Benzo Elias Rudnikas v. Mercedes Gisela Gonzalez

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: March 27, 2024
• Docket: 2023-0975
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed March 27, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-975 Lower Tribunal No. 22-238 ________________

Benzo Elias Rudnikas, Appellant,

vs.

Mercedes Gisela Gonzalez, Appellee.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Bertila Soto, Judge.

Benzo E. Rudnikas, in proper person.

Luis E. Barreto & Associates, P.A., Luis E. Barreto, The Billbrough Firm, and G. Bart Billbrough, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and EMAS, and MILLER, JJ.

MILLER, J. The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether the disinherited

adult son of a decedent has standing to obtain a determination of homestead

on the basis he is a potential heir of the devisee of the property. Concluding

he does not, we affirm.1

BACKGROUND

Appellant, Benzo Elias Rudnikas, is the adult son of Elias B. Rudnikas.

The elder Rudnikas died testate several years ago, and he was not survived

by a spouse or minor children. Pursuant to the terms of his last will and

testament, Marta Mercedes Rudnikas was to receive all real and personal

property and appellee, Mercedes Gisela Gonzalez, was to serve as the

personal representative of the estate. Marta is Elias’s mother and Benzo’s

grandmother. Elias further provided that, in the event Marta did not survive

him, his daughter, Maria Mercedes Rudnikas, was to receive the full estate,

save a single dollar that would be bequeathed to Benzo.

The will was admitted to probate, and Benzo executed a series of

standard consents and waivers. Marta was soon declared incapacitated,

and the trial judge appointed a plenary guardian. Ostensibly dissatisfied with

the turn of events, Benzo sought a determination that the benefits of

homestead protection vested in Marta, as a qualified beneficiary, upon

1 We summarily affirm the remaining issues on appeal.

2 Elias’s death. The trial court declined to reach the merits, finding that Benzo

lacked standing. The instant appeal ensued.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We apply a de novo standard when reviewing whether a party has

standing to maintain an action. See Westport Recovery Corp. v. Midas, 954

So. 2d 750, 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

ANALYSIS

Two distinct sources of law guide our resolution of this appeal. The

first is the homestead protection afforded by the Florida Constitution. See

Art. X, § 4, Fla. Const. The second is established principles of Florida

probate law, as derived from the Florida Probate Code, the Florida Probate

Rules, and a well-developed body of authoritative case law. We examine

each source, in turn.

The Florida Constitution protects homestead property in three marked

yet convergent ways. See Art. X, § 4, Fla. Const. As the Florida Supreme

Court explained in the seminal case of Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla.

1997): “[f]irst, a clause . . . provides homesteads with an exemption from

taxes. Second, the homestead provision protects the homestead from

forced sale by creditors. Third, the homestead provision delineates the

restrictions a homestead owner faces when attempting to alienate or devise

3 the homestead property.” Id. at 1001–02 (footnotes omitted). This dispute

implicates the third protection.

“[O]ur courts have emphasized that, in Florida, the homestead

provision is in place to protect and preserve the interest of the family in the

family home.” Id. at 1002. Homestead protections promote this interest “by

securing to the householder a home, so that the homeowner and his or her

heirs may live beyond the reach of financial misfortune.” Pub. Health Tr. of

Dade Cnty. v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 948 (Fla. 1988).

A devise of homestead property is constitutionally restricted when “the

owner is survived by spouse or minor child.” Art. X, § 4(c); see also City Nat’l

Bank of Fla. v. Tescher, 578 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1991) (“Historically, the

purpose of the homestead provision was to protect the family. The

constitutional provision prohibiting devise of the homestead property if the

owner is survived by a spouse or minor child reflects this same concern for

protection of the family.”) (citation omitted). If an owner contravenes this

prohibition, the property descends by way of intestate succession, as

provided in section 732.401(1), Florida Statutes (2021). See In re Finch’s

Est., 401 So. 2d 1308, 1309 (Fla. 1981). Absent a surviving spouse or minor

child, however, the homestead may pass by devise, rather than operation of

law. See Cutler v. Cutler, 994 So. 2d 341, 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

4 The Florida Probate Rules authorize an “interested person” to file a

petition for homestead determination in probate proceedings. The rules

themselves do not contain an express definition of the term “interested

person,” but, absent conflict, we look to the definitions promulgated by the

Florida Probate Code. See Fla. Prob. R. 5.015(a). The Code, in turn, defines

the term as follows:

“Interested person” means any person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the outcome of the particular proceeding involved. In any proceeding affecting the estate or the rights of a beneficiary in the estate, the personal representative of the estate shall be deemed to be an interested person. In any proceeding affecting the expenses of the administration and obligations of a decedent's estate, or any claims described in [section] 733.702(1), the trustee of a trust described in [section] 733.707(3) is an interested person in the administration of the grantor's estate. The term does not include a beneficiary who has received complete distribution. The meaning, as it relates to particular persons, may vary from time to time and must be determined according to the particular purpose of, and matter involved in, any proceedings.

§ 731.201(23), Fla. Stat.

In accord with this definition, ascertaining whether an individual is an

interested person “requires the trial court to evaluate the nature of both the

proceeding[s] and the interest asserted.” Hayes v. Guardianship of

Thompson, 952 So. 2d 498, 507 (Fla. 2006). While this analysis may at time

be fluid, this court has previously held that “[s]imply being next of kin does

not confer [a person with] ‘interested person’ status.” Hernandez v.

5 Hernandez, 230 So. 3d 119, 123 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). In this vein, the Fifth

District Court of Appeal has held that a disinherited child is not an interested

person for the purposes of probate proceedings. See Newman v. Newman,

766 So. 2d 1091, 1093–94 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). And the Fourth District

Court of Appeal has determined that a party without the right to make

financial decisions is not an interested person. See Rudolph v. Rosecan,

154 So. 3d 381, 385 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

Against this line of authority, we examine the instant case. Here,

Benzo sought to insert himself into the probate proceedings, not the

guardianship proceedings. He was not a beneficiary under the will, and

because his father was not survived by a spouse or minor child, the

homestead was an asset of the estate and legally passed by devise. See

Monks v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 740, 743 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Although Benzo

may stand to inherit a portion of his grandmother’s estate, any such right has

not yet vested and would necessarily be the subject of a separate and distinct

probate proceeding.

6 Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly found the asserted

interest was too attenuated to establish standing. We therefore affirm in all

respects.2

Affirmed.

2 Our opinion should not be construed as imposing a limitation on any future participation in the guardianship proceedings.