Benton Rapid Express, Inc. v. United States

171 F. Supp. 868, 145 Ct. Cl. 360, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 90
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 8, 1959
DocketNo. 217-54
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 171 F. Supp. 868 (Benton Rapid Express, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Benton Rapid Express, Inc. v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 868, 145 Ct. Cl. 360, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 90 (cc 1959).

Opinion

Jones, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court r

This is a suit for additional charges for the transportation by motor truck of a number of shipments of internal combustion engines between Air Force bases in Georgia. The-shipments were between the Robins Air Force Base at Warner Robins, Georgia, and the Chatham and Hunter Field Air Force bases, both of the latter being located at Savannah,. Georgia.

Each bill of lading contained the following notation:

Released at full valuation. Lowest rating per Item-61244, National Motor Freight Classification No. 10 applicable.

[362]*362The reverse side of each bill of lading contained the following condition under the caption “General Conditions and Instructions

It is mutually agreed and understood between the United States and carriers who are parties to this bill of lading that
# * * # *
5. This shipment is made at the restricted or limited valuation specified in the tariff or classification at or under which the lowest rate is available, unless otherwise indicated on the face hereof.

Findings 5 and 6 set out the provisions of National Motor Freight Classification No. 10 which were in effect on motor shipments in Georgia during the period of these shipments. The rules issued by the Georgia Public Service Commission in respect to motor freight rates were in effect during that period. Pertinent parts of these rules are set out in finding 12.

It is plaintiff’s contention that it is entitled to the rate prescribed by the Georgia Public Service Commission; that that valuation governed the rate and that since the articles were released at full valuation it is entitled to the rate thus prescribed unless there was a definite agreement for a lower rate, which it denies.

The defendant takes the position (1) that the second sentence quoted above indicated a lower item rate1 than would have been applicable otherwise, and (2) that the railway rates were less than motor rates at that time and that pursuant to an order by the Chief of Transportation there was a definite understanding between the parties that the lower rates would apply; that otherwise the shipments would have gone by rail.

Thus there are two issues, first, the interpretation of the language on the bills of lading and, second, the factual issue as to whether there was an understanding or agreement for the lower rate to conform to the rail competition. The two issues are interwoven.

The notation found on the face of each bill of lading was placed there pursuant to an order dated March 4,1949, issued [363]*363■■by tbs Chief of the Transportation Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff and sent to all the major Air Commands in the Zone of Interior. The order reads as follows:

Reference shipments of airplane engines via commercial motor freight. Released valuation items not suspended by Interstate Commerce Commission. Motor freight transportation of internal combustion engines now considered premium transportation and will not originally be used unless carrier agrees to and transportation officers insert following notation on bills of lading: “Released at full valuation. Lowest rating per Item 61244, Supplement 21, National Motor Freight Classification No. 9, applicable.” When internal combustion engines must move by motor freight and carrier will not agree to above notation, the following notation will be placed on bills of lading: “Lowest rate to apply per condition No. 5 this bill of lading.”

The above order was issued as a result of conferences with "many of the motor carriers. These carriers desired to regain the business of transporting the airplane engines which had been diverted to the railroads as a result of the amendment to the National Motor Freight Classification which set up the charges on the basis of the released valuation. The rail tariffs were not based on released valuation.

All the shipping points involved in this case were served "by railroads. The railroad rate for transportation was less than the amendment provided in the Motor Freight Classification.

In their effort to get the business of transporting the engines, many of the motor carriers had given the Government specific section 22-type quotations, or had reduced rate tenders covering the transportation of these engines. The wording to be placed on the bills of lading was devised in a conference with many of the motor carriers to cover those carriers who had not given specific quotations on the engines. There was no evidence as to whether plaintiff was present at any of these conferences.

There is not the slightest doubt that if these shipments had been made with the simple notation on the bills of lading “released at full valuation” and there had been no qualification of this statement on the bills of lading and no agreement orally or in writing that a lower rate should apply, the [364]*364plaintiff would be entitled to recover the sum for which it sues. On the other hand, if the notation on the bills of lading is construed as a limitation on the rates to be charged or if an agreement by the representatives of the respective-litigants that a lower rate should apply is found to have been made, then the position taken by the defendant should be-sustained.

To reach a proper conclusion we must interpret the meaning of the notation on the bills of lading and if the meaning' of the notation is not clear we must determine whether or not there was an agreement between the respective litigants; to have the lower rates made applicable to the shipments in question. If the notation on the bills of lading made-, the application of the lower rate perfectly clear it would, not be necessary to go into the question of whether an oral' or written agreement for a lower rate was made. However,, there has been an extended dispute between the parties as. to the exact meaning of the notation on the bills of lading.True, it could have been stated with greater clarity. But. if it had been made crystal clear there would have been no-lawsuit. As a consequence we have gone into the entire-record to determine whether the notation taken in connection with the evidence as to an agreement served to clarify the-entire situation.

At the threshold we are met with the undisputed fact that the railroad rates were less than motor rates if those motor-rates were based on full valuation. It would seem strange-that the defendant, in spite of the order that had been issued and in spite of the agreements by other motor carriers to-apply lower rates to other shipments, would nevertheless, agree to pay plaintiff a higher rate for the transportation between the points involved when substantially lower rates; were available through the railroads which served the same points.

In looking at the notations on the bills of lading it will be. observed that immediately following the statement of release-at full valuation is a sentence to the effect that the lowest rating per item in Motor Freight Classification No. 10 is applicable. Then in section 5 of the notation on the reverse side of the bills of lading is found the statement to the effect [365]*365that the shipment was made at or under a classification which made the lowest rate available unless otherwise indicated on the face of the bills of lading.

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Related

United States v. Georgia Public Service Commission
197 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Georgia, 1961)
United States v. Carter
121 So. 2d 433 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1960)

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171 F. Supp. 868, 145 Ct. Cl. 360, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 90, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/benton-rapid-express-inc-v-united-states-cc-1959.