BENSON HOTEL CORPORATION v. City of Minneapolis

187 N.W.2d 610, 290 Minn. 14, 1971 Minn. LEXIS 1089
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedMarch 26, 1971
Docket42287
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 187 N.W.2d 610 (BENSON HOTEL CORPORATION v. City of Minneapolis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
BENSON HOTEL CORPORATION v. City of Minneapolis, 187 N.W.2d 610, 290 Minn. 14, 1971 Minn. LEXIS 1089 (Mich. 1971).

Opinion

Otis, Justice.

This action is brought by two property owners to enjoin the city of Minneapolis from enforcing an ordinance which changes Third Avenue South from a two-way street to a one-way street for northbound traffic. The trial court permanently enjoined the city from enforcing the ordinance, and the city appeals.

The issues are (1) whether the Municipal Housing and Redevelopment Act has limited the jurisdiction of the city of Minneapolis to prevent it from unilaterally creating one-way streets within the Gateway Center Urban Renewal area; (2) whether a cooperation agreement entered on February 17, 1961, between the Minneapolis Housing and Redevelopment Authority and the city of Minneapolis requires the city to secure the Authority’s approval before changing streets within the renewal area from two-way to one-way; and (3) whether a property owner outside the renewal area whose business is adversely affected by the change is entitled to a permanent injunction. We answer the questions in the negative and reverse.

The ordinance under attack was adopted over the mayor’s veto on August 28, 1969. It changes Third Avenue South in downtown Minneapolis from a two-way to a one-way street permitting traffic to travel only in a northerly direction between 12th Street and Washington Avenue. Plaintiff, Benson Hotel Corporation, owns and operates the Leamington Hotel which abuts Third Avenue and occupies about half the block bounded by Third Avenue, 10th Street, Second Avenue, and 11th Street. The hotel is 6 blocks from the urban renewal area. Third Avenue is the boundary of the renewal area between First and Second Streets, the south half of the block between Washington and Third Street, *16 and betweén Third Street and Fourth Street. It runs through the renewal area in the north half of the block between Washington and Third Street.

In essence, Benson argues that the ordinance is illegal but asserts that even if it is found to be valid its adoption would irreparably harm Benson’s hotel business by requiring circuitous access to the main entrance and to its parking lot west of the building.

The Mikulay Company, Inc., and two of its shareholders intervened to join Benson in attacking the validity of the ordinance. Mikulay owns two open-air parking lots within the renewal area facing Washington Avenue in the north half of the blocks bounded by Third Avenue, Third Street, and Fifth Avenue. It alleges that it will suffer damages from the change of traffic patterns for two reasons. First, the change will prevent cars, which now approach from the north across Washington Avenue, from making a left turn into the driveway which now abuts Third Avenue. Although traffic can enter the lots by making a left turn at Washington, Mikulay argues that the congestion at that intersection during the morning rush hour, when a great many people park their cars, will discourage motorists from approaching the lots in that manner.

A principal argument on which Mikulay relies stems from the city’s plan, set forth in the ordinance in question, to divert southbound traffic from Third Avenue west on Second Street, and thence south on Second Avenue, which is a one-way street. The Gateway Center Urban Renewal Plan has set aside the block bounded by Third Avenue, Second Street, Second Avenue, and First Street for commercial and residential purposes. Until the area in that block is actually developed, the authority will continue to lease the land for parking in competition with Mikulay. Mikulay has been granted the exclusive right within the renewal area to operate an open air parking lot until the year 1990. It contends that the ordinance will result in seriously depressing the market for the sale of the block described because of the *17 heavy traffic which will travel in front of it on Second Street, destined for Second Avenue. Consequently, that area will remain in competition with Mikulay to its continuing detriment.

Minneapolis City Charter, c. 8, § 1, provides:

“The City Council shall have the care, supervision and control of all highways, streets, alleys, public squares and grounds within the limits of the city * * *.”

As we noted in The Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312, 324, 24 N. W. (2d) 244, 252, charter provisions of this kind vest in municipalities extensive police power. Consequently, unless the legislature has expressly limited the right of a municipality to regulate traffic on its streets, or unless it has authorized municipalities to contract away that right, the ordinance here in question enjoys a presumption of validity.

The Municipal Housing and Redevelopment Act, Minn. St. 462.411 to 462.711, confers broad authority on entities such as the Minneapolis Housing and Redevelopment Authority. Under an “urban renewal project,” property may be acquired to reduce traffic hazards and install, construct, or reconstruct streets. § 462.421, subd. 13. However, for whatever inference may be drawn, the city points out that in 1947, when the original act was adopted, “redevelopment plan” included “improved traffic” as one of the objectives to which it related. The reference to traffic was deleted by L. 1959, c. 545, § 1. We find no provision in the statute which expressly or by implication confers on a municipal housing and redevelopment authority either the right to regulate the flow of traffic within the renewal project or the power to overrule decisions reached by the municipal authorities in traffic matters. This is not to say that traffic patterns do not play an important role in urban planning. That fact is recognized in the statute. It is one which must be weighed and considered both by the municipality and the housing authority in developing renewal areas. However, in the absence of a clear intent by the legislature to delegate the power to regulate traffic flow, we hold *18 that the Municipal Housing and Redevelopment Act does not in itself deprive the city of its inherent and traditional power to regulate traffic on its streets.

The question then arises as to whether, apart from statute, the city of Minneapolis has entered an agreement with the housing authority which permits a sharing of responsibility for regulating traffic within the Gateway Renewal Project. The agreement of February 17, 1961, to which we have alluded, contains a number of references to the use of streets. The preamble recites that the project involves the acquisition of property “and the provision of streets” for reuse of land in accordance with the redevelopment plan. It further provides:

“The Local Government agrees that it will provide as a local non-cash grant-in-aid to the project, site clearance work, streets, alleys, curb and sidewalk, and sewer and water disconnection work; site improvement work including sewer, water supply, curb, sidewalk, road and alley surfacing, road base, street lighting, relocation and construction of traffic semaphores, parking meters, traffic signs and call boxes, * * *.

“The Local Government in accordance with the Redevelopment Plan and at no cost or expense to the Local Public Agency, shall vacate streets, roads, alleys, and other public ways as provided by said Redevelopment Plan after the abutting property and the underlying fee in the streets, alleys and other public ways shall have been acquired by the Local Public Agency.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
187 N.W.2d 610, 290 Minn. 14, 1971 Minn. LEXIS 1089, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/benson-hotel-corporation-v-city-of-minneapolis-minn-1971.