Beninate v. Bruno

497 So. 2d 1022
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 14, 1986
Docket86-CA-131
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 497 So. 2d 1022 (Beninate v. Bruno) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beninate v. Bruno, 497 So. 2d 1022 (La. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

497 So.2d 1022 (1986)

John A. BENINATE
v.
Michael A. BRUNO, Preferred Investment Corporation, Phadco, Inc., C & T Properties, Inc., and Robert A. Guy.

No. 86-CA-131.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.

October 14, 1986.
Rehearing Denied December 17, 1986.

Martin A. Welp, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.

Jacob Kansas, Law Office of Jacob Kansas, New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.

Before GRISBAUM and WICKER, JJ., and J. BRUCE NACCARI, J. Pro Tem.

GRISBAUM, Judge.

This appeal presents issues of procedural law relating to cumulation of actions, misjoinder of parties, nonjoinder of necessary parties, lack of procedural capacity, vagueness, and prematurity. The plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the district court sustaining all of the exceptions. We affirm in part, set aside in part, and remand.

We have before us only the allegations of the plaintiff's petition, which is appended to this opinion. Basically, without joining the 12 partnerships in which he is a partner in commendam, the plaintiff-appellant seeks to sue the general partner (P.I.C., a real estate management corporation), a subsidiary (Phadco), a sister corporation (C & T), and one of the corporate officers and his son-in-law, who is an employee of the management corporation. The petition reads very much like one alleging corporate wrongdoing, charging numerous *1023 breaches of fiduciary duty, ultra vires acts, breaches of contract, comingling of funds, collections of unauthorized fees, refusals to distribute sums owed, and conversions. The allegations are both lengthy and detailed.

This Court will address only whether the trial court erred in sustaining the exceptions of prematurity and nonjoinder of necessary parties.

Our jurisprudence states that

A partnership once formed and put into action becomes, in contemplation of law, a moral being separate and distinct from the persons who compose it. It is a civil person which has peculiar rights and attributes. The partners in their individual capacities are not the owners of the partnership property. It belongs to the ideal being, which has the control and administration thereof to enable it to fulfill its legal duties and obligations. The interests of the partners therein are only residuary.

Miller v. Barnes, 135 So.2d 555, 557 (La. App. 2d Cir.1961). Citations omitted. Because the partnership is itself an entity, it is the usual proper party to file suits on partnership claims. As the jurisprudence asserts,

Under the Louisiana civil law a partnership is an entity separate and distinct from the partners thereof. Trappey v. Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co., 229 La. 632, 86 So.2d 515 [(La.1956)]. Suits for partnership claims must be filed by the partnership itself (appearing through and represented by all its partners) and cannot be prosecuted by the partners individually.

Modicut v. Rist, 98 So.2d 268, 269 (La.App. 1st Cir.1957). Some citations omitted.

As an additional corollary to the entity theory, the partnership is principally liable for partnership debts. As expressed in the cases,

It is well-settled that a partnership in Louisiana is a legal entity, separate and distinct from the persons who compose it, and during its existence it is the proper party defendant against whom all actions to impose rights against the partnership must be brought[,] and the members of the partnership cannot be sued on a partnership debt during the existence of the partnership unless joined with the partnership itself.

Harrison v. Frye, 46 So.2d 382, 383 (La. App. 1st Cir.1950). In addition,

"liability does not become enforceable against the individuals who compose the partnership, separate and apart from the firm, until it has been dissolved. So long as it continues, they must be sued through and with it. Key v. Box, 14 La.Ann. 497 [(La.1859)]."
"`Under the law of Louisiana a commercial partnership is an entity, capable of being sued, is brought into court as defendant by service of citation upon one of its members, and while the ultimate liability of the parties is in solido—i.e., joint and several—they, during the life of the partnership, cannot be charged individually except through the partnership; that is, during the life of the partnership a partner is, like a corporator in a corporation, liable and made to respond individually only through a judgment against the intellectual being of which he is a component part.' Liverpool, Brazil & River Platte Navigation Co. v. Agar, C.C., 14 F. 615 [, 615-16 (E.D.La.1882) ]."

Id. at 384 (quoting E.B. Hayes Mach. Co. v. Eastham, 147 La. 347, 84 So. 898, 900 (1920)).

The trial court, in its reasons for judgment, stated, "It is the opinion of this Court that the Exception of Prematurity should be maintained because it has long been held in Louisiana that there can be no cause of action by one partner against another prior to the dissolution of the partnership." We disagree.

The jurisprudential rule that one partner cannot sue another during the existence of the partnership was originally formulated, without citation, in Dromgoole v. Gardner's Widow & Heirs, 10 Mart. (O.S.) 433 (La.1821). In that same case, a concurrence suggested that the stated rule was *1024 subject to at least limited exception. Certain exceptions are now well-established, Parker v. Davis, 225 La. 359, 72 So.2d 877, 878 (1954), and Dohm v. O'Keefe, 458 So.2d 964 (La.App. 4th Cir.1984), writ denied, 460 So.2d 1046 (La.1984) perhaps anticipates the definition of still others. New La.C.C. art. 2809 in particular may create both a cause of action and a right of action in a plaintiff partner against other partners for breaches of fiduciary duty as to himself.[1]

However, confronted with an evolving jurisprudence and an absence of any factual findings, we decide only that the court erred in considering the jurisprudential rule an absolute bar to the present suit. At the very least, should the plaintiff be able to pierce P.I.C.'s corporate veil, its officers would be amenable to suit. Additionally, it appears neither C & T nor Phadco are in partnership with the plaintiff. Accordingly, depending on what is proved, the suit is not necessarily premature as to these parties. Finally, as discussed above, the rule barring suit by one partner against another during the partnership may not be available in extreme cases, among which might be fraud, breach of a fiduciary duty specifically owed the plaintiff partner by the defendant partner, and wrongdoing or self-dealing so pervasive that the partnership has become a mere facade. Accordingly, the ruling of the court maintaining the prematurity exception is set aside. However, because the plaintiff's claims are so interwoven with the interests of the various partnerships concerned, it is clear that the partnerships are either necessary or indispensable parties to suit under La.C. C.P. arts. 641-42. Accordingly, the court's ruling in this respect is correct.

We thus find that while the exception of prematurity was erroneously sustained, the exception of nonjoinder of necessary parties was properly sustained by the trial court. We see no need to address the court's actions on the remaining exceptions. We set aside the judgment relating to those exceptions.

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497 So. 2d 1022, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beninate-v-bruno-lactapp-1986.