NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
19-624
BENNY BELL
VERSUS
SABINE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD
**********
APPEAL FROM THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF SABINE, NO. 68,723 HONORABLE STEPHEN B. BEASLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE
PHYLLIS M. KEATY JUDGE
Court composed of John D. Saunders, Phyllis M. Keaty, and D. Kent Savoie, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
J. Keith Gates Gates Law Firm, L.L.C. Post Office Box 1433 Winnfield, Louisiana 71483 (318) 648-9800 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant: Benny Bell
Robert L. Hammonds Neal L. Johnson, Jr. Hammonds, Sills, Adkins & Guice, LLP 2431 S. Acadian Thruway, Suite 600 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 (225) 923-3462 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Sabine Parish School Board KEATY, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Defendant. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter involves the interpretation of La.R.S. 17:418(C)(2), which
provides: “Each vocational agricultural teacher employed by a city, parish, or other
local public school board shall teach a twelve-month program for a twelve-month
budget period and shall be paid a proportional salary for a twelve-month budget
period according to the salary schedule established by his employing school board.”
Benny Bell, a vocational agricultural teacher employed by the Sabine Parish School
Board (hereinafter “the Board”), filed a Petition against the Board on January 31,
2018, for its failure to comply with La.R.S. 17:418(C)(2). Bell alleged the Board
failed to pay him a proportional salary for a twelve-month budget period according
to the salary schedule established by the Board. He requested all due back pay along
with an order requiring the Board to pay him a proportional salary pursuant to the
statute, along with attorney’s fees and costs of the proceeding. The Board filed an
answer and acknowledged that Bell was required to work 210 days per year, spread
out over a twelve-month period. The Board advised it had paid Bell for his work
and affirmatively asserted extinguishment of its obligation. Bell thereafter filed a
motion for partial summary judgment, and the Board filed a motion for summary
judgment. The cross motions for summary judgment were heard on July 8, 2019.
Following a hearing, the trial court submitted a written judgment on July 9, 2019,
wherein it denied Bell’s motion for partial summary judgment, granted the Board’s
motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the matter without prejudice. Bell
appealed the judgment. On appeal, Bell asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying
his motion for summary judgment and in granting the Board’s motion for summary
judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews a motion for summary judgment de novo, using
the identical criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary
judgment is appropriate. Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880.
Therefore, just like the trial court, we must determine whether “the motion,
memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to
material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code
Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3). Moreover, “[t]o uphold a summary judgment on appeal, the
record must reflect the mover secured the judgment in accordance with the procedure
mandated by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966.” Acadian Props.
Northshore, L.L.C. v. Fitzmorris, 17-424, p. 9 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/1/17), 234 So.3d
927, 934. We also must ensure that all procedural requirements have been met.
Magnon v. Miller, 06-321 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/27/06), 939 So.2d 658.
Additionally, “[q]uestions of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute,
are reviewed by [an appellate] court under the de novo standard of review.” La.
Mun. Ass’n v. State, 04-227, p. 35 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809, 836. “On legal
issues, the appellate court gives no special weight to the findings of the trial court,
but exercises its constitutional duty to review questions of law and renders judgment
on the record.” State, Through La. Riverboat Gaming Comm’n v. La. State Police
Riverboat Gaming Enforcement Div., 95-2355, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/21/96), 694
So.2d 316, 319. “Appellate review of a question of law involves a determination of
whether the lower court’s interpretive decision is legally correct.” Johnson v. La.
2 Tax Comm’n, 01-964, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/16/02), 807 So.2d 329, 331, writ denied,
02-445 (La. 3/8/02), 811 So.2d 887.
This appeal involves the interpretation of a statute arising from cross motions
for summary judgment. Accordingly, we will conduct a de novo review.
