1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BENJAMIN JOSEPH LORENZINI Case No. 23-cv-05904-PCP (F94673), 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 9 SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION v. 10 Re: Dkt. No. 27 RAGASA, et al., 11 Defendants. 12
13 14 Benjamin Lorenzini, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint 15 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Lorenzini alleges that defendant Ragasa subjected Mr. 16 Lorenzini to excessive force. See generally Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). 17 At defendant Ragasa’s request, this action was referred to early settlement negotiations 18 before United States Magistrate Judge Illman. Dkt. No. 20. After the parties failed to settle, 19 defendant Ragasa moved for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 27 (“MSJ”). The Court agrees with 20 defendant Ragasa that, if force was used, it was used in an effort to restore discipline and further 21 agrees that Mr. Lorenzini did not introduce evidence showing that any force applied to him was 22 excessive. Because these arguments are dispositive of the matter, the Court need not consider 23 defendant Ragasa’s other arguments. 24 For the reasons stated below, defendant Ragasa’s motion for summary judgment is 25 GRANTED. 26 BACKGROUND 27 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 1 Ex. A (“Plaintiff’s Deposition”) at 37:22–25. On October 10, 2023, Mr. Lorenzini’s insulin 2 injection was to be administered by non-defendant Nurse Alcantar. Dkt. No. 27-4 (“Ragasa 3 Declaration”) ¶ 4. Nurse Alcantar was escorted by defendant Ragasa. Id. Mr. Lorenzini explains 4 that Nurse Alcantar “[is] by the book,” and so would “give [Mr. Lorenzini] the shot in the arm” 5 rather than allowing him to inject his own insulin. Pl.’s Depo. at 2:3–9. The California 6 Correctional Health Care Services Manual requires prisoners to be “escorted to clinical space in 7 the housing unit (if available) or to the clinic where the licensed health care staff can safely 8 administer the medication.” Dkt. No. 27-2, Ex. B (“CCHCS Manual”) Art. 5, Ch. 3, Sec. 9 3.5.29(c)(6)(D)(2). 10 When non-defendant Nurse Alcantar and defendant Ragasa arrived at Mr. Lorenzini’s cell, 11 defendant Ragasa opened the food port in Mr. Lorenzini’s cell door so that he could apply 12 restraints in preparation for being escorted to a space where Nurse Alcantar could administer the 13 injection. See id. at 42:10–16. Mr. Lorenzini refused to exit his cell and, by his own testimony, 14 instead insisted that the insulin be injected “in front of [his] door.” See id. at 43:1–9, 13–15. 15 Defendant Ragasa represents that Mr. Lorenzini insisted on receiving his insulin injection “while 16 still in the cell.” Ragasa Decl. 5. Under either version of the facts, Mr. Lorenzini’s wish to receive 17 his injection at or in his cell was at odds with department requirements. See CCHCS Manual Art. 18 5, Ch. 3, Sec. 3.5.29(c)(6)(D)(2). 19 When Mr. Lorenzini refused to exit his cell, defendant Ragasa informed Nurse Alcantar 20 that Mr. Lorenzini was refusing his insulin injection. See Pl.’s Depo. at 44:5–6. Mr. Lorenzini 21 protested that he, in fact, wanted his injection, and “put [his] hands out” through the food port. See 22 id. at 44:7–45:7. Defendant Ragasa was about to apply regular handcuffs to Mr. Lorenzini’s 23 hands, but Mr. Lorenzini again refused to exit his cell unless defendant Ragasa used waist chains 24 instead. See id. at 45:9–19. Defendant Ragasa told Mr. Lorenzini to “move [his] hands,” and Mr. 25 Lorenzini refused and told defendant Ragasa to call the sergeant. See id. at 45:22–14. Mr. Lorenzi 26 “left [his] hands right there” in the food port, then subsequently reached farther out of the food 27 port, until his upper arm extended through the food port. Id. at 45:19, 46:1, 46:8–9, 49:9–16. 1 Defendant Ragasa closed the food port. See Ragasa Decl. ¶ 5; Pl.’s Depo at 51:15–16. Defendant 2 Ragasa represents that he had committed to opening the cell door if Mr. Lorenzini retracted his 3 arms, that Mr. Lorenzini had retracted his arms before the food port was closed, and that the food 4 port did not close on Mr. Lorenzini’s arms. See Ragasa Decl. ¶ 5. Mr. Lorenzini represents that he 5 had not retracted his arms, and that defendant Ragasa slammed the food port closed on Mr. 6 Lorenzini’s arms. See Opp. at 1; Pl.’s Depo at 51. Some time later, another guard escorted Nurse 7 Alcantar to give Mr. Lorenzini his injection. See id. at 57:17–19. 8 The following day, Mr. Lorenzini reported pain in his arm and was seen by medical staff. 9 See MSJ at 7. Medical records indicate that Mr. Lorenzini’s upper left arm was red, and that Mr. 10 Lorenzini reported “pain ... radiat[ing] down [his] arm to [his] fingers.” Pl.’s Depo., Ex. G. Mr. 11 Lorenzini represents that he suffered a blood clot and nerve damage but does not present any 12 medical documents recording such injuries or treatments for such injuries. See Pl.’s Depo at 13 91:15–17 (stating that Mr. Lorenzini suffered a blood clot and nerve damage); see generally Opp. 14 & Exs. (failing to include medical records); see also Dkt. No. 37 (“Reply”) at 2 (pointing to the 15 lack of medical evidence). 