Benson v. Dantzler

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 30, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-01218
StatusUnknown

This text of Benson v. Dantzler (Benson v. Dantzler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Benson v. Dantzler, (E.D. Wis. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ JOSEPH LEE BENSON,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 23-cv-1218-pp

MD K. PURCELL, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2), SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A AND ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT ______________________________________________________________________________

Joseph Lee Benson, who is incarcerated at Racine Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prison trust account. Id. On September 14, 2023, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $16.37. Dkt. No. 5. The court received that fee on October 2, 2023. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay the remainder of the filing

fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated person raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, “accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The complaint names as defendants MD K. Purcell, Wellpath Healthcare staff and Jane and John Doe Milwaukee County classification staff. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. The plaintiff alleges that on February 8, 2023, he was brought into the Milwaukee County Jail for sentencing in a state criminal case. Id. at 2. He

alleged that when he was “booked in” the jail, he was given a complete health screening, which revealed that he “was still healing from a gun shot wound that broke [his] femur bone in [his] right leg.” Id. The plaintiff says he previously was housed at the jail from August 28 through December 7, 2022, before he was transferred to Dodge Correctional Institution. Id. The plaintiff asserts that he had been receiving restrictions from Wellpath Services concerning his injury. Id. at 2, 4. The plaintiff says that when he returned to the jail on February 8,

“classification” housed him on the upper tier, “when Wellpath clearly [k]new of [his] injury and [his] restrictions of lower level and lower bunk and [his] use of a cane to get around safely.” Id. at 4. The plaintiff says that on February 8, 9 and 10, 2023, he complained to staff about his “housing situation” because it was on the upper tier. Id. He says jail officers and Wellpath staff assured him that, due to his restrictions, he would be moved to a lower level with a lower bunk. Id. The plaintiff alleges, however, that he never was moved to a lower tier or lower bunk and that his “leg ended up giving out.” Id.

The plaintiff explains that since February 10, he has been seeing doctors about the injury to his femur and the healing process. Id. at 3. He alleges that on February 10, 2023 at about 2:15 p.m., he was coming down the stairs of the sixth floor when he fell down the stairs because his “leg gave out.” Id. The plaintiff says that a medical emergency was called to assist him and examine the situation. Id. He says that at that time, Wellpath staff “made a decision due to [his] prior injury and the severe swelling in [his[ leg.” Id. He says he was

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Bluebook (online)
Benson v. Dantzler, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/benson-v-dantzler-wied-2023.