DISCUSSION
In his sole assignment of error, Bell contends the trial court erred as a matter
of law in denying his motion for summary judgment and in granting the Board’s
motion for summary judgment. The cross motions for summary judgment were
based upon application of La.R.S. 17:418(C)(2) which provides: “Each vocational
agricultural teacher employed by a city, parish, or other local public school board
shall teach a twelve-month program for a twelve-month budget period and shall be
paid a proportional salary for a twelve-month budget period according to the salary
schedule established by his employing school board.” At issue are the factors the
Board considers “twelve” months and nine months when calculating Bell’s annual
salary. La.R.S. 17:418(C)(2). Bell contends the Board erroneously classifies him
as a 210-day employee rather than a twelve-month employee and pays him a
proportional salary based on 174 days instead of nine months. Bell notes that under
this formula, the Board multiplies a nine-month teacher’s salary by 1.207, i.e., 210
days divided by 174 days equals 1.207. In order to comply with the statute, Bell
maintains that the Board should multiply a nine-month teacher’s salary by 1.33, i.e.,
twelve months divided by nine months equals 1.33.
In opposition, the Board maintains that Bell is entitled to have a nine-month
teacher’s salary multiplied by 1.207 rather than 1.33. Regular nine-month teachers
work 174 days rather than nine months, according to the Board. It further advises
that Bell works 210 days rather than twelve months. Thus, the Board contends that
3 its current formula used to determine Bell’s salary complies with La.R.S.
17:418(C)(2).
On appeal, we are called upon to interpret La.R.S. 17:418(C)(2). In cases
involving statutory interpretation, the fundamental question is legislative intent and
the ascertainment of the reasons that prompted the legislature to enact the law. In re
Succession of Boyter, 99-761 (La. 1/7/00), 756 So.2d 1122. “When a law is clear
and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law
shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of
the intent of the legislature.” La.Civ.Code art. 9. Although the language of the law
may be susceptible to different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the
meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law, and the words of law must be
given their generally prevailing meaning. La.Civ.Code arts. 10 and 11. The
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
19-624
BENNY BELL
VERSUS
SABINE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD
**********
APPEAL FROM THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF SABINE, NO. 68,723 HONORABLE STEPHEN B. BEASLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE
PHYLLIS M. KEATY JUDGE
Court composed of John D. Saunders, Phyllis M. Keaty, and D. Kent Savoie, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
J. Keith Gates Gates Law Firm, L.L.C. Post Office Box 1433 Winnfield, Louisiana 71483 (318) 648-9800 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant: Benny Bell
Robert L. Hammonds Neal L. Johnson, Jr. Hammonds, Sills, Adkins & Guice, LLP 2431 S. Acadian Thruway, Suite 600 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 (225) 923-3462 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Sabine Parish School Board KEATY, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Defendant. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter involves the interpretation of La.R.S. 17:418(C)(2), which
provides: “Each vocational agricultural teacher employed by a city, parish, or other
local public school board shall teach a twelve-month program for a twelve-month
budget period and shall be paid a proportional salary for a twelve-month budget
period according to the salary schedule established by his employing school board.”
Benny Bell, a vocational agricultural teacher employed by the Sabine Parish School
Board (hereinafter “the Board”), filed a Petition against the Board on January 31,
2018, for its failure to comply with La.R.S. 17:418(C)(2). Bell alleged the Board
failed to pay him a proportional salary for a twelve-month budget period according
to the salary schedule established by the Board. He requested all due back pay along
with an order requiring the Board to pay him a proportional salary pursuant to the
statute, along with attorney’s fees and costs of the proceeding. The Board filed an
answer and acknowledged that Bell was required to work 210 days per year, spread
out over a twelve-month period. The Board advised it had paid Bell for his work
and affirmatively asserted extinguishment of its obligation. Bell thereafter filed a
motion for partial summary judgment, and the Board filed a motion for summary
judgment. The cross motions for summary judgment were heard on July 8, 2019.
Following a hearing, the trial court submitted a written judgment on July 9, 2019,
wherein it denied Bell’s motion for partial summary judgment, granted the Board’s
motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the matter without prejudice. Bell
appealed the judgment. On appeal, Bell asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying
his motion for summary judgment and in granting the Board’s motion for summary
judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews a motion for summary judgment de novo, using
the identical criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary
judgment is appropriate. Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880.
