Benham v. United States

7 F.2d 271, 4 Ohio Law. Abs. 207, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 3520
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit·Decided July 15, 1925·No. No. 4262·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

MACK, Circuit Judge.

On November 9, 1923, an indictment in 12 counts, under section 215 of the Criminal Code (Comp. St. § 10385), charging the use of the mails in a scheme to defraud, was returned against the defendants. Each count was predicated upon the sending of a specific letter. Motions to quash and demurrers were successively filed and overruled. The trial began January 14, 1924, and ended March 1, 1924; during its progress the twelfth count was nolled on application of the government. The jury returned a verdict on the remaining 11 counts. After motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled, sentence was imposed on .each defendant cumulative as to several sets of counts, aggregating' 20 years’ imprisonment and $5,000 fine.

We adopt the summary of the indictment as given in the court’s charge substantially as in the appendix hereto.

1. The demurrers and the motions to quash and in arrest of judgment were properly overruled. Begardless of any vagueness in the introductory portions of the indictment and in subdivision (a), matters that will be hereafter considered, the misrepresentations, falsity, and fraudulent intent involved in the scheme are clearly charged in subdivisions (b) and (c) as to each of two of the subsidiary companies. That, with the other relevant allegations essential to the statutory offense, suffices to save the entire indictment