport to show, and that in themselves, the photographs were probative evidence of the crimes charged.” Id. 352 N.Y.S.2d at 917, 308 N.E.2d at 438. Accord, State v. Kasold, (1974) 110 Ariz. 558, 521 P.2d 990.
Our evaluation of these authorities, analysis of the silent witness theory, and consideration of the facts of this case lead us to but one conclusion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion and thus committed no error in admitting the photographs as substantive evidence.
II. MARITAL PRIVILEGE
Appellant’s second argument concerns the applicability of the marital privilege to the testimony of his ex-wife, X. It is his contention that X’s identification of his hernia scar and lower body was based on knowledge gained by virtue of the marital relationship, and therefore, constituted privileged information which should not have been admitted.
Ind.Code 34-1-14-5 states husbands and wives are “incompetent”5 witnesses “as to communications made to each other.” “Communications” are not limited to audible communications but include any knowledge gained by virtue of an act by one spouse which would not have been done in the presence of the other spouse but for the marital relationship. Smith v. State, (1926) 198 Ind. 156, 152 N.E. 803. The privilege is based on strong public policy grounds which “favors the promotion and preservation of marital confidences, even at the expense, in certain instances, of depriving honest causes of upright testimony.” Shepherd v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 229, 277 N.E.2d 165, 167. The policy clearly restricts the privilege to communications made in the course of a legally recognized marriage. Lane v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 485, 364 N.E.2d 756; Damrell v. State, (1976) Ind.App., 352 N.E.2d 855. However, as long as a communication is made within the course of a marriage, divorce does not subsequently remove the privilege. Shepherd v. State, supra; Perry v. Randall, (1882) 83 Ind. 143.
Based upon this law, appellant argues his ex-wife’s knowledge of his lower body and hernia scar “was gained by virtue of the very essence of the conjugal relationship between the spouses, i. e., the intimacy occasioned by acts of sexual intercourse during the marriage.”6 However, even if [1020]*1020we assume appellant is correct and hold the marital privilege applicable to X’s testimony, any error must be deemed harmless on the basis of other equally persuasive evidence. Chatman v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 531, 334 N.E.2d 673; Hunter v. State, (1977) Ind.App., 360 N.E.2d 588, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 306, 54 L.Ed.2d 193.
The first basis for our determination involves the testimony of Detective James Mitchell.7 He was the arresting officer and during booking procedures asked appellant to display his hernia scar. From this observation, Detective Mitchell testified appellant’s hernia scar was “consistent with” the scar portrayed in the photographs.
Secondly, any error in X’s testimony was rendered harmless by virtue of appellant’s display of his abdomen and thighs to the jury. This evidential exhibition, clearly viewed by all members of the jury and compared by them to the photographic exhibits, surely dispelled any doubts they might have had regarding the identification testimony. Seldom has a finder of fact had such a unique opportunity to view first hand such crucial, if not ultimate, evidence.
In light of the compelling nature of this evidentiary presentation, in addition to the testimony of Detective Mitchell, we hold any error in the admission of X’s testimony harmless.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Appellant’s final assertion of error attacks the sufficiency of the evidence. More specifically, it is argued the identification testimony was insufficient to establish appellant was the male portrayed in the photographs. We disagree and, contrary to appellant’s argument, think the evidence indicates more than appellant’s opportunity to commit the crime.
The commission of the crime of sodomy cannot seriously be disputed. In graphic detail, State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 photographically depict the prohibited sexual activity. The identity of the male in the photographs is not nearly as clear, however. Unlike all other cases our research has revealed, the facial features of the male are not visible. This deficiency has been more than overcome, however, by strong identification evidence, both circumstantial and direct.
The location of the sexual act was established to be the living room of appellant’s house. Appellant was the only adult male who lived in or was given access to the home during the time the pictures were taken. The photographs were found in appellant’s darkroom. Also, appellant was a professional photographer who possessed the equipment and expertise necessary to produce the photographs. This evidence, though circumstantial, tends to show appellant may have been the male depicted in the photographs.
This tendency is elevated to a near certainty once the personal identification evidence is considered. Both X and Detective Mitchell identified appellant’s hernia scar as the one shown in the photographs. X also testified that she recognized the lower body of the male as her former husband’s. Last, and certainly not least, the jury viewed appellant’s thighs and lower abdomen, including the hernia scar. We think this evidence was more than sufficient to sustain the verdict.
Affirmed.
MILLER, P. J., concurs.
YOUNG, J., dissents -with opinion.