Benjamin F. Ellis v. Gabriel Williams, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BENJAMIN F. ELLIS, No. 2:23-cv-1962 WBS SCR P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 GABRIEL WILLIAMS, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is incarcerated in state prison and proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with 18 an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of 19 counsel. ECF No. 50. Petitioner claims the appointment of counsel is warranted based on the 20 factual and legal complexities of the case, his indigency and limited legal education and ability to 21 investigate, the likelihood of conflicting testimony, and the merits of the case. Id. at 6-8. 22 I. Legal Standard 23 District courts lack authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to require counsel to represent 24 indigent prisoners in section 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 25 (1989). In exceptional circumstances, the court may request that an attorney voluntarily represent 26 such a plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 27 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). The test for exceptional 28 circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits and 1 the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal 2 issues involved. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. 3 Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack 4 of legal education and limited law library access, do not establish exceptional circumstances that 5 would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel. Wood, 900 F.2d at 1335; Riley v. 6 Franke, 340 F. Supp. 3d 783, 787 (E.D. Wis. 2018). 7 Beyond § 1915(e)(1), other sources of law may implicate a request for counsel. For 8 example, appointed counsel may be required in a civil proceeding as an accommodation for a 9 litigant who is disabled. See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-cv-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 10 WL 3674492, at *3-*9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (granting summary judgment to class of 11 mentally disabled individuals in civil immigration proceedings on their request for appointed 12 representatives under the Rehabilitation Act). Due process may also require appointment of 13 counsel in certain proceedings. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444-45 (2011) (analyzing 14 request for appointment of counsel in civil proceeding under the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 15 319 (1976), procedural due process framework). 16 II. Discussion 17 Having considered plaintiff’s arguments, the undersigned finds that the appointment of 18 counsel is not warranted at this time. Plaintiff’s concerns regarding his indigency and limited 19 legal education and investigative resources are barriers common to all incarcerated litigants and 20 do not constitute exceptional circumstances. While plaintiff has stated colorable claims, he has 21 also demonstrated an ability to articulate his claims pro se throughout these proceedings – not 22 only through his operative complaint but in his July 18, 2025, ex parte motion for temporary 23 restraining order (“TRO”), ECF No. 29, challenging his alleged transfer to an inaccessible cell.1 24 Nor is the undersigned convinced that this case presents the type of medical complexity 25 warranting voluntary appointment of counsel. The operative complaint raises Eighth Amendment 26

27 1 The unsigned recommended that the TRO motion be granted, ECF No. 35, but later vacated that recommendation after defendants provided notice that petitioner was returned to a 28 wheelchair-accessible DPW cell. ECF No. 37. 1 | medical indifference and disability discrimination claims regarding defendants’ alleged failure to 2 || provide plaintiff with a safe and medically appropriate wheelchair. ECF No. 12. By contrast, the 3 || main case that plaintiff cites for support involved systemic, complex medical issues that the court 4 | determined required vast expert and investigative resources. See Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 5 || 272 (Sth Cir. 1992) (finding, in putative pro se class action, that the “complex subject of HIV— 6 || AIDS management in a prison environment is beyond the ability of a mere prisoner to investigate 7 || adequately”). The other cases plaintiff cites on this point were at much different procedural 8 | postures than the present case, which is still about two months out from the dispositive motion 9 || deadline. See Tucker v. Randall, 948 F.2d 388, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1991) (directing lower court to 10 | appoint counsel after reversing motion to dismiss); Jackson v. Cnty. of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 11 | 1073 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding district court erred in not appointing counsel at trial). 12 Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel is denied. The denial is without 13 || prejudice, which means that plaintiff may refile at a later stage of the case should exceptional 14 || circumstances arise. 15 CONCLUSION 16 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for the appointment of 17 || counsel (ECF No. 50) is denied without prejudice. 18 | DATED: April 7, 2026 kimk 20 SEAN C. RIORDAN 21 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28