Beretta v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

141 F.2d 452, 32 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 418, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3696
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedMarch 3, 1944
Docket10621
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 141 F.2d 452 (Beretta v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beretta v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 141 F.2d 452, 32 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 418, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3696 (5th Cir. 1944).

Opinion

WALLER, Circuit Judge.

The taxpayer was a stockholder in the Laredo Bridge Company, a Texas corporation, which owned and operated a toll bridge across the Rio Grande River between the cities of Laredo, Texas, and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. As of March 31, 1922, the capital stock of the company was $250,000, with a surplus in excess of $259,-000. In April, 1922, the capital stock of the company was increased to $500,000 by the declaration of a 100% stock dividend to the stockholders of record. The par value of the shares was $100. The stock dividend was treated as a non-taxable transaction, by which the capital stock was increased to $500,000 and the surplus reduced to approximately $10,000.

The bridge was constructed under a concession from the Mexican Government and under a permit or franchise from the City of Laredo, Texas. The concession from Mexico contained a provision that at the end of fifty years the Mexican portion of the bridge should become the property of the government of Mexico upon the payment to the company of two-thirds of its then appraised value. This franchise expired June 26, 1937, and Mexico took over that end of the bridge in accordance with the terms of the franchise, and on July 24, 1937, paid the Bridge Company $75,962.28. On June 15, 1937, the directors of the corporation, after having voted to declare two two-percent cash dividends out of surplus earnings, also passed the following resolution :

“Resolved, that the Treasurer be, and hereby is, authorized to distribute to Stockholders of record as of June 7, 1937, substantially all of the net proceeds of the sale of the Mexican end of the bridge on receipt of payment from the Mexican Government.”

But on September 14, 1937, the directors met again, at which time the Treasurer reported that the sale of the Mexican end of the bridge had resulted in a net loss to the capital of $68,630.53, which, together with the cash dividend previously voted but not yet paid, would result in the impairment of the capital stock of the company in the sum of $62,388.48. Nevertheless, the directors voted to distribute to the stockholders the sum of $135,000, representing the sum received from the sale to the Mexican Government, and a portion of the sum reserved for depreciation attributable to the end of the bridge which it no longer owned. At a special meeting of the stockholders, called for the purpose of authorizing the stock to be reduced from $500,000 to $250,000, the following resolution was passed:

“Be It Resolved, that the action of the Board of Directors of Laredo Bridge Company on September 14, 1936, authorizing the Treasurer to make a capital distribution of Twenty-seven per cent on September 30, 1937, to the Stockholders of record on September 27, 1937, be and hereby is, approved and ratified.

“Be It Resolved, by the Stockholders of Laredo Bridge Company that the capital stock of this corporation be, and the same hereby is, decreased from Five Thousand Dollars [sic] ($500,000.00) to Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00) ; *454 and the Board of Directors of this corporation is hereby authorized and directed to execute and file with the Secretary of the State of Texas an amendment to the charter of this corporation, and to take such other action as is necessary to make such decrease in the capital stock effective.”

An appropriate amendment to the charter was approved by the Secretary of State of Texas on October 23, 1937, for the reduction of capital stock.

Taxpayer and wife, reporting income on the community basis, received $27,706 of the $135,000 so distributed, but did not report it as taxable income. Taxpayers also received, and duly reported as income, their proportionate part of the cash dividends declared by the company.

The taxpayer contends that the $135,000 distribution by the company was a capital distribution made in partial liquidation of the corporation under Sections 115 (c) and (1) of the Revenue Act of 1936, 26 U.S. C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, pages 868, 871. 1

The Commissioner contended that the distribution was not in partial liquidation because: (1) the corporation did not cancel nor redeem any part of its stock but merely reduced the par value of its shares; (2) the dividend was out of profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, and since the original increase in capital stock by the 100% stock dividend was out of earnings and profits the distribution here would be deemed to be out of earnings and profits, to be treated as income for tax purposes. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner and we are asked to review the decision.

The first question to be determined is whether or not the dividend of $135,000 by the corporation to its stockholders was a distribution in partial liquidation. Section 115 (i) defines partial liquidation as “a distribution by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of a part of its stock.” In the present case the par value of the shares of stock was reduced from $100 to $50 and a notation to that effect was stamped upon each certificate of stock, but no share of stock was canceled completely. We must, therefore, determine whether or not the $135,000 distribution and the attendant reduction of each share of stock from $100 to $50 resulted in the complete cancellation or redemption of a part of the stock and was a partial liquidation under said Section.

“Liquidation is generally deemed to be the operation of winding up the affairs of a corporation by realizing upon its assets, paying its liabilities, and appropriating the amount of its surplus or loss.” Horn & Hardart Baking Co. v. United States, D.C., 34 F.Supp. 89, 90; 25 Words & Phrases, Perm. Ed., pp. 370, 371.

There must be a manifest intention to liquidate and a continuing purpose to terminate and dissolve the corporation. Its activities must be directed to that end. The question of whether a corporation is in liquidation is not necessarily resolved by corporate resolutions, but the solution lies in the intent, to be determined by the acts and doings of the corporation. The process of liquidation is not a status that can be assumed or discarded at will, but is a condition brought about by affirmative action, the normal and necessary result of which is winding up the corporation. The adoption or failure to adopt a resolution of liquidation is not controlling. Kennemer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 96 F.2d 177.

This leads to the inquiry, whether or not the distribution or dividend was made with the intent that the' corporation would re *455 main as a going concern or was it made with the affirmative intent to ultimately liquidate the company. Holmby Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 9 Cir., 83 F.2d 548; Canal-Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 63 F.2d 619.

The same intent and purpose must be present in a partial liquidation. 2 Ordinarily, a partial liquidation is merely a step toward complete liquidation, anteceded by an intent to wind up the corporate affairs, but under Sec. 115 (i) (Rev.

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Bluebook (online)
141 F.2d 452, 32 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 418, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3696, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beretta-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca5-1944.