Freedman, J.
The defendant, the administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, Evelyn Bennett, and remanding the case to the employment security board of review for a hearing to determine the amount of benefits to be awarded. On appeal, the administrator claims that the trial court improperly construed General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (2) (A) (ii)1 to eliminate the requirement that Bennett must be available for work in order to be eligible for benefits under General Statutes § 31-235 (a) (2).2 We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
[622]*622The following facts are undisputed. Bennett worked for Sikorsky Aircraft for eight years. On April 22,1992, she voluntarily left her full-time position to care for her minor daughter who suffers from hyperactivity and an emotional deficit disorder. The daughter’s physician signed a certification to the employment security division stating that the daughter needs full-time care.
After Bennett left her job at Sikorsky, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits with the administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act. On May 13, 1992, the administrator determined that Bennett was not eligible for benefits because she was not available3 for work as required by General Statutes § 31-235 (a) (2).
Bennett appealed the decision to an appeals referee. See General Statutes § 31-242. After a de novo hear[623]*623ing, the referee affirmed the administrator’s decision on June 2, 1992. Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249,4 Bennett appealed to the board of review. On July 23, 1992, the board of review adopted the findings of the appeals referee and affirmed the referee’s decision.
On August 18, 1992, Bennett appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b.5 After hearing argument of counsel, the trial court rendered judgment sustaining Bennett’s appeal and remanding the matter to the board of review for a hearing to determine the amount of benefits to be awarded. This appeal followed.6
[624]*624The administrator claims that the trial court improperly applied General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (2) (A) (ii) to eliminate the requirement that a claimant must be available for work to be eligible for benefits under General Statutes § 31-235 (a) (2).
Section 31-235 (a) enumerates three benefit eligibility requirements. First, an individual must file a claim in accordance with § 31-240 and register for work at a public employment bureau. Second, the individual must be physically and mentally able to work and be available for work and be making reasonable efforts to work. This is referred to as the “availability provision.” The third requirement is that the claimant has been paid wages by an employer, subject to the provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Act, during the base period of the current benefit year in an amount at least equal to forty times the claimant’s benefit rate for total unemployment. The only exception to the availability provision in § 31-235 is that a claimant shall not be considered unavailable for work because he or she is enrolled in and attending a school, college or university during separation from employment.
Section 31-236 (a) lists certain situations where an individual is deemed ineligible for benefits. The situation pertinent here is where a claimant has “left suita[625]*625ble work voluntarily and without sufficient cause connected to his work, until such individual has earned at least ten times his benefit rate.” This is referred to as the “penalty provision.” The statute contains exceptions to this penalty provision. The exceptions include individuals who quit to care for a seriously ill spouse, child, or parent domiciled with the claimant (referred to as the “quit to care provision”) and discontinuance of nonpersonally owned transportation.
The administrator claims that the quit to care provision in § 31-236 operates only as an exception to the penalty imposed under that statute on those who voluntarily leave suitable work without sufficient cause connected to the work, and not as an exception to the availability provision in § 31-235. The administrator further asserts that this interpretation is consistent with the legislature’s intent because if the legislature had intended to include the quit to care provision as an exception to the availability provision, it could have included it in § 31-235 together with the exception it created pertaining to students enrolled in and attending a school, college or university during separation from employment.
Bennett claims, to the contrary, that the quit to care provision in § 31-236 should also be applied as an exception to the availability provision in § 31-235 despite the absence of specific language directing such an application. She argues that the Unemployment Compensation Act is remedial legislation and, therefore, should be construed to alleviate the harsh consequences of unemployment. Reger v. Administrator, 132 Conn. 647, 650, 46 A.2d 844 (1946); Waterbury Savings Bank v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 78, 82, 20 A.2d 455 (1940).
The question presently before us then is whether the quit to care provision should be applied to the availa[626]*626bility provision in § 31-235 or only as an exception to the penalty provision in § 31-236.
