Bensalem Racing Ass'n v. State Horse Racing Commission

645 A.2d 933, 165 Pa. Commw. 647, 1994 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 389
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 12, 1994
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 645 A.2d 933 (Bensalem Racing Ass'n v. State Horse Racing Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bensalem Racing Ass'n v. State Horse Racing Commission, 645 A.2d 933, 165 Pa. Commw. 647, 1994 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 389 (Pa. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

COLINS, Judge.

The Bensalem Racing Association (Bensa-lem) and the Penn National Turf Club, Inc. (Penn National) petition for review of two separate orders of the Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission (PA Commission) which reversed their respective determinations that pursuant to Section 215(c) of the Race Horse Industry Reform Act (Act),1 they properly exercised their discretion when they (1) denied Burton K. Sipp (Sipp) the privilege of admission to the grounds, facilities, or enclosures and (2) refused to validate Sipp’s racing license (cumulatively, Sipp’s ejection).2 We reverse.

Bensalem and Penn National are corporations licensed to conduct thoroughbred racing and pari-mutuel wagering. Sipp has been a licensed trainer of thoroughbred racehorses in both New Jersey and Pennsylvania for the past thirty years. On December 26, [934]*9341984, the PA Commission suspended Sipp, because his license had been suspended by the New Jersey Horse Racing Commission (NJ Commission). Thereafter, the NJ Commission rescinded Sipp’s suspension; then, on January 15, 1993, the PA Commission granted Sipp the right to apply for a conditional license to own and/or train thoroughbred horses in Pennsylvania. On January 25, 1993, the PA Commission granted Sipp a conditional trainer’s license.

On February 3, 1993, Sipp appeared at Penn National for the purpose of submitting his license for validation. Penn National denied Sipp access to the grounds and validation of his license. Sipp appealed to the PA Commission, which ordered that Penn National’s ejection of Sipp be reversed. Subsequently, on April 26, 1993, Sipp again appeared at Penn National for the purpose of submitting his license for validation. A Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau (TRPB)3 agent served Sipp with an ejection notice and escorted him off the track. In a written letter addressed to Sipp, Penn National explained that it was ejecting and/or denying admission to Sipp on April 26, 1993, “[d]ue to a record of numerous fines and suspensions both in Pennsylvania and other states and a serious criminal eonvietion[;] it is obvious that your presence at this racetrack is not in the best interest of racing.” (Penn National Finding of Fact No. 18).

Similarly, on February 12, 1993, Sipp appeared at Philadelphia Park for the purpose of submitting his license for validation; Ben-salem is the corporate licensee which conducts meets at this site. Bensalem denied Sipp access to the grounds and validation of his license, because Bensalem “concluded that [Sipp] was detrimental to the best interests of horse racing.” (Bensalem Finding of Fact No. 12). In a written letter addressed to Sipp, Bensalem explained that it was denying validation of Sipp’s license because:

A. [Sipp] was convicted of witness tampering in the State of New Jersey and sentenced therefor on August 1, 1986.
B. [Sipp] on numerous occasions violated racing rules when he was an active trainer.
C.[Sipp] has failed to apply for and receive a license as a trainer in New Jersey.

(Bensalem Finding of Fact No. 13). Sipp appealed both Penn National’s and Bensa-lem’s determinations to the PA Commission. In separate orders the PA Commission reversed both Penn National’s and Bensalem’s ejection of Sipp. Penn National and Bensa-lem have brought this petition for review.

On appeal to this Court, Bensalem argues that the PA Commission’s determination was not supported by any evidence that would allow it to overrule Bensalem’s determination that Sipp’s presence at the grounds was detrimental to the best interest of horse racing. Specifically, Bensalem argues that pursuant to this Court’s holding in Kulick v. Pennsylvania State Harness Racing Commission, 115 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 408, 540 A.2d 620, petition for allowance of appeal denied, 520 Pa. 620, 554 A.2d 512 (1988), it properly exercised its discretion to exclude Sipp based on a reasoned determination that Sipp’s presence at the facility would be detrimental to the best interest of horse racing. In addition, unlike in Kulick, wherein the adverse allegations were speculative, the record in the instant matter is replete with documented violations of criminal laws and racing regulations. Furthermore, pursuant to Martinez v. State Horse Racing Commission, 81 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 1, 472 A.2d 1180 (1984), and with respect to Sipp’s tainted history, a licensee’s pattern of past conduct is an appropriate factor to consider when determining whether to eject that licensee.

Similarly, Penn National argues that the PA Commission’s findings of fact are not supported by any evidence that would allow it to overrule Penn National’s determination that Sipp’s presence at the grounds was detrimental to the best interest of horse racing. Specifically, Penn National argues that Sipp’s record provides more than enough of a basis to support its reasoned determination that his presence is detrimental to the best interest of horse racing. Penn National also argues that there is no evidence to justify disregarding Sipp’s past conduct.

[935]*935In Kulick, this Court articulated the following:

At issue in the instant matter is the burden of proof imposed upon a track in support of a determination that the presence of a licensee2 is detrimental to the best
interests of racing. In support of a decision to eject from the track such a licensed person, Section 215(c) of the Act requires nothing more of the corporation than that it cite the reasons upon which its decision is based.... The [PA] Commission, in its review, [should] require not that such allegations of impropriety be proven but that the track’s determination be reasonable, a standard which finds support in Iwinski v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission, 85 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 176, 481 A.2d 370 (1984), wherein we stated that the ‘legal right of [a corporation] to exclude a licensed person from its track depends upon a reasoned determination that his presence there is “detrimental to the best interests of horse racing.” ’ Id. at 179, 481 A.2d at 372 (emphasis deleted).
'.. [T]he Act’s ‘overriding purpose [is] to foster an image of horse racing that would make the image of that “industry” an irreproachable one, even in the eyes of the skeptical public.’ To that end, the [PA] Commission must discourage conduct which undermines the public confidence and respect in the sport. Daly v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission, 38 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 77, 391 A.2d 1134 (1978). Such proscribed conduct ‘need not be criminal in nature nor proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It is sufficient that the complained-of conduct and its attending circumstances be such as to reflect negatively on the sport.’ Id. at 81, 391 A.2d at 1134 (citation omitted). The [PA] Commission’s articulation of the burden of proof as entailing a demonstration only of the appearance

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Related

Bensalem Racing Ass'n v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission
703 A.2d 598 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1997)
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651 A.2d 656 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
645 A.2d 933, 165 Pa. Commw. 647, 1994 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 389, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bensalem-racing-assn-v-state-horse-racing-commission-pacommwct-1994.