Benjar v. Ajo

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Benjar v. Ajo

15 A.D.2d 466, 222 N.Y.S.2d 124, 1961 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7133

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 14, 1961

StatusPublished

This text of 15 A.D.2d 466 (Benjar v. Ajo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Benjar v. Ajo, 15 A.D.2d 466, 222 N.Y.S.2d 124, 1961 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7133 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1961).

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Opinion

The alleged libels are contained in an exchange of cables between defendants’ New York office and their Frankfurt office. The cables concern a change of locks on the office door. They do not mention plaintiff by name or refer to him in any way. By way of innuendo plaintiff alleges that the cables were prompted by the termination of his connection with the defendants and therefore cast doubt on his honesty. Such a claim is beyond the province of an innuendo. The true function is to explain matter that is not sufficiently expressed (Tracy v. Newsday, Inc., 5 N Y 2d 134). Language clear in itself and not susceptible of a libelous meaning cannot be made so by innuendo (Tracy v. Newsday, Inc., supra; O’Connell v. Press Pub. Corp., 214 N. Y. 352). Applying those tests, it is apparent that no cause of action is or can be stated. Concur — Rabin, J. P., Tálente, Stevens, Eager and Steuer, JJ.

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The alleged libels are contained in an exchange of cables between defendants’ New York office and their Frankfurt office. The cables concern a change of locks on the office door. They do not mention plaintiff by name or refer to him in any way. By way of innuendo plaintiff alleges that the cables were prompted by the termination of his connection with the defendants and therefore cast doubt on his honesty. Such a claim is beyond the province of an innuendo. The true function is to explain matter that is not sufficiently expressed (Tracy v. Newsday, Inc., 5 N Y 2d 134). Language clear in itself and not susceptible of a libelous meaning cannot be made so by innuendo (Tracy v. Newsday, Inc., supra; O’Connell v. Press Pub. Corp., 214 N. Y. 352). Applying those tests, it is apparent that no cause of action is or can be stated. Concur — Rabin, J. P., Tálente, Stevens, Eager and Steuer, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

15 A.D.2d 466, 222 N.Y.S.2d 124, 1961 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7133, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/benjar-v-ajo-nyappdiv-1961.

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