Benson v. Harris
This text of 91 S.E. 491 (Benson v. Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1. The motion to dismiss the bill of exceptions, upon the ground that it does not appear from the record specified and sent up, or from the bill of exceptions, that any brief of evidence was filed in the court below, must be' denied, it affirmatively appearing from the record that the ease was heard and determined by the court upon the admission of the adverse party that the statement of facts contained in the answer to the scire facias was true, and the answer being specified in the bill of exceptions as a part of the record and duly transmitted to this court; especially since it further appears that the “statement of facts” was in truth only an agreement that the recital of facts in the response was true. Lindsey v. Hardeman, 60 Ga. 60.
S?. Where a person arrested on a charge of stabbing gave bond to appear at the city court of Carrollton, to be held in and for the County of [329]*329Carroll on the the first Monday in December, 1915, to answer for such offense, and thereafter, at the October term, 1915, of Carroll superior court, a ■ true bill of indictment was returned against him, charging him with the offense of assault with intent to murder, but in fact involving the same transaction, and upon the finding of the true bill the judge issued a bench warrant, under which the accused was arrested and taken into the custody of the sheriff of the county, from whose custody he subsequently escaped; held: Applying the “same-transaction test,” the indictment charged the same offense, or a higher grade of the same offense, as that for which bail was given by the defendant, and his rearrest on the bench warrant discharged the sureties. The only consideration for the undertaking of the sureties, accruing to them, was the custody of the principal; and this consideration having failed, their liability ceased, and his subsequent escape, through no fault of the sureties, does not alter the rule. Smith v. Kitchens, 51 Ga. 159 (21 Am. R. 232) ; 6 C. J. 1027, § 282; 3 R. C. L. 52, § 62. The subsequent indictment and the arrest of the defendant were both legal and proper, but the Stated—the obligee in the bond—having elected to charge the defendant with a more serious offense, growing out of and involving the same transaction in which the bond for his appearance before the city court was given, released the sureties from further liability when it took the defendant into custody. The subsequent arrest or custody of one on another charge, while he is out on bail, does not operate ipso facto as a discharge of his bail, but its effect depends upon its continuance. The decision in Cooper v. Brown, 10 Ga. App. 730 (73 S. E. 1101), while authority upon the general proposition announced in this case, is unsound on the peculiar facts in that case.
[329]*329 Judgment reversed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
91 S.E. 491, 19 Ga. App. 328, 1917 Ga. App. LEXIS 108, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/benson-v-harris-gactapp-1917.