Benson v. Stenger

337 P.2d 338, 216 Or. 318, 1959 Ore. LEXIS 286
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedApril 4, 1959
StatusPublished

This text of 337 P.2d 338 (Benson v. Stenger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Benson v. Stenger, 337 P.2d 338, 216 Or. 318, 1959 Ore. LEXIS 286 (Or. 1959).

Opinions

ROSSMAN, J.

This is an appeal by the two plaintiffs who are partners and who do business under the name of Tom Benson Class Co. from a judgment which the circuit court entered in favor of the defendant upon his motion for a directed verdict.

The plaintiffs present four assignments of error but stress only the first two. The first reads:

“The Court on examination of witness Paul B. Landry erred in sustaining objections to the following questions.”

The second challenges the ruling which directed the verdict in defendant’s favor.

The complaint alleges that between May 19, 1954, and August 30, 1954, the plaintiffs “at the special instance and request of the defendant sold and delivered to defendant certain window glass and mirrors” of the reasonable value of $1,730. It alleges that no part of that sum has been paid. The answer denies the averments. At the times mentioned in the complaint one Burton Newton, who, as a witness for the plaintiffs, described himself as a “building contractor,” was constructing a dwelling house for the defendant [320]*320upon a cost plus basis. No written instrument evidenced tbe agreement between tbe defendant and Newton. An architect by the name of Gerald G. Scott drew the plans and specifications. The glass mentioned in the complaint became the windows of the house and the mirrors were installed in the bathrooms. The alleged value of the materials, $1,730, is not contested, and it is conceded that all of the material entered the structure. The defendant has not paid the plaintiff for the material, but the unchallenged evidence shows that he paid Newton.

We will now consider the first assignment of error which is based upon rulings that were made when the plaintiffs sought to show that the defendant through a purported telephone call to Paul B. Landry, plaintiffs’ manager, made a request concerning the glass or its installation. It appears that Newton had solicited bids from other glass dealers in addition to the plaintiffs and that the latter’s bid was the lowest. Landry testified that some time after he had given the plaintiffs’ bid to Newton he received a telephone call from some one with whose voice he was not familiar, and a day or two later delivered the glass. The identity of the caller was not established and Landry was unacquainted with the defendant’s voice. No effort was made to reveal the answer that Landry would have given had he been permitted to answer the question, and no offer of proof was made to show that the question to which the objection was sustained would have developed any fact material to the issues on trial. It is impossible to infer that the plaintiffs sought, through the question to which the objection was sustained, to prove that the defendant accepted the plaintiffs’ bid for Landry swore that it was Newton who accepted their bid. Landry had conducted all [321]*321of the negotiations pertaining to the glass. As a witness for the plaintiffs under examination by their counsel Landry gave the following testimony:

“Q Well, you had your negotiations with Burt Newton, he was the one that accepted the bid?
“A He is the one.”

Thus, it was Newton who accepted the plaintiffs’ bid. The plaintiffs do not claim that Landry misspoke himself. To the contrary, their brief states:

“* * * However, the plaintiff submits that under the evidence in this case the jury could have found from a review of all of the evidence that Mr. Newton ordered the glass * *

In view of that situation, we are unable to conceive of any material answer which Landry could have made to the question in controversy. In the absence of an offer of proof this assignment of error reveals no merit.

The second assignment of error, as we have indicated, challenges the trial judge’s ruling which directed the verdict for the defendant. During the trial the plaintifffs’ position appears to have been that (1) when the construction work got under way and until it was two-thirds completed the relationship between the defendant and Newton was that of owner and independent contractor and (2) when the structure was two-thirds finished the relationship was changed into that of owner-employee and Newton agreed no longer to take a percentage of the cost of construction. We add that when the house was two-thirds completed Newton discovered that the cost of construction would exceed his preliminary estimate of $40,000 by $20,000 and so told the defendant. According to the plaintiffs, they did not submit their bid to Newton until the [322]*322purported change in relationship between Newton and the defendant was effected. The defendant denies that any change in his relationship to Newton was ever made except he concedes that when it developed that the cost of construction would exceed the preliminary estimate by $20,000 Newton agreed that he would no longer make a percentage surcharge as compensation for his work.

The question presented by the second assignment of error is this: does the record contain substantial evidence showing that when the glass transaction occurred Newton was the defendant’s employee or agent? If the relationship between the defendant and Newton was that of owner and independent contractor the trial judge committed no error when he made the challenged ruling. The plaintiffs had the burden of proof of showing that the relationship was that of owner-employee; and unless the record contains substantial evidence showing that Newton was the defendant’s employee or agent, and not an independent contractor, the challenged ruling must be affirmed.

At least three members of this court have read the transcript of evidence and examined the exhibits. The study thus given the record was conducted with great care. The case has been argued before this court twice, the second time before the entire bench. Since the issue presented by the second assignment of error calls for virtually nothing but an examination of the evidence, we find it unnecessary to detail herein the contents of the transcript.

The undisputed testimony indicates that Newton agreed to construct for the defendant a dwelling house which the parties had clearly in mind. It also indicates that the defendant agreed to pay Newton the cost of [323]*323construction plus a surcharge. The house was actually built, and according to the defendant’s unchallenged testimony no deviation from the original design was made. The defendant’s unchallenged testimony shows that he paid Newton in full for the cost of construction, including all charges for the glass and Newton’s surcharge. Our study of the record has satisfied us that the defendant retained no control over Newton, the award of subcontracts and the purchase of material. At least no control was retained which conflicted with Newton’s undertaking to build the house according to his own ways and methods. There is nothing in the record which even intimates that the defendant suggested to Newton the hiring of this or that carpenter, the letting of any subcontract or the place where any material should be purchased. In short, Newton agreed to build the house which the parties had in mind as an independent contractor.

All payments to mechanics, subcontractors and material dealers were made by Newton with the possible exception of nine payments which we will presently mention. Newton, after paying the mechanics, material dealers and subcontractors, was reimbursed by the defendant.

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Bluebook (online)
337 P.2d 338, 216 Or. 318, 1959 Ore. LEXIS 286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/benson-v-stenger-or-1959.