Therefore, just like the trial court, we must determine whether “the motion,
memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to
material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code
Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3). Moreover, “[t]o uphold a summary judgment on appeal, the
record must reflect the mover secured the judgment in accordance with the procedure
mandated by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966.” Acadian Props.
Northshore, L.L.C. v. Fitzmorris, 17-424, p. 9 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/1/17), 234 So.3d
927, 934. We also must ensure that all procedural requirements have been met.
Magnon v. Miller, 06-321 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/27/06), 939 So.2d 658.
Additionally, “[q]uestions of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute,
are reviewed by [an appellate] court under the de novo standard of review.” La.
Mun. Ass’n v. State, 04-227, p. 35 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809, 836. “On legal
issues, the appellate court gives no special weight to the findings of the trial court,
but exercises its constitutional duty to review questions of law and renders judgment
on the record.” State, Through La. Riverboat Gaming Comm’n v. La. State Police
Riverboat Gaming Enforcement Div., 95-2355, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/21/96), 694
So.2d 316, 319. “Appellate review of a question of law involves a determination of
whether the lower court’s interpretive decision is legally correct.” Johnson v. La.
2 Tax Comm’n, 01-964, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/16/02), 807 So.2d 329, 331, writ denied,
02-445 (La. 3/8/02), 811 So.2d 887.
This appeal involves the interpretation of a statute arising from cross motions
for summary judgment. Accordingly, we will conduct a de novo review.
DISCUSSION
In his sole assignment of error, Bell contends the trial court erred as a matter
of law in denying his motion for summary judgment and in granting the Board’s
motion for summary judgment. The cross motions for summary judgment were
based upon application of La.R.S. 17:418(C)(2) which provides: “Each vocational
agricultural teacher employed by a city, parish, or other local public school board
shall teach a twelve-month program for a twelve-month budget period and shall be
paid a proportional salary for a twelve-month budget period according to the salary
schedule established by his employing school board.” At issue are the factors the
Board considers “twelve” months and nine months when calculating Bell’s annual
salary. La.R.S. 17:418(C)(2). Bell contends the Board erroneously classifies him
as a 210-day employee rather than a twelve-month employee and pays him a
proportional salary based on 174 days instead of nine months. Bell notes that under
this formula, the Board multiplies a nine-month teacher’s salary by 1.207, i.e., 210
days divided by 174 days equals 1.207. In order to comply with the statute, Bell
maintains that the Board should multiply a nine-month teacher’s salary by 1.33, i.e.,
twelve months divided by nine months equals 1.33.
In opposition, the Board maintains that Bell is entitled to have a nine-month
teacher’s salary multiplied by 1.207 rather than 1.33. Regular nine-month teachers
work 174 days rather than nine months, according to the Board. It further advises
that Bell works 210 days rather than twelve months. Thus, the Board contends that
3 its current formula used to determine Bell’s salary complies with La.R.S.
17:418(C)(2).
On appeal, we are called upon to interpret La.R.S. 17:418(C)(2). In cases
involving statutory interpretation, the fundamental question is legislative intent and
the ascertainment of the reasons that prompted the legislature to enact the law. In re
Succession of Boyter, 99-761 (La. 1/7/00), 756 So.2d 1122. “When a law is clear
and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law
shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of
the intent of the legislature.” La.Civ.Code art. 9. Although the language of the law
may be susceptible to different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the
meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law, and the words of law must be
given their generally prevailing meaning. La.Civ.Code arts. 10 and 11. The
meaning of ambiguous terms must be sought by examining the context in which they
occur and the text of the law as a whole, and laws on the same subject matter must
be interpreted in reference to each other. La.R.S. 1:3; La.Civ.Code. arts. 12 and 13.
“Courts should give effect to all parts of a statute and should not give a statute an
interpretation that makes any part superfluous or meaningless, if that result can be
avoided.” Boyter, 756 So.2d at 1129. “If application of the foregoing rules of
interpretation fails to illuminate definitively the legislature’s intent, only then should
the rule of strict construction apply to the interpretation of laws in derogation of
common rights[.]” Hutchinson v. Patel, 93-2156, p. 6 (La. 5/23/94), 637 So.2d 415,
421.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:418, entitled “Salaries; teachers and other
school employees[,]” was passed by Act 1 in the 2012 regular legislative session.
