Berea v. Blackshear

2025 Ohio 4757

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 16, 2025
• Docket: 114819
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Berea v. Blackshear, 2025-Ohio-4757.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF BEREA, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114819 v. :

REGINALD N. BLACKSHEAR, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 16, 2025

Criminal Appeal from the Berea Municipal Court Case No. 24CRB01037-1

Appearances:

Barbara L. Jones, City of Berea Law Director and Megan M. Matthews, City of Berea Assistant Law Director, for appellee.

Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Jennifer J. Pritchard, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J.:

Reginald N. Blackshear (“Blackshear”) appeals his conviction for

domestic violence. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Facts and Procedural History

On August 26, 2024, a complaint was filed in the Berea Municipal

Court alleging that Blackshear, who was living with I.G. at the time, kicked I.G. in

the face in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The court held a hearing that same day

during which Blackshear entered a not guilty plea and the court issued a domestic-

violence temporary protection order against Blackshear pursuant to R.C. 2919.26.

On November 21, 2024, the court conducted a bench trial and, on November 26,

2024, the court issued a journal entry finding Blackshear guilty of domestic violence.

On December 5, 2024, a magistrate sentenced Blackshear to pay a

$1,000 fine which was suspended; a 180-day jail sentence, with 179 days suspended

and credit for one day served; “Basic 2 Yr Probation,” which we take to mean two

years of community-control sanctions pursuant to R.C. 2929.25 and no contact with

I.G. On December 9, 2024, the court issued a journal entry adopting the

magistrate’s decision and imposing the aforementioned sentence.

II. Trial Testimony and Evidence

The following evidence was presented at trial.

I.G. testified that she was living with Blackshear in Berea on

August 26, 2024. According to I.G., she and Blackshear “had an on and off

relationship . . . since 2011.” I.G. testified that, in the late-night hours of August 25,

2024 and the early morning hours of August 26, 2024, she and Blackshear had a

disagreement about an air mattress. I.G. poked a hole in the air mattress with a

knife she had retrieved from the kitchen and then she lay down on blankets on the floor. According to I.G., when she was lying on the ground, Blackshear kicked her

in the nose “with his yellow and black LeBron James shoes.”

Asked how Blackshear caused her physical harm, I.G. testified as

follows: “I mean, he kicked me across my face this way. I was sort of insulated by

the blankets and everything. He made an attempt to kick at my body more after he

kicked me in the face, but I was on my way down the steps as quickly as I possibly

could.”

Under cross-examination about her physical injuries, I.G. testified

that her face was “sore.” When asked to identify the injury to her face from a still

photograph, as well as the video taken from a police officer’s body camera

immediately after the incident, I.G. testified as follows: “I’m not sure if I would be

able to see an injury or not, sir, because I was terrified for my life, so I ran down the

steps as quickly as I could to initiate a call to the police.” Blackshear’s attorney

cautioned I.G. that she was not answering the questions he was asking and he asked

her again if there was “an actual physical injury” to her face. I.G. answered, “Yes.

There was a physical injury to my face. I was kicked in my face right here.”

Ultimately, I.G. testified that her nose looked “a little swollen” in the photograph.

Berea Police Department Patrolman Xavier Payton (“Ptl. Payton”)

testified that he responded to a call concerning a domestic dispute “around 12:30,

12:40 in the morning” on August 26, 2024. When he arrived at the apartment

building, I.G. was sitting outside. I.G. told Ptl. Payton that she and her boyfriend,

Blackshear, lived at the address. According to Ptl. Payton, I.G. told him the following about what occurred: “She said that she and [Blackshear] had gotten into an

argument. She had been laying on an air mattress. At some point, she was dragged

off of the air mattress. And she did state to me that at some point, she popped it.

After popping the air mattress, he pulled her and kicked her in the face.”

Asked if he “examined [I.G.] physically for injuries,” Ptl. Payton

answered, “Yes . . . . I saw some redness around her nose.” Ptl. Payton further

testified that it was “not atypical” that I.G. did not “have marks or bruises where she

was injured.”

According to Ptl. Payton, he spoke with Blackshear at the scene, and

Blackshear stated that he and I.G. “were having an argument over other women that

he was seeing — or another woman he was seeing, and that made [I.G.] upset. And

I believe he stated that she’s called the police on him in the past to get him in trouble

to prevent him from leaving her.” Ptl. Payton also testified that, during Blackshear’s

transport to the police station, Blackshear alleged that I.G. “came after him with a

knife.”

The prosecutor asked Ptl. Payton the following question: “Based

upon your training and knowledge, along with the evidence that was before you on

August 26th, 2024, do you believe that Mr. Blackshear knowingly caused or

attempted to cause physical harm to his live-in girlfriend, [I.G.], by kicking her in

the face?” Ptl. Payton replied, “Yes.”

On cross-examination, Blackshear’s attorney played the video from

Ptl. Payton’s body camera as he arrived at the scene. Ptl. Payton agreed that there is a “pretty clear image” of I.G. on the video as she is speaking to him. Ptl. Payton

also agreed that there is no “redness” visible on or around I.G.’s nose in the body-

camera video.

III. Law and Argument

Blackshear raises two assignments of error on appeal.

I. The trial court erred by entering a judgment of conviction that was against the manifest weight of the evidence, in derogation of Reginald Blackshear’s right to due process of law, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.