The trial court’s standard of review with regard to administrative appeals is limited. “Such appeals are heard by the court upon certified copy of the record filed by the board. The court does not retry the facts or hear evidence. It considers no evidence other than that certified to it by the board, and then for the limited purpose of determining whether the finding should be corrected, or whether there was any evidence to support in law the conclusions reached.” Practice Book § 519 (a). “The court’s ultimate duty is to decide only whether, in light of the evidence, the board of review has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion.” Burnham v. Administrator, 184 Conn. 317, 322, 439 A.2d 1008 (1981); Robinson v. Unemployment Security Board of Review, 181 Conn. 1, 5, 434 A.2d 293 (1980); Cervantes v. Administrator, 177 Conn. 132, 134, 411 A.2d 921 (1979); DaSilva v. Administrator, 175 Conn. 562, 564, 402 A.2d 755 (1978); Guevara v. Administrator, 172 Conn. 492, 495, 374 A.2d 1101 (1977); Taminski v. Administrator, 168 Conn. 324, 326, 362 A.2d 868 (1975).
“[T]he interpretation of statutes presents a question of law;
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Freedman, J.
The defendant, the administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, Evelyn Bennett, and remanding the case to the employment security board of review for a hearing to determine the amount of benefits to be awarded. On appeal, the administrator claims that the trial court improperly construed General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (2) (A) (ii)1 to eliminate the requirement that Bennett must be available for work in order to be eligible for benefits under General Statutes § 31-235 (a) (2).2 We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
[622]*622The following facts are undisputed. Bennett worked for Sikorsky Aircraft for eight years. On April 22,1992, she voluntarily left her full-time position to care for her minor daughter who suffers from hyperactivity and an emotional deficit disorder. The daughter’s physician signed a certification to the employment security division stating that the daughter needs full-time care.
After Bennett left her job at Sikorsky, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits with the administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act. On May 13, 1992, the administrator determined that Bennett was not eligible for benefits because she was not available3 for work as required by General Statutes § 31-235 (a) (2).
Bennett appealed the decision to an appeals referee. See General Statutes § 31-242. After a de novo hear[623]*623ing, the referee affirmed the administrator’s decision on June 2, 1992. Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249,4 Bennett appealed to the board of review. On July 23, 1992, the board of review adopted the findings of the appeals referee and affirmed the referee’s decision.
On August 18, 1992, Bennett appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b.5 After hearing argument of counsel, the trial court rendered judgment sustaining Bennett’s appeal and remanding the matter to the board of review for a hearing to determine the amount of benefits to be awarded. This appeal followed.6
[624]*624The administrator claims that the trial court improperly applied General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (2) (A) (ii) to eliminate the requirement that a claimant must be available for work to be eligible for benefits under General Statutes § 31-235 (a) (2).
Section 31-235 (a) enumerates three benefit eligibility requirements. First, an individual must file a claim in accordance with § 31-240 and register for work at a public employment bureau. Second, the individual must be physically and mentally able to work and be available for work and be making reasonable efforts to work. This is referred to as the “availability provision.” The third requirement is that the claimant has been paid wages by an employer, subject to the provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Act, during the base period of the current benefit year in an amount at least equal to forty times the claimant’s benefit rate for total unemployment. The only exception to the availability provision in § 31-235 is that a claimant shall not be considered unavailable for work because he or she is enrolled in and attending a school, college or university during separation from employment.
Section 31-236 (a) lists certain situations where an individual is deemed ineligible for benefits. The situation pertinent here is where a claimant has “left suita[625]*625ble work voluntarily and without sufficient cause connected to his work, until such individual has earned at least ten times his benefit rate.” This is referred to as the “penalty provision.” The statute contains exceptions to this penalty provision. The exceptions include individuals who quit to care for a seriously ill spouse, child, or parent domiciled with the claimant (referred to as the “quit to care provision”) and discontinuance of nonpersonally owned transportation.