16 LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 17 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show that 18 there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is entitled to 19 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court will grant summary judgment “against 20 a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 21 that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial ... since a complete 22 failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders 23 all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). A fact is 24 material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law and a dispute about such 25 a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 26 the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 27 In a typical summary judgment motion, a defendant moves for judgment against a plaintiff 1 identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of 2 material fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings, and by 3 his own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,’ 4 designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 5 The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 6 determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. 7 Elec. Serv. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence must 8 be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and inferences to be drawn from the 9 facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 631. 10 ANALYSIS 11 The treatment a convicted prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is 12 confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 13 31 (1993).
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BENJAMIN JOSEPH LORENZINI Case No. 23-cv-05904-PCP (F94673), 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 9 SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION v. 10 Re: Dkt. No. 27 RAGASA, et al., 11 Defendants. 12
13 14 Benjamin Lorenzini, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint 15 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Lorenzini alleges that defendant Ragasa subjected Mr. 16 Lorenzini to excessive force. See generally Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). 17 At defendant Ragasa’s request, this action was referred to early settlement negotiations 18 before United States Magistrate Judge Illman. Dkt. No. 20. After the parties failed to settle, 19 defendant Ragasa moved for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 27 (“MSJ”). The Court agrees with 20 defendant Ragasa that, if force was used, it was used in an effort to restore discipline and further 21 agrees that Mr. Lorenzini did not introduce evidence showing that any force applied to him was 22 excessive. Because these arguments are dispositive of the matter, the Court need not consider 23 defendant Ragasa’s other arguments. 24 For the reasons stated below, defendant Ragasa’s motion for summary judgment is 25 GRANTED. 26 BACKGROUND 27 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 1 Ex. A (“Plaintiff’s Deposition”) at 37:22–25. On October 10, 2023, Mr. Lorenzini’s insulin 2 injection was to be administered by non-defendant Nurse Alcantar. Dkt. No. 27-4 (“Ragasa 3 Declaration”) ¶ 4. Nurse Alcantar was escorted by defendant Ragasa. Id. Mr. Lorenzini explains 4 that Nurse Alcantar “[is] by the book,” and so would “give [Mr. Lorenzini] the shot in the arm” 5 rather than allowing him to inject his own insulin. Pl.’s Depo. at 2:3–9. The California 6 Correctional Health Care Services Manual requires prisoners to be “escorted to clinical space in 7 the housing unit (if available) or to the clinic where the licensed health care staff can safely 8 administer the medication.” Dkt. No. 27-2, Ex. B (“CCHCS Manual”) Art. 5, Ch. 3, Sec. 9 3.5.29(c)(6)(D)(2). 10 When non-defendant Nurse Alcantar and defendant Ragasa arrived at Mr. Lorenzini’s cell, 11 defendant Ragasa opened the food port in Mr. Lorenzini’s cell door so that he could apply 12 restraints in preparation for being escorted to a space where Nurse Alcantar could administer the 13 injection. See id. at 42:10–16. Mr. Lorenzini refused to exit his cell and, by his own testimony, 14 instead insisted that the insulin be injected “in front of [his] door.” See id. at 43:1–9, 13–15. 15 Defendant Ragasa represents that Mr. Lorenzini insisted on receiving his insulin injection “while 16 still in the cell.” Ragasa Decl. 5. Under either version of the facts, Mr. Lorenzini’s wish to receive 17 his injection at or in his cell was at odds with department requirements. See CCHCS Manual Art. 18 5, Ch. 3, Sec. 3.5.29(c)(6)(D)(2). 19 When Mr. Lorenzini refused to exit his cell, defendant Ragasa informed Nurse Alcantar 20 that Mr. Lorenzini was refusing his insulin injection. See Pl.’s Depo. at 44:5–6. Mr. Lorenzini 21 protested that he, in fact, wanted his injection, and “put [his] hands out” through the food port. See 22 id. at 44:7–45:7. Defendant Ragasa was about to apply regular handcuffs to Mr. Lorenzini’s 23 hands, but Mr. Lorenzini again refused to exit his cell unless defendant Ragasa used waist chains 24 instead. See id. at 45:9–19. Defendant Ragasa told Mr. Lorenzini to “move [his] hands,” and Mr. 25 Lorenzini refused and told defendant Ragasa to call the sergeant. See id. at 45:22–14. Mr. Lorenzi 26 “left [his] hands right there” in the food port, then subsequently reached farther out of the food 27 port, until his upper arm extended through the food port. Id. at 45:19, 46:1, 46:8–9, 49:9–16. 