Bennett v. Stanford

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Bennett v. Stanford

2017 NY Slip Op 1667, 148 A.D.3d 767, 48 N.Y.S.3d 737

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 8, 2017

Docket2015-11908

StatusPublished

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 1667 (Bennett v. Stanford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bennett v. Stanford, 2017 NY Slip Op 1667, 148 A.D.3d 767, 48 N.Y.S.3d 737 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Rouse, J.), entered October 15, 2015, which, upon an order of the same court dated September 14, 2015, granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident, is in favor of the defendants and against her dismissing the complaint. The notice of appeal from the order is deemed to be a notice of appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5512 [a]).

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied, the complaint is reinstated, and the order dated September 14, 2015, is modified accordingly.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the cervical region of the plaintiff’s spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury to the cervical region of her spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Rivera, J.R, Austin, Roman, Hinds-Radix and Connolly, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Rouse, J.), entered October 15, 2015, which, upon an order of the same court dated September 14, 2015, granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident, is in favor of the defendants and against her dismissing the complaint. The notice of appeal from the order is deemed to be a notice of appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5512 [a]).

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied, the complaint is reinstated, and the order dated September 14, 2015, is modified accordingly.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the cervical region of the plaintiff’s spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury to the cervical region of her spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Rivera, J.R, Austin, Roman, Hinds-Radix and Connolly, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

2017 NY Slip Op 1667, 148 A.D.3d 767, 48 N.Y.S.3d 737, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bennett-v-stanford-nyappdiv-2017.

Opinion

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