Prior to the passage of Act 1, the salary of vocational agricultural teachers was
determined by two statutes: La.R.S. 17:421.3 and 422(B)(1). The former provision 4 provided that each vocational agricultural teacher teach “a twelve-month program”
and be “paid a salary at the same monthly rate as provided in the minimum salary
schedule” whereas the latter provision established a minimum teacher salary
schedule. Those two statutes were repealed on July 1, 2012 and replaced with
La.R.S. 17:418 pursuant to Act 1. Under the new statute, “[t]he governing authority
of each local public elementary and secondary school, the state special schools, and
the schools and programs administered through the special school district shall
establish salary schedules” for the teachers and other school employees. La.R.S.
17:418(A)(1). At issue herein is the part of the statute requiring a vocational
agricultural teacher to “be paid a proportional salary for a twelve-month budget
period according to the salary schedule established by his employing school board.”
La.R.S. 17:418(C)(2). A school board’s discretion to determine salary is limited by
the provision in La.R.S. 17:418(C)(1), which provides that the amount of salary paid
to a teacher annually “shall not be reduced below the amount of such salary paid
during the previous school year, nor shall the amount of the annual salary paid to
such school personnel be reduced at any time during an academic year.” La.R.S.
17:418(C)(1).
The Board relied upon the affidavit of Rodney Wilson, the Board’s Director
of Finance. Wilson attested to the Board’s formula it used to determine teachers’
salaries before and after the implementation of Act 1. During the 2012-13 school
year and prior thereto, “the minimum salary for the twelve-month program of
vocational agriculture teachers was calculated by determining, based on the 2011-
2012 Sabine Parish School Board New State Minimum table [(“minimum table”)],[]
the monthly minimum salary of an identically qualified nine-month teacher and
multiplying that monthly amount by twelve.” This amount was augmented by
adding the additional salary amount taken from general funds. Wilson advised that 5 by 2012-13, Bell’s qualifications included over twenty-five years of experience as a
teacher with a master’s degree and thirty plus hours of graduate course credit.
According to Wilson, the minimum salary for a teacher with Bell’s qualifications
during 2012-13 was $30,985.00, which was augmented by $19,308.00 in general
funds that were not required to be expended under the state minimum salary schedule.
Wilson attested that in 2013-14, the Board complied with Act 1 by adopting
and implementing an Extended Teacher Salary Schedule (“salary schedule”) to
determine the adjusted salary of teachers assigned to programs exceeding nine
months; it was used in place of the 2011-12 minimum table to determine the adjusted
salary of vocational agricultural teachers. Under the 2013-14 salary schedule, the
teachers were assigned to the “step” that provided for compensation that was one
“step” higher than their nine-month base salary in the prior school year, i.e., 2012-
13. Wilson revealed that Bell was assigned to step eighteen of the new twenty-five-
step schedule under the 2013-14 salary schedule. According to Wilson, the Board
implemented the same teacher salary schedule in 2014-15.
Wilson advised that a simplified teacher salary schedule was adopted by the
Board in 2015-16 whereby a factor of 1.207 was applied to the salary of nine-month
teachers to determine the salary of identically qualified vocational agricultural
teachers. “The 1.207 factor was established by dividing the number of days worked
annually by vocational agriculture teachers (210 days) by the number of days worked
annually by nine-month teachers (174 days).” Wilson noted that the 2015-16 salary
schedule was implemented without change in 2016-17 and 2017-18. He explained
that the method for determining the salary of vocational agricultural teacher salaries
in 2018-19 did not change, although the Board raised the salaries for nine-month
teachers upon which vocational agricultural teacher salaries are based.