1 Defendant Ragasa closed the food port. See Ragasa Decl. ¶ 5; Pl.’s Depo at 51:15–16. Defendant 2 Ragasa represents that he had committed to opening the cell door if Mr. Lorenzini retracted his 3 arms, that Mr. Lorenzini had retracted his arms before the food port was closed, and that the food 4 port did not close on Mr. Lorenzini’s arms. See Ragasa Decl. ¶ 5. Mr. Lorenzini represents that he 5 had not retracted his arms, and that defendant Ragasa slammed the food port closed on Mr. 6 Lorenzini’s arms. See Opp. at 1; Pl.’s Depo at 51. Some time later, another guard escorted Nurse 7 Alcantar to give Mr. Lorenzini his injection. See id. at 57:17–19. 8 The following day, Mr. Lorenzini reported pain in his arm and was seen by medical staff. 9 See MSJ at 7. Medical records indicate that Mr. Lorenzini’s upper left arm was red, and that Mr. 10 Lorenzini reported “pain ... radiat[ing] down [his] arm to [his] fingers.” Pl.’s Depo., Ex. G. Mr. 11 Lorenzini represents that he suffered a blood clot and nerve damage but does not present any 12 medical documents recording such injuries or treatments for such injuries. See Pl.’s Depo at 13 91:15–17 (stating that Mr. Lorenzini suffered a blood clot and nerve damage); see generally Opp. 14 & Exs. (failing to include medical records); see also Dkt. No. 37 (“Reply”) at 2 (pointing to the 15 lack of medical evidence). 16 LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 17 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show that 18 there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is entitled to 19 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court will grant summary judgment “against 20 a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 21 that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial ... since a complete 22 failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders 23 all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). A fact is 24 material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law and a dispute about such 25 a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 26 the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 27 In a typical summary judgment motion, a defendant moves for judgment against a plaintiff 1 identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of 2 material fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings, and by 3 his own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,’ 4 designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 5 The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 6 determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. 7 Elec. Serv. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence must 8 be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and inferences to be drawn from the 9 facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 631. 10 ANALYSIS 11 The treatment a convicted prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is 12 confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 13 31 (1993). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ...constitutes 14 cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 15 312, 319 (1986) (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation and citation omitted). A prison official 16 violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must 17 be, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable 18 state of mind, i.e., the offending conduct was wanton. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 824, 834 19 (1994) 20 What is required to establish an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain varies according 21 to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. For an excessive 22 force claim, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to 23 maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. See Hudson v. 24 McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21; Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 25 912–13 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying “malicious and sadistic” standard to claim that prison guards 26 used excessive force when attempting to quell a prison riot). In determining whether the use of 27 force was for the purpose of maintaining or restoring discipline, or for the malicious and sadistic 1 between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of any injury inflicted, the threat 2 reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a 3 forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; see, e.g., Simmons v. Arnett, 47 F.4th 927, 933 (9th Cir. 4 2022) (concluding that guard’s decision to shoot the closer of two inmates who were fighting with 5 sponge rounds, the lowest level of force available to him, to stop the fight and keep staff and 6 prisoners safe was not an excessive use of force); Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 7 2002) (holding that pepper-spraying fighting inmates a second time after hearing coughing and 8 gagging from prior spray was not malicious and sadistic for purpose of causing harm, where initial 9 shot of spray had been blocked by inmates’ bodies). 10 Here, the parties dispute whether force was applied at all. See supra I. Assuming force was 11 used, however, it is undisputed that it was necessary to restore discipline. 12 It is undisputed that, by reaching out of the food port, Mr. Lorenzini created a security risk. 13 According to Mr. Lorenzini’s own testimony, he had reached his arms out of his food port up to 14 his bicep. See Pl.’s Depo. at 45:19, 46:1, 46:8–9, 49:9–16. Defendant Ragasa explains that 15 “[w]hen it is open, the food port poses an extreme safety and security risk” because “[a]n 16 incarcerated person can use the food port opening to attack or injure staff members” such as “for 17 example, by grabbing, biting, breaking, or stabbing staff members’ arms, wrists, or hands ....” 18 Ragasa Decl. ¶ 3. Other courts have recognized that “when an inmate refuses to remove his hand 19 from the food port, it causes serious security concerns and interferes with the regular activities at 20 the prison.” Harnden v. Key, No. 1:02CV06529LJOGSAPC, 2009 WL 57637, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 21 Jan. 9, 2009) (summarizing and agreeing with defendants’ arguments while denying motion for a 22 new trial); see also Hayes v. Forsyth, 104 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1996) (accepting defendant’s 23 argument “that due to security considerations, an inmate’s food slot must be closed and locked at 24 all times, other than when an inmate’s meal is served”). 25 Assuming force was used, it also is undisputed that defendant Ragasa first attempted to 26 temper the need for a forceful response. According to Mr. Lorenzini’s own testimony, defendant 27 Ragasa instructed Mr. Lorenzini to remove his arms from the food port at least twice and 1 47:2–4. According to Mr. Lorenzini’s version of the facts, Mr. Lorenzini expressly refused to 2 withdraw his arms, and in fact reached farther out of the food port. See id. at 45:19, 46:1, 46:8–9, 3 49:9–16. Mr. Lorenzini’s refusal to comply with instructions made the use of force necessary. In 4 such circumstances, courts have found it reasonable for an officer to apply force to restore 5 discipline. See, e.g., Welsh v. Correct Care Recovery Sols., 845 F. App’x 311, 317–18 (5th Cir. 6 2021) (affirming dismissal of an excessive force claim where officer “kicked the food slot … 7 closed, causing bruising,” after the prisoner refused to remove his hands after repeated instructions 8 to do so); Erby v. Ray, 47 F. App’x 744, 745 (6th Cir. 2002) (approving district court’s grant of 9 summary judgment where defendants applied force to a prisoner holding his food slot hostage 10 because force was used “in a good faith effort to secure Erby’s cell, not for the very purpose of 11 causing him any pain”). 12 Finally, assuming force was used, there is no evidence that the amount of force used was 13 “malicious and sadistic.” See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37–38 (2010) (explaining that “the 14 ‘absence of serious injury’” is relevant to an excessive force inquiry because it may “provide some 15 indication of the amount of force applied … “An inmate who complains of a ‘push or shove’ that 16 causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.”). 17 Although Mr. Lorenzini argues that he suffered a blood clot and nerve damage after the event, he 18 did not present evidence of either injury. See generally Opp. & Exs. In the absence of any medical 19 evidence of these injuries, Mr. Lorenzini has failed to make a showing that his injury was so 20 severe as to necessarily imply defendant Ragasa used an excessive amount of force. See Celotex 21 Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23 (“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 22 nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); see also Arpin v. Santa 23 Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the plaintiff’s claim of 24 injury due to allegedly excessive force was “unsupported” where the plaintiff “d[id] not provide 25 any medical records to support her claim that she suffered injury as a result of being handcuffed”). 26 The only medical evidence in the record shows that Mr. Lorenzini experienced some pain 27 and redness on one arm. See MSJ at 7 (noting this is the extent of Mr. Lorenzini’s injuries); see 1 medical evidence does not suggest that Mr. Lorenzini experienced so much as a bruise. See id. 2 || This is not so severe as to necessarily imply that defendant Ragasa applied a wanton amount of 3 force. See, e.g., Floyd v. Santa Clara Dep’t of Correction, No. 22-CV-00750-CRB, 2024 WL 4 |} 4801852, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2024), aff'd, No. 24-6866, 2025 WL 3012645 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 5 || 2025) (where inmate suffered only bruising from handcuffs, this “lack of severe or lasting injuries 6 || supports a conclusion that the amount of force used was not excessive”); Saddozai v. Arqueza, No. 7 18-CV-03972 BLF (PR), 2023 WL 4206069, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2023) (concluding, where a 8 “nurse noted no injuries” following a use-of-force incident, that “the degree of force used was de 9 minimis and thus not actionable”); Lewis v. Stankus, No. 3:10-CV-00497-ECR, 2012 WL 10. || 3293730, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 10, 2012) (finding that swelling and a soft tissue injury were too de 11 minimis to demonstrate an excessive use of force). 12 Because Mr. Lorenzini has introduced no evidence that defendant Ragasa’s use of force 13 || was excessive under the circumstances, the Court GRANTS defendant Ragasa’s summary 14 || judgment motion. 15 a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Z 18 Dated: March 18, 2026 19
P. CASEY PYITS 2] United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28