Berg v. Wilpon

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Berg v. Wilpon

271 A.D.2d 629, 707 N.Y.S.2d 861, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4525

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 24, 2000

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 271 A.D.2d 629 (Berg v. Wilpon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Berg v. Wilpon, 271 A.D.2d 629, 707 N.Y.S.2d 861, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4525 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover a finder’s fee in connection with the leasing of certain real property, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Ponterio, J.), dated February 1, 2000, which, after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the defendants and against him dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff’s notice of appeal from a decision of the same court dated May 3, 1999, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment (see, CPLR 5520 [c]).

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly determined that the subject real property was a dominant feature of the transaction at issue. The plaintiff, who did not have a real estate broker’s license, was therefore barred from collecting a fee for his endeavors, which were in the nature of brokerage services (see, [630]*630Real Property Law § 440 [1], [3]; §§ 442-a, 442-d; G.C. Fortune Mgt. Co. v Stockade Mobile Home Park, 246 AD2d 739; Eaton Assocs. v Highland Broadcasting Corp., 81 AD2d 603; Sorice v DuBois, 25 AD2d 521). O’Brien, J. P., Friedmann, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur. [See, 180 Misc 2d 956.]

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—In an action to recover a finder’s fee in connection with the leasing of certain real property, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Ponterio, J.), dated February 1, 2000, which, after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the defendants and against him dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff’s notice of appeal from a decision of the same court dated May 3, 1999, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment (see, CPLR 5520 [c]).

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly determined that the subject real property was a dominant feature of the transaction at issue. The plaintiff, who did not have a real estate broker’s license, was therefore barred from collecting a fee for his endeavors, which were in the nature of brokerage services (see, [630]*630Real Property Law § 440 [1], [3]; §§ 442-a, 442-d; G.C. Fortune Mgt. Co. v Stockade Mobile Home Park, 246 AD2d 739; Eaton Assocs. v Highland Broadcasting Corp., 81 AD2d 603; Sorice v DuBois, 25 AD2d 521). O’Brien, J. P., Friedmann, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur. [See, 180 Misc 2d 956.]

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Bluebook (online)

271 A.D.2d 629, 707 N.Y.S.2d 861, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4525, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/berg-v-wilpon-nyappdiv-2000.

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