The administrator claims that the quit to care provision in § 31-236 operates only as an exception to the penalty imposed under that statute on those who voluntarily leave suitable work without sufficient cause connected to the work, and not as an exception to the availability provision in § 31-235. The administrator further asserts that this interpretation is consistent with the legislature’s intent because if the legislature had intended to include the quit to care provision as an exception to the availability provision, it could have included it in § 31-235 together with the exception it created pertaining to students enrolled in and attending a school, college or university during separation from employment.
Bennett claims, to the contrary, that the quit to care provision in § 31-236 should also be applied as an exception to the availability provision in § 31-235 despite the absence of specific language directing such an application. She argues that the Unemployment Compensation Act is remedial legislation and, therefore, should be construed to alleviate the harsh consequences of unemployment. Reger v. Administrator, 132 Conn. 647, 650, 46 A.2d 844 (1946); Waterbury Savings Bank v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 78, 82, 20 A.2d 455 (1940).
The question presently before us then is whether the quit to care provision should be applied to the availa[626]*626bility provision in § 31-235 or only as an exception to the penalty provision in § 31-236.
The trial court’s standard of review with regard to administrative appeals is limited. “Such appeals are heard by the court upon certified copy of the record filed by the board. The court does not retry the facts or hear evidence. It considers no evidence other than that certified to it by the board, and then for the limited purpose of determining whether the finding should be corrected, or whether there was any evidence to support in law the conclusions reached.” Practice Book § 519 (a). “The court’s ultimate duty is to decide only whether, in light of the evidence, the board of review has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion.” Burnham v. Administrator, 184 Conn. 317, 322, 439 A.2d 1008 (1981); Robinson v. Unemployment Security Board of Review, 181 Conn. 1, 5, 434 A.2d 293 (1980); Cervantes v. Administrator, 177 Conn. 132, 134, 411 A.2d 921 (1979); DaSilva v. Administrator, 175 Conn. 562, 564, 402 A.2d 755 (1978); Guevara v. Administrator, 172 Conn. 492, 495, 374 A.2d 1101 (1977); Taminski v. Administrator, 168 Conn. 324, 326, 362 A.2d 868 (1975).
“[T]he interpretation of statutes presents a question of law; Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 153, 158, 585 A.2d 82 (1991); which is ultimately for the court to decide.” University of Connecticut v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 322, 328, 585 A.2d 690 (1991). Nonetheless, “it is the well established practice of this court to ‘accord great deference to the construction given [a] statute by the agency charged with its enforcement.’ ” Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 496, 512 A.2d 199, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023, 107 S. Ct. 781, 93 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1986); Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 326, 307 A.2d 155 (1972) (Loiselle, J., [627]*627concurring), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S. Ct. 903, 34 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1973).
“When application of the statute to a particular situation reveals a latent ambiguity in seemingly unambiguous language, however, we turn for guidance to the purpose of the statute and its legislative history to resolve that ambiguity.” University of Connecticut v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 217 Conn. 328; State v. Champagne, 206 Conn. 421, 428, 538 A.2d 193 (1988).
In 1985, the legislature amended § 31-236 creating exceptions to the penalty provision set forth therein. This amendment included the quit to care provision as well as the exception for discontinuance of transportation that is not personally owned. In debating the purpose and scope of this amendment, the sponsoring representative specifically stated that an individual who quits to care for a seriously ill family member is disqualified from collecting unemployment benefits. When the individual no longer needs to care for the family member and becomes available for work, the individual then becomes eligible for benefits without having to return to work and earn at least ten times his benefit rate.7
[628]*628It is clear from the legislative history that the purpose of the amendment was to create an exception to the penalty provision normally imposed on those who voluntarily quit suitable work. It was not enacted to eliminate the availability provision.
According deference to the construction given these statutes by the agency charged with its enforcement and in light of the legislative history, we conclude that the quit to care provision operates as an exception to the penalty provision in § 31-236 and does not apply as an exception to the availability provision in § 31-235.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment affirming the decision of the board of review.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.