Berford v. New York Iron Mine

24 Jones & S. 236, 21 N.Y. St. Rep. 439
The Superior Court of New York City·Decided October 25, 1888·Published

Opinion

Truax, J.

The defendants above named separately demur to the complaint herein, on the grounds that the [238]*238court has not jurisdiction of the subject of the action, and, secondly, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The plaintiff' contends that by demurring on the ground that the court has not jurisdiction of the subject of the action, the defendants concede that the complaint does state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In this I am of the opinion that he errs.

Section 488 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “ a defendant may demur to the complaint where one or more of the following objections thereto appear upon the face thereof.” Logically, it cannot be said that a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the court has not jurisdiction of the subject of the action, concedes that a cause of action is set forth. Especially is this so in view of the fact that by the same demurrer the defendant demurs to the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Moreover, the defendants would have had the right, under the code, to demur now to the complaint, on the ground that the court has not jurisdiction of the subject of the action, and at the trial to demur on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The plaintiff also contends that the demurrers to the complaint should be overruled if it appears on the face of the complaint that any cause of action is stated against any of the defendants, and then he claims that a cause of action is stated against one of the defendants, Wetmore, who has not, as far as it yet appears, pleaded.

I am of the opinion that this is not the law, and the cases cited by the plaintiff as authorities for this proposition do not decide the point.

The case of Wheeler v. The Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 82 N. Y. 543, is one of the cases cited by the plaintiff. In that case the complaint contained distinct causes of action, and the demurrer was on the ground that the complaint did .not state any cause of action. [239]*239The court of appeals held that one of the -causes of action was well pleaded, and therefore overruled the demurrer. It is not enough that the complaint states a cause of action against a defendant who does not demur in order to sustain it against a defendant who does demur. The test is, does the complaint state a cause of action against the defendant who demurs ? If it does not, the demurrer must be sustained. .

It appears from the face of the complaint that the defendant, The New York Iron Mine, is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Michigan. It does not appear under the laws of what state the defendant The York Mining Company was organized.

The plaintiff alleges in his complaint certain facts which he claims entitle him to the relief as against the said defendant, The New York Iron Mine. The relief that he claims against this defendant is that it be decreed to declare and pay such dividends as may appear upon an accounting to be proper.

The case of Fisher v. The Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., reported in 52 Super. Ci. 179, is a conclusive authority in favor of this demurrer. It was there held that the courts of this state will not interfere with the internal administration of the affairs of a foreign corporation; that the law does not give any remedy here for the things complained of, and therefore that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action. This demurrer of the defendant, The New York Iron Mine, is sustained.

The more important question in the case, however, is, does the complaint state a cause of action against any of the defendants demurring ?

The complaint is quite a lengthy one, and it is difficult to distinguish the allegations of fact from the conclusions of law stated therein. The material allegations of fact stated in the complaint, as I read it, are the following :

On the 26th day of April, the 1st and the 6th days of May, 1877, respectively, at the city of Marquette, in the [240]*240state of Michigan, the defendant, Wetmore, made, indorsed, sold and delivered for value to the First National Bank of Negaunee, three certain promissory notes by each of which the defendant, The New York Iron Mine, by the said Wetmore, promised to pay sixty days after date, for value received, to said First National Bank $5,000; and that the said First National Bank thereupon paid said Wetmore the amount of the said three notes, less the legal interest thereon.

That said Wetmore induced said bank to discount said notes by representing to the said bank that he was expressly and duly authorized by the defendant, The New York Iron Mine, to make said notes; that he could and did, by his execution of said notes, bind the defendant, The New York Iron Mine, its property and assets for the payment of the same ; and that the said bank relied upon said representation when it discounted said notes and paid the proceeds thereof to the said Wetmore.

That said Wetmore was not authorized by the defendant, The New York Iron Mine, to make said notes or said representations, and that he had no power (except as hereinafter set forth), to bind the defendant, The New York Iron Mine, its property or assets, for the payment of said notes; all of which facts he then and there knew and concealed from the said First National Bank.

That said Wetmore obtained said money from the said bank for the purpose of enabling him to realize certain interests in the profits of said New York Iron Mine, and he applied the said proceeds to his own use, and in the hooks of account of the said defendant, The New York Iron Mine, which were then in the possession and control of said Wetmore, as an officer and director thereof, he charged said notes as obligations against himself.

That the said bank assigned said notes to one John Mitchell; that Mitchell died, and administrators were duly appointed on his estate. That said administrators sold, assigned, conveyed and delivered the notes and all [241]*241the liens and privileges appertaining thereto, to this plaintiff; and that said notes were duly presented for payment and payment was refused, and said notes were duly protested and remain wholly unpaid.

That The New York Iron Mir'' was a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Michigan. That its capital stock was 20,000 shares, of which the said Wetmore then owned 5,333 shares, and the said Samuel J. Tilden owned the rest of said shares. That 4,000 shares were at the time of the discounting of the notes by the said bank then in the possession of Tilden as collateral for certain debts of Wetmore’s under a written instrument dated May 31, 1876, and that it is claimed by Tilden and his executors that said shares became collateral to certain other debts under an instrument dated May 31, 1877. That Wetmore was adjudged a bankrupt and is wholly insolvent and a judgment and execution at law would be wholly ineffectual against him.

The complaint further alleges, that Tilden and The New York Iron Mine have omitted to state the accounts of the corporation since May 31,1877, and to make any dividends of its property or profits; and that The New York Iron Mine has ceased to do business.

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Berford v. New York Iron Mine, 24 Jones & S. 236, 21 N.Y. St. Rep. 439 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1888).

24 Jones & S. 236 (Berford v. New York Iron Mine) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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