II. Reginald Blackshear was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel as provided by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.

A. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

A manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge attacks the credibility of

the evidence presented and questions whether the State met its burden of

persuasion. State v. Whitsett, 2014-Ohio-4933, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). Weight of the

evidence “addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief,” i.e., “whose evidence is

more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s?” State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-

2202, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387 (1997). When

considering an appellant’s claim that a conviction is against the manifest weight of

the evidence, the appellate court functions as a “thirteenth juror” and may disagree

“with the factfinder’s resolution of . . . conflicting testimony.” Thompkins at 387,

citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). Furthermore, in State v. Jordan,

2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[s]itting as the ‘thirteenth juror,’ the court of appeals considers whether the evidence should be believed and

may overturn a verdict if it disagrees with the trier of fact’s conclusion.”

In a manifest-weight challenge, the appellate court examines the

entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn

therefrom, considers the witnesses’ credibility and determines whether, in resolving

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact ‘“clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial

ordered.”’ Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st

Dist. 1983). Reversal on manifest-weight grounds is reserved only for the

‘“exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”’ Id.

R.C. 2919.25(A) states that “[n]o person shall knowingly cause or

attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member.” R.C.

2919.25(F)(1) and (2) define “household member” to include someone who is

“cohabitating with the offender.” Additionally, R.C. 2901.01(A)(3) defines “physical

harm” as “any injury . . . regardless of its gravity or duration.” This court has held

that, because the word “attempt” is in the domestic violence statute, “an offender

does not have to cause a tangible injury to his victim in order to be convicted of

domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A).” State v. Stover, 2017-Ohio-291,

¶ 15 (8th Dist.).

In Blackshear’s first assignment of error, he argues that his conviction

for domestic violence is against the manifest weight of the evidence because I.G.’s

“testimony is questionable and was contradicted by the photographic evidence presented.” Specifically, Blackshear argues that the “implications of being kicked in

the face with a shoed foot while lying on the ground and the only visible evidence

captured being possibly minor swelling or redness seems incredible.”

Upon our review of the trial transcript we find that I.G. testified that

Blackshear kicked her in the face with his shoes on and attempted to kick her in the

body before she ran down the stairs and called the police. Blackshear’s argument

concerning the lack of “visible evidence” of any injury is not well-taken. To be

convicted of domestic violence under R.C. 2919.25(A), visible evidence of an injury

is not required. In other words, attempting to cause physical injury is sufficient to

violate the domestic-violence statute. See, e.g., Parma v. Singh, 2018-Ohio-5235,

¶ 18 (8th Dist.) (“[T]o be convicted of domestic violence, actual physical harm is not

required; the statute criminalizes . . . knowingly attempting to cause someone

physical harm.”).

We do not find this to be the exceptional case that weighs heavily

against the conviction. Accordingly, Blackshear’s first assignment of error is

overruled.

B. Effective Assistance of Counsel

In his second assignment of error, Blackshear argues that he was

denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because of trial counsel’s failure to

object to inadmissible testimony. Specifically, Blackshear argues that “the

prejudicial effect of permitting the introduction of improper character evidence

including years of abuse, the legal conclusion that [Blackshear ] committed the offense of domestic violence, and the arresting officer’s determination that

[Blackshear] was not truthful in the statement he provided law enforcement

demonstrates that there is a reasonable probability that the deficient performance

deprived [Blackshear] of a fair trial rendering the result unreliable.”

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must establish that his or her attorney’s performance was deficient and that the

defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). However, “a court need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant

as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to

grade counsel’s performance.” Id. at 697. See also State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d

136 (1989).

It is well established that “in a bench trial, the court is presumed to

have considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence.” State v.

Willis, 2008-Ohio-6156, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). See also State v. White, 15 Ohio St.2d 146,

151 (1968) (“We indulge in the usual presumption that in a bench trial in a criminal

case the court considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in

arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.”).

Furthermore, “failure to object to error, alone, is not sufficient to

sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Watson, 2020-Ohio-

3462, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.). The Ohio Supreme Court “has recognized that . . . failing to object to certain evidence [] is not deficient performance, especially in a bench trial.”

Id., citing State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 668 (1998).

In this case, we need not analyze the allegedly improperly admitted

evidence. This court has held that “because the matter was tried to the court and

not a jury, we may presume that this improper evidence did not infect the judge’s

decision-making.” Willis at ¶ 16. See also Watson at ¶ 46 (“Any prejudicial effects

of [the] testimony were . . . eliminated by the trial court hearing the facts rather than

a jury.”).

Our review of Blackshear’s arguments on appeal shows that he failed

to argue how his counsel’s allegedly deficient performance prejudiced him.

Blackshear did nothing more than summarily conclude that his counsel’s deficient

performance was prejudicial: “[T]he failure of trial counsel to object to each of these

lines of questioning was deficient and such deficient performance prejudiced him so

as to deprive him of a fair trial.” Blackshear’s conclusory statement fails to take into

account the long-established presumption that a judge in a bench trial considers

only properly admitted evidence. Blackshear fails to argue, let alone demonstrate,

anything to the contrary.

Accordingly, Blackshear’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Berea

Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s convictions

having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________________________ EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR