Bennett v. State Corporation Commission

385 P.2d 978, 73 N.M. 126
CourtNew Mexico Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 16, 1963
Docket7258
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 385 P.2d 978 (Bennett v. State Corporation Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Mexico Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bennett v. State Corporation Commission, 385 P.2d 978, 73 N.M. 126 (N.M. 1963).

Opinion

NOBLE, Justice.

This appeal requires us to review an order of the State Corporation Commission revoking the authority of Bennett’s Transportation Company (hereinafter referred to as Bennett), a non-scheduled carrier over irregular routes, to transport certain commodities because of a finding by the commission that its authority to transport such commodities is dormant.

An application by one Paul Miesner to transfer to him that part of Bennett’s permit which it was claimed authorized transportation of petroleum products, led to protests by other carriers, pursuant to which the state corporation commission issued its order directing Bennett to show cause why its certificate should not be amended or cancelled. At the hearing Miesner withdrew his application. Whether the permit authorized the hauling of petroleum products is not an issue on this appeal and was not specifically determined by the commission.

We must determine whether § 64-27-12, N.M.S.A.1953, authorizes the commission to amend a certificate held by a non-scheduled, irregular-route carrier, as to those commodities not regularly hauled.

Bennett has maintained a terminal at Raton, New Mexico, and has been engaged in the hauling of commodities since 1913 under a certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing it to haul commodities subject to the following:

“ ‘Restricted to hauls where such hauls will not interfere with the impairment of efficiency of regualr route and scheduled common carriers, Raton and all points, and no haul to be made without first having obtained authority from the State Corporation Commission.’ ”

The commission entered an order amending Bennett’s permit and restricting its authority to:

“Transportation of household goods between Raton, New Mexico, on the one hand, and points and places in New Mexico, on the other.”

Suit in the district court pursuant to § 64 — 27-68, N.M.S.A.1953, to vacate the order of the commission followed, which resulted in affirmance of the order by the district court. This appeal resulted.

The order of the commission is based upon its finding No. 7:

“7. That the only commodity transported by the certificate holder, in any substantial quantity, since 1945, consists of uncrated household goods, and that the authority to transport any other commodity is dormant and should be cancelled accordingly.”

The commission’s finding and order based thereon requires us to determine the existence of the commission’s authority to revoke the permit pro tanto because of a claimed dormancy in the use of the permit. Transcontinental Bus System v. State Corporation Commission, 67 N.M. 56, 352 P.2d 245; Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 63 N.M. 137, 314 P.2d 894.

Review by the district court, and by this court on appeal, is limited to questions of law, and is restricted to whether the commission’s findings and order were supported by substantial evidence; were within the scope of its authority; and, whether the action was unlawful, arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Sec. 64-27-68, N.M.S.A.1953; Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 71 N.M. 464, 379 P.2d 763; Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 351 P.2d 449; Durand v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 71 N.M. 479, 379 P.2d 773.

We first examine the commission’s authority to enter the order complained of. Sections 64-27-12 and 13, N.M.S.A.1953, are claimed as granting the commission power to so amend or revoke a certificate. Section 64 — 27-12 provides:

"The holder of a certificate shall render reasonably continuous and adequate service to the public, and no common or contract motor carrier operating under the laws of this state shall abandon or discontinue any service established under the laws of this state unless the commission shall have first entered its order approving such proposal to abandon or discontinue service.” (Emphasis added.)

It is claimed that non-user or only occasional transportation of commodities other than household goods amounts to a failure of the carrier to “render reasonably continuous * * * service” and authorized the pro tanto revocation of the permit as to such commodities under provisions of § 64 — 27-13, N.M.S.A.1953. We are compelled to disagree. It is to be noted that in this case the pro tanto revocation of the permit was for dormancy alone. On that question, the nature of the service authorized to be rendered by Bennett under his certificate is important. The certificate only authorized transportation of commodities over non-scheduled and irregular routes when his service is required by a shipper. He is neither required nor permitted to operate on specified schedules nor between specific points or places.

The italicized portion of the statute, supra, was included by amendment of the 1959 legislature. Prior to the amendment we said in Musslewhite v. State Corporation Commission, 61 N.M. 97, 295 P.2d 216 that:

“ * * * mere non-user by the holder cf a certificate authorizing nonscheduled service over irregular routes does not constitute either abandonment or discontinuance of service by a certificate holder shown to be at all times fully equipped, ready, able and zvilling to operate. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)

See also Bekins Van and Storage Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 65 N.M. 423, 338 P.2d 1055.

The commission asserts that the amendment had the effect of changing the rule of Musslewhite and Bekins. We think not. As applied to a non-scheduled carrier operating over irregular routes, it only broadened the commission’s authority by granting it power to revoke the permit of such carrier for failure to render reasonably adequate service to the public. The amendment, however, is to be given a prospective effect. Board of Education v. Boarman, 52 N.M. 382, 199 P.2d 998; Davis v. Meadors-Cherry Co., 65 N.M. 21, 331 P.2d 523. No evidence of Bennett’s failure to render reasonably adequate service after the effective date of the amendment has been pointed out to us. Motor carriers who furnish transportation of commodities upon the call and demand of the shipper to a wide territory and over irregular routes perform a very useful service to the public. Northeastern Lines, Inc., Common Carrier Application, 11 Interstate Commerce Commission, Motor Carrier Cases, 179, 183.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lion's Gate Water v. D'ANTONIO
2009 NMSC 057 (New Mexico Supreme Court, 2009)
AA Oilfield Service, Inc. v. New Mexico State Corp. Commission
881 P.2d 18 (New Mexico Supreme Court, 1994)
Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. State
1971 OK 77 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1971)
Springer Corp. v. State Corp. Commission
464 P.2d 552 (New Mexico Supreme Court, 1969)
Springer Corporation v. STATE CORPORATION COM'N
464 P.2d 552 (New Mexico Supreme Court, 1969)
Eklund Brothers Transport, Inc. v. Thompson
146 N.W.2d 613 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1966)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
385 P.2d 978, 73 N.M. 126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bennett-v-state-corporation-commission-nm-1963.