6 Wilson also provided a table comparing the work requirements and salary of
Bell and an identically qualified nine-month teacher from the 2008-09 school year
to the 2018-19 school year. The table reveals that Bell earned $60,621.33 in 2008-
09. This amount was determined, in part, by Bell’s 240 days of work, a nine-month
teacher’s 172 days of work, and a factor of 1.205. Bell earned the same amount each
subsequent year up until, and including, the 2012-13 school year. His salary
thereafter increased each year. Specifically, in 2013-14 and 2014-15, Bell earned
$60,888.00 and $61,154.67 respectively, based upon 240 to 174 days of work and a
factor of 1.206. In 2015-16, 2016-17, and 2017-18, Bell earned $62,173.78,
$62,415.18, and $62,656.58 respectively. His salary during these three years was
determined by using 210 days worked by Bell, 174 days worked by a nine-month
teacher, and a factor of 1.207. According to Wilson, Bell’s salary was projected to
increase to $63,622.17 in 2018-19, using the same formula adopted by the Board in
2015-16. Attached to Wilson’s affidavit were the salary schedules, tables, and
guidelines used by the Board in determining teacher salaries.
In addition to Wilson’s affidavit, the Board relied upon Louisiana Attorney
General Opinion Number 15-0061 of April 1, 2016. The issue was whether the
compensation plan for vocational agricultural teachers during 2015-16 was
consistent with Act 1. After reviewing the 2015-16 Board salary schedule, the
Attorney General concluded the Board was in compliance because vocational
agricultural teachers would receive a full monthly salary for twelve months and that
salary was not less than that paid in the prior year. The Attorney General then
explained the statute’s purpose, as follows:
The Act 1 repeal of La. R.S. 17:421.3 eliminated a state-wide minimum salary for teachers. Subject to the limitation in La. R.S. 17:418(C)(1) that a teacher’s annual salary for a given year may not be reduced below the annual salary paid in the previous year, current law generally leaves the fixing of teacher salaries to the discretion of the individual school 7 governing authority. However, during the debate prior to final passage of the bill on the House Floor, Rep. Jim Fannin offered an amendment to put back into law the requirement that vocational agricultural teachers be paid for twelve months of work.[] He explained that “it’s always been in statute” that these teachers receive a full twelve months of pay, as opposed to “nine months of pay distributed over 12 months.”[] The amendment passed without opposition and became La. R.S. 17:418(C)(2) in the law as signed by the Governor.
The Attorney General also discussed the rules regarding statutory
interpretation and opined: “In this case, although the law is clear, rendering
unnecessary an examination of legislative intent, [] nonetheless the legislative
history supports this opinion.” It concluded that a parish school board has the
authority to set teacher salaries, including vocational agricultural teachers, subject
to the limitation in La.R.S. 17:418(C)(1). The Attorney General determined that
“vocational agricultural teachers must be paid for a full twelve months of work.”
In Louisiana, opinions rendered by the Attorney General are advisory rather
than binding. McCaig v. Town of Gueydan, 01-140 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/27/01), 788
So.2d 1283. “We have recognized their persuasive authority, particularly where no
cases on point exists [sic].” Id. at 1285. “‘Although the Attorney General’s opinion
is not binding, we agree with its result and further find that it provides guidance in
this case.’” Bailey v. City of Lafayette, 05-29, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 904 So.2d
922, 924, writs denied, 05-1690, 05-1689, 05-1691, 05-1692 (La. 1/9/06), 918 So.2d
1054, 1055 (quoting Hayes v. City of Alexandria, 629 So.2d 435 (La.App. 3 Cir.
1993)).
In this case, the current statute instituted by Act 1 clearly and unambiguously
evidences the Board’s authority to fix Bell’s salary subject to the provision that it
cannot be reduced. The statute, by its own terms, proclaims that “[e]ach vocational
agricultural teacher employed by a city, parish, or other local public school board
shall teach a twelve-month program for a twelve-month budget period and shall be
8 paid a proportional salary for a twelve-month budget period according to the salary
schedule established by his employing school board.” The Board’s compliance with
this statute is consistent with Wilson’s affidavit, the Attorney General’s opinion,
and is otherwise unrefuted. Moreover, we have found no authority, statutorily or
otherwise, which denies the Board the power to utilize a factor of 1.207 as opposed
to 1.33 when determining the salary of vocational agricultural teachers such as Bell.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court’s judgment is legally correct.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. Costs of this
appeal are assessed to Plaintiff, Benny Bell.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.