Benjamin v. Evansville, Indianapolis, &c., Railroad

28 Ind. 416
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 15, 1867
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 28 Ind. 416 (Benjamin v. Evansville, Indianapolis, &c., Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Benjamin v. Evansville, Indianapolis, &c., Railroad, 28 Ind. 416 (Ind. 1867).

Opinion

Elliott, J.

— This was a suit instituted in 1863, by The Evansville, Indianapolis and Cleveland Straight Line Railroad Co. against Benjamin, Blythe and Be Wolf. The complaint alleges, in substance, that in 1859, and prior thereto, the plaintiff was the payee and owner of a large number of promissory notes, which are described, and on which interest had accrued to the amount of $2,000; that said notes fell into the hands of Henry B. Allis, the vice president of said railroad company, who, without any authority of law or of the plaintiff', and without any consideratioh whatever, indorsed them in blank; that said notes had fallen into the hands of the defendant Benjamin, who claimed to be the owner thereof, and had placed them in the hands of said Blythe and Be Wolf for collection, who were threatening to collect the money due thereon for the benefit of said Benjamin; that the indorsement of said notes was fraudulent and void as to the plaintiff, who was still the legal owner-thereof and entitled to their possession. Prayer that tho defendants be required to deliver the notes to the plaintiff'; that the indorsements thereon be cancelled, and the defendants perpetually enjoined from collecting the same for the use or benefit of said Benjamin, and for general relief.

At the February term of the. court, 1864, Blythe filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint. At the succeeding August term, the death of Blythe was suggested of record, and leave was given the plaintiff' to amend the [417]*417complaint, and the cause was continued. The plaintiff* filed a supplemental complaint by way of amendment, alleging the death of Blythe, testate, the publication of his will, and the grant of letters testamentary to Thomas JE. Garvin, the executor named in the will, praying that Garvin, as such executor, be made a party defendant, and averring that a large portion of the notes referred to in the complaint had gone into the hands of Garvin, as such executor, and also the sum of $2,000, the proceeds of others of said notes collected by said Blythe in his lifetime. It further avers that the sum of $1,500 had also been collected on said notes by the defendant Be Wolf, which sum was still in his hands.

At the August term, 1865, the judge of said court, having previously been engaged as counsel in the case, declined to preside at the trial thereof. The cause was thereupon set for trial at a special term of the court “ to be held at the court house in Vincennes on the third Monday of November (then) next, before some disinterested judge who would be called to preside at the trial of causes at said special term.” The special term was held at the time appointed by Bavid T. Laird, judge of the Court of Common Pleas for the third district.

The defendants appeared at said term, and Be Wolf and Benjamin demurred to the complaint. The demurrer was overruled,.and the defendants then filed an answer in throe' paragraphs, upon which issues were formed.

By agreement of the parties, the cause was submitted to.< the court for trial without a jury. The court found as follows, viz: “ that the notes, in the complaint herein mentioned, were, at the time of their execution respectively, and still are, the property of the plaintiff; that the property in said notes, as aforesaid, did not pass out of the plaintiff by the indorsement, or pretended indorsement on the same, and delivery thereof referred to in the complaint. The court also finds that the defendant William P. Benjamin is not now, nor has he been, the bona fide holder or-[418]*418owner of said notes. The court also finds that the plaintiff is entitled to a return of said notes, or to the proceeds thereof in cases in which any of them have been collected. The court also finds that, since the commencement of this suit, and since the temporary restraining order herein was granted, an agreement was entered into between the parties, by which the said James E. Blythe and William H. DeWolf, as the attorneys of their co-defendant Benjamin, were to proceed with the collection of said notes, or such portion of them as might be convenient, and hold the proceeds of the same, subject to the order of this court in this cause. The coui’t also finds that there was in the hands of the said James E. Blythe, attorney as aforesaid, at the time of his death,- as the proceeds of a portion of said notes collected under said agreement, the net sum of §1,355, after deducting all offsets and counter-charges due to the said Blythe, and that sum of money is now in the hands of the said Thomas E. Garvin, executor of the last will and testament of the said James E'. Blythe, who is now deceased, subject to the order of this court herein. The court also finds that there is a sum of money in the hands of the defendant De Wolf, attorney as aforesaid, as the proceeds also of a portion of said notes, also collected under said agreement, but the court is unable, from the testimony, to ascertain the true amount of the same.”

The defendants moved the court for a new trial, for the reasons that—

1. The finding by the court, of the facts in the case, is contrary to the evidence.

2. The finding by the court of the facts is contrary to law as well as the evidence.

The court overruled the motion, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff" on the finding. The defendants appeal.

The first objection to the proceedings, urged by the appellants, relates to the legality of the court by which the =case was tried. It is claimed that, though the record shows ithat the case was not tried by the judge of the circuit, it [419]*419does not show a trial before any other judge legally authorized. The record, however, does not sustain the position. Wo have seen that the circuit judge, having been of counsel, declined to try the case, and set it for trial at a special term of the court to commence on the 3d Monday of November, 1865. The record in the case is badly made up. In setting out, in the complete record, the first proceedings had in the cause at each term, the clerk should state before whom the court is held. This is not done in that part of the record in which the proceedings of the special term, at which the cause was tried, are set out, but the record commences with the following statement: “At a special term of the Knox Circuit Court, held at the court house in Vincennes, Knox county, Indiana, pursuant to an order of court, and notice given as required by the said order, commencing on the 20th day of November, 1865, being the third Monday in November, 1865, before the lion. David T. Laird, judge of the Court of Common Pleas of district number three, in tho State of Indiana, the following proceedings were had, to-wit.” This statement can only relate to the proceedings of the special term, as all the others occurred prior to its date. This is not a case in which tho judge presiding should have a special appointment.

Tho regular judge of the court being incompetent to try the cause, it was his duty to fix the time for trial, and notify some other judge thereof, who is required by the statute to attend at the time and place appointed, and to hold the court.

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Related

Wabash Railroad v. Kelley
52 N.E. 152 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1898)
Wood v. Franklin
97 Ind. 117 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1884)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
28 Ind. 416, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/benjamin-v-evansville-indianapolis-c-railroad-ind-1867.