Benton Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission

151 N.E. 520, 321 Ill. 208
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedApril 23, 1926
DocketNo. 16449. Reversed and remanded.
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 151 N.E. 520 (Benton Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Benton Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 151 N.E. 520, 321 Ill. 208 (Ill. 1926).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Duncan

delivered the opinion of the court:

J. P. Cheatwood, defendant in error, on May 9, 1923, filed an application with the Industrial Commission for compensation against the Benton Coal Mining Company, plaintiff in error, for an injury received by him December 20, 1922, while engaged in loading coal for said company. He received an electric shock, causing an injury to his back and arms. The arbitrator awarded him compensation at the rate of $17 per week for twelve weeks for temporary total incapacity and refused to award anything for permanent disability. The decision of the arbitrator was reviewed by the Industrial Commission, and an award was entered in favor of defendant in error for $17 per week for 250 weeks and thereafter a pension for life of $28.33% per month. The decision of the commission was confirmed by the circuit court of Franklin county, and this court allowed a writ of error for a review of the record.

It was stipulated before the arbitrator that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment of defendant in error; that notice of the injury and demand for compensation were made in apt time; that the annual earnings of petitioner for the year preceding the injury were $1456 and that the average weekly wage was $28, and that plaintiff in error and defendant in error were on the date of the accident operating under and subject to the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation act. The only question in dispute was the extent of the injury to defendant in error and the number and ages of his children.

The decision of the arbitrator was received by the defendant in error June 28, 1923. The proof in the record shows that on June 30, 1923, his attorneys mailed to the Industrial Commission at the City Hall Square building, Chicago, Illinois, a petition for review of the decision of the arbitrator, which was enclosed in a properly stamped envelope, with a letter to the commission advising it of the enclosure of the petition. On July 5, 1923, the said attorneys wrote and addressed a letter to the commission in which they referred to the fact that they had previously mailed the petition for review in said cause, and therein asked the commission to have their reporter to prepare the transcript of evidence and that they would remit for the same upon a receipt of a statement. This letter addressed to the commission appears in the record and bears the stamp or file-mark of the Industrial Commission reciting that it was received July 6, 1923. On July 12, 1923, the attorney for defendant in error received a letter from the commission acknowledging receipt of letter of July 5 and stating that the original petition could not be located. On August 16, 1923, the commission entered an order finding that such petition for review had been mailed by defendant in error within the required time to the commission and that through no fault of him or his attorney petition had been lost or mislaid, and that the application of the defendant in error to file with the commission the said original petition, or a copy thereof, as of date July 2, 1923, be allowed. Notice of the hearing on review was given to plaintiff in error, and it appeared by attorneys, limiting its appearance before the commission for that purpose only, and filed its motion to dismiss the petition for review, alleging as grounds therefor that it had not been filed with the commission within fifteen days after the receipt of the decision of the arbitrator; that the commission had no jurisdiction or authority to allow the defendant in error, by its nunc pro tunc order, to file the said original petition of the defendant in error or copy thereof, and that the decision of the arbitrator became legally the decision of the Industrial Commission. This motion of the plaintiff in error was denied and it thereafter took no part in the hearing before the commission. Defendant in error introduced additional evidence, on which the commission entered its award aforesaid.

Paragraph (&) of section 19 of the Workmen’s Compensation act provides that unless a petition for review is filed by either party within fifteen days after the receipt by said party of the copy of the decision of the arbitrator, and unless the party petitioning shall, within twenty days after the receipt by him of the copy of the decision, file with the commission an agreed statement of the facts appearing upon the hearing before the arbitrator or a correct stenographic report, the decision of the arbitrator shall become the decision of the Industrial Commission. The right to review under said section is entirely statutory, and this court has held that the method provided by the statute is sui generis, and that in order for a party to obtain a review of the decision of the arbitrator by the commission the statute must be strictly followed. (People v. Andrus, 299 Ill. 50.) The commission had no authority or jurisdiction to enter the nunc pro tunc order of August 16, and for the reason that the commission had never received the original petition, or a copy thereof, within the fifteen days required by the statute. The office of a nunc pro tunc order is for the purpose of making the record show it. as it should exist if the proper authorities making the record had done their duty in correctly making the record. In other words, its office is to cause the record to speak the truth. The nunc pro tunc order in this case does not speak the truth. It proceeds on the theory that the record should show that defendant in error had filed the said original petition in apt time or was entitled to have it filed in apt time, neither of which is true. If the petition had been lodged with the commission in apt time but was not properly stamped or shown to be filed in such time then the nunc pro tunc order would have been properly entered. The order of the arbitrator legally became the order of the commission if the defendant in error did not, in fact, petition the commission ■ for a review and lodge his petition with the commission within fifteen days, as required by the statute, because the objections and motion of the plaintiff in error were not waived by plaintiff in error but were strictly adhered to by it. Pocahontas Mining Co. v. Industrial Com. 301 Ill. 462; Gould Construction Co. v. Industrial Com. 311 id. 472.

The attorneys for defendant in error contend that their letter to the commission of July 5, 1923, is a sufficiently prepared petition, under the statute, to give the Industrial Commission jurisdiction to review the decision of the arbitrator. The two things that are jurisdictional for such a review by the commission are the filing of “a petition for review” by the party desiring such review within fifteen days after the receipt by such party of the copy of the arbitrator’s decision and notification of time when filed, and the filing by him with the commission either an agreed statement of the facts appearing upon the hearing before the arbitrator or committee of arbitration, or a correct stenographic report of the proceedings at such hearing, within twenty days after the receipt by him of the copy of said decision. The statute also provides that the Industrial Commission may, for sufficient cause shown, grant further time, not exceeding thirty days, in which to petition for such review or to file such agreed statements or stenographic report. Such extensions of time should be made before the original time allowed in each case has expired.

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Bluebook (online)
151 N.E. 520, 321 Ill. 208, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/benton-coal-mining-co-v-industrial-commission-ill-1926.