Benjamin v. Malcolm

564 F. Supp. 668, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16852
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 19, 1983
Docket75 Civ. 3073 (MEL)
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 564 F. Supp. 668 (Benjamin v. Malcolm) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F. Supp. 668, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16852 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).

Opinion

LASKER, District Judge.

CONTENTS

I. BACKGROUND OF THE PENDING APPLICATION 670

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. CURRENT CONDITIONS — HDM 671

1. Safety 672
2. Activities and Recreation 672
3. Sanitation 673
4. Medical Care 674
5. Fire Safety 675
6. Visiting 675
7. Compliance with Consent Decrees 676

(a) Laundry Facilities 676

(b) Personal Hygiene 676 8. Breakfast Food 677

9. Duration of Stay 677

B. CURRENT CONDITIONS — AMKC 677

1. Safety 677 2. Activities and Recreation 677

3. Sanitation 678

*670 CONTENTS-Continued

4. Medical Care 678
5. Fire Safety 678
6. Visiting 678
7. Compliance with Consent Decrees 678
8. Breakfast Food 678
9. Duration of Stay 678

C. EXPERT OPINIONS 679

D. CHANGES IN THE FACILITIES SINCE 1980 683

E. DEFENDANTS’ PLAN 683

F. CONCLUSIONS 685

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 685

IV. REMEDIES FOR OVERCROWDING 688

Defendants move to modify two orders entered by this Court, the first of which, dated September 3, 1980, set a “cap” of 1200 inmates on the population of the House of Detention for Men (“HDM”), and the second of which, dated June 23, 1981, set a limit of 50 detainees per dormitory in the Anna M. Kross Correctional Facility (“AMKC”). 1 Defendants assert that the conditions in the facilities and the applicable constitutional principles have been significantly altered since the entry of the orders, and that, accordingly, the enforcement of the orders is no longer justified in fact or in law. Plaintiffs, a class of inmates residing at the facilities, argue that neither the facts nor the law have changed to any significant degree.

A two-week hearing was held in March and April, 1983 to determine whether the conditions have changed sufficiently since the entry of the respective orders to justify modification under applicable law. Following a brief history of the action, our findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below.

I.

BACKGROUND OF THE PENDING APPLICATION

This action was filed in June, 1975, alleging that plaintiffs, inmates at the House of Detention for Men at Rikers Island, a New York City detention facility, were being subjected to conditions of confinement which violated their constitutional rights. The events preceding the establishment of the HDM population cap are set forth in detail in the decision of August 27, 1980, 495 F.Supp. 1356, familiarity with which is assumed.

In brief, after a lengthy trial held in 1976-77, the parties attempted to resolve their differences by negotiation, leading up to the entry of a “Stipulation for Entry of an Order,” the pertinent provisions of which provide that:

“c. ... [T]he parties agree:
(1) that the record in Benjamin v. Malcolm established plaintiffs’ factual claim that, at the time of trial,[ 2 ]
f. The housing blocks at HDM and the institution at large were overpopulated; such overpopulation resulted in an atmosphere of tension and hostility, a strain on all of the institution’s facilities, and interference with supervision, protection and provision of services to members of the plaintiff class.
(2) Plaintiffs are entitled, as a matter of law, to the entry of a judgment remedying the conditions described in paragraph (1) above;
(3) That plaintiffs reserve the right to litigate the issue of the appropriate remedy for the conditions described in para *671 graph (1), prior to the entry of judgment, and to contest, on appeal, the specific terms of any final remedy ordered by the Court.”

On the basis of the Stipulation, the defendants’ report of the 1975 riot at HDM, the record of the 1976-77 trial and the changes in conditions between the trial and the time of decision, we concluded that the conditions of confinement at HDM violated constitutional standards as those standards are articulated in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), and that the appropriate relief was a population cap of 1200 inmates. That decision was not appealed.

Six months after the entry of the 1200 person population cap at HDM, plaintiffs moved for emergency relief from overcrowded conditions in all detainee dormitory housing, including the dormitories at AMKC, another pretrial detention facility located on Rikers Island. In response, defendants agreed to reduce the dormitory populations to 50 men per dorm. An order effecting the parties’ consent to a 50 person per dorm limit was entered by the Court on June 23, 1981.

It is with respect to these two orders that defendants seek relief.

The case history subsequent to the entry of the orders is discussed below since it easts light on the pending application. In July, 1981, plaintiffs moved for an order holding defendants in contempt of consent decrees previously entered by the parties governing conditions in HDM and AMKC. Defendants cross-moved for relief from certain of the provisions of the consent decrees. On consent of both parties, the motions were adjourned sine die, subject to a referral to a neutral third party compliance consultant, to “advise and assist the defendants in achieving compliance with the Consent Judgments and to informally assist the parties in resolving disputes as to compliance with the Consent Judgments.” (Order of June 18, 1982).

In addition to seeking relief from the obligations imposed by the consent decrees, defendants have also sought the assistance of the Court in complying with the population caps. In July, 1981, defendants moved for an order compelling the State Department of Correctional Services to remove “forthwith” from the City’s detention facilities, as the State is required to do under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 430.-20, all inmates who had already been sentenced.

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Bluebook (online)
564 F. Supp. 668, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16852, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/benjamin-v-malcolm-nysd-1983.