Benjamin F. Marlowe v. J. Frank Coakley

Ninth Circuit

Benjamin F. Marlowe v. J. Frank Coakley

404 F.2d 70

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 28, 1969

Docket19-70339

StatusPublished

Cited by20 cases

This text of 404 F.2d 70 (Benjamin F. Marlowe v. J. Frank Coakley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Benjamin F. Marlowe v. J. Frank Coakley, 404 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1969).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

This appeal is from the District Court’s dismissal of appellant’s civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the district attorney of Alameda County, California, and his assistants. Appellant complained that appellees knowingly and wilfully, or with gross negligence, presented perjured testimony to the grand jury investigating appellant’s activities and that appellees wilfully and deliberately suppressed from the grand jury exculpating evidence within their knowledge. The grand jury indicted appellant for the crime of grand theft, but the subsequent state court trial resulted in acquittal. The District Court’s jurisdiction was conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and ours rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The sole issue is whether appellees are immune from civil liability for the acts of which appellant complained.

A prosecuting attorney is immune from civil suit for acts committed in the performance of duties constituting an integral part of the judicial process. Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965). In Robichaud we discussed the policy behind such immunity as well as its limitations. We stated at 536:

“The key to the immunity previously held to be protective to the prosecuting attorney is that the acts, alleged to have been wrongful, were committed by the officer in the performance of an integral part of the judicial process.”

A California district attorney’s presentation of evidence to a grand jury is clearly within the scope of his duty to advise and present information to the grand jury as authorized by California *71 law. See Cal.Pen.Code, § 925 (West 1956); Cal.Gov.Code, § 26501 (West 1955). The function is “an integral part of the judicial process.”

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM:

This appeal is from the District Court’s dismissal of appellant’s civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the district attorney of Alameda County, California, and his assistants. Appellant complained that appellees knowingly and wilfully, or with gross negligence, presented perjured testimony to the grand jury investigating appellant’s activities and that appellees wilfully and deliberately suppressed from the grand jury exculpating evidence within their knowledge. The grand jury indicted appellant for the crime of grand theft, but the subsequent state court trial resulted in acquittal. The District Court’s jurisdiction was conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and ours rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The sole issue is whether appellees are immune from civil liability for the acts of which appellant complained.

A prosecuting attorney is immune from civil suit for acts committed in the performance of duties constituting an integral part of the judicial process. Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965). In Robichaud we discussed the policy behind such immunity as well as its limitations. We stated at 536:

“The key to the immunity previously held to be protective to the prosecuting attorney is that the acts, alleged to have been wrongful, were committed by the officer in the performance of an integral part of the judicial process.”

A California district attorney’s presentation of evidence to a grand jury is clearly within the scope of his duty to advise and present information to the grand jury as authorized by California *71 law. See Cal.Pen.Code, § 925 (West 1956); Cal.Gov.Code, § 26501 (West 1955). The function is “an integral part of the judicial process.”

Affirmed.

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404 F.2d 70, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/benjamin-f-marlowe-v-j-frank-coakley-ca9-1969.

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