Benjamin Taylor v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 28, 2024
• Docket: 07-23-00370-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-23-00370-CR

BENJAMIN TAYLOR, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 403rd District Court Travis County, Texas Trial Court No. D-1-DC-23-500042, Honorable Brandy Mueller, Presiding

February 28, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

Benjamin Taylor appeals his convictions for obstruction or retaliation through one

issue. He contends that the trial court erred in sua sponte 1) redacting content from

certain letters despite the agreement of the parties that their entirety was admissible and

2) barring the parties from identifying the offense with which he was charged when the

letters were written. We affirm.

1 Because this appeal was transferred from the Third Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent

should it conflict with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. Background

At trial, the State alleged appellant committed obstruction or retaliation. Same was

exemplified through a series of threatening letters directed at a potentially adverse

witness and investigator. He wrote them while in custody on an aggravated assault

charge.

Both the State and the defense agreed that 1) the full, unredacted letters should

be admitted into evidence; and 2) the jurors should be told appellant had been jailed for

“aggravated assault.” The trial court disagreed, believing the prejudicial effect

outweighed the probative value of that evidence. Thus, the parties were ordered to forego

mentioning the nature of the crime, though they remained free to discuss the fact of

appellant being jailed. The trial court also permitted them to admit redacted versions of

the threatening letters. Appellant objected. He believed the offense was part of the

“nucleus of operative facts . . . both parties agree that that’s the nucleus of operative facts,

and a judge is trying to control that.”

In their respective opening arguments, the State and appellant mentioned the

substance of the letters. The State alluded to the specific threats of violence therein and

their repeated, consistent nature. In turn, appellant argued that the letters did not

constitute real threats; rather, it was “acting-out behavior” and “bus stop talk.”

The acting out and engaging in uncontrolled diatribe or “bus stop talk” served as

the underlying theme of appellant’s defense. Same purportedly derived from his anger

about his being jailed on false assault charges and failure to take his appropriate

medications. Furthermore, the theme continued through closing argument. There,

defense counsel uttered such comments as: 1) “now you realize there’s a bunch of

2 people who just can’t control what comes out of their mouth, right? True or false. Well,

if that’s true, then you can acquit”; 2) “you realize that some people can’t control the stuff

that they’re trying to put him in prison on, that’s a good argument, and it does deserve to

be made . . .”; 3) “[t]hey should have called the mental response team”; 4) “[y]ou know

why we’re acquitting this guy? Because the State didn’t call their mental health team . . .”;

5) appellant was “clearly not on his meds as is dictated by everyone”; 6) “you have got a

real intersection because the guy [is] not on his meds . . .”; 7) “[y]ou’re free to make a

distinction because every act has to be voluntary”; 8) “if you find that his talking was just

uncontrollable, are we allowed to find that his talking was just uncontrollable and not a

threat within the meaning of the law for which you are convicted of obstruction or

retaliation, that is absolutely a finding you can make . . .”; and 9) “[w]e know he said it.

We know they’re his words. We know he wrote it. We know he intended it to go where it

went. All of that stuff was done . . . [and] [t]he law allows absolutely for you to say this is

not a threat within the meaning of the law.”

Analysis

Through his sole issue on appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred in redacting

the letters and barring mention of “aggravated assault” despite the agreement of the

parties otherwise. We overrule the issue for the following reasons.

First, the ground urged here implicating the rule of optional completeness went

unmentioned below. Because the grounds underlying an objection at trial must comport

with those raised on appeal, the matter of optional completeness was waived. See

Randig v. State, No. 03-19-00083-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 847, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—

Austin Feb. 4, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (so holding).

3 Second, the Third Court of Appeals said years ago that “[a]lthough the trial judge

may rule on admissibility of evidence on his own motion, the initiative in excluding

improper evidence rests with the party against whom the evidence is sought to be used.”

Anderson v. McDonald, 486 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1972, no writ)

(emphasis added). We can see a trial court’s logic in questioning the rationality of telling

jurors that the accused sat in jail for committing a violent offense when that same person

is being tried for threatening violence from his jail cell. This seems especially so when

appellants seldom hesitate to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel after being

convicted. Nevertheless, we need not determine what the Third Court of Appeals meant

in Anderson. Assuming arguendo the trial court erred, the supposed mistake was

harmless.

Erroneous evidentiary rulings are non-constitutional error. Motilla v. State, 78

S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). As such, they do not

result in reversal unless they affect the defendant’s substantial rights. Rosales v. State,

No. 03-15-00735-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 10583, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 10,

2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). A substantial right is affected

when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict. Id. In assessing non-constitutional error, an appellate court must disregard the

error if the court, “after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error

did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Id. So too should it consider the entire

record when making that assessment. Id.

Despite the restrictions imposed by the trial court, appellant remained capable of

pursuing his defensive theme. Evidence of his missing medication was mentioned at trial.

4 His frustration with authorities failing to address “the validity to my claim” was also clear

from the redacted letters. Indeed, using all capital letters to apparently emphasize that

frustration, he wrote in one letter:

I HAVE BEEN SITTING IN THIS F . . . ING CELL FOR A QUARTER OF A YEAR NOW ON HEARSAY, HEARSAY THAT LEAD [sic] TO A WARRANT FOR MY ARREST IN AN HOUR. I HAVE PUT PHYSICAL EVIDENCE ON THE LEAD INVESTIGATORS [sic] DESK NUMEROUS TIMES AND NOT A SINGLE FINGER IS LIFTED AGAINST THIS PROSTITUTION RING . . . .

So, the jury had before it evidence providing basis for appellant’s contention that his

threats to harm were not real but rather a frustrated rant akin to one heard from someone

on the street suffering mental illness. To that we add defense counsel’s own

acknowledgement, on behalf of appellant, that appellant wrote the letters. Within this

framework of the record, we can say, with fair assurance, that the trial court’s decisions

at issue did not influence the jury. Redacting the letters and prohibiting the mention of

the phrase “aggravated assault” did not impede appellant’s defensive theme in any

appreciable way.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Brian Quinn Chief Justice

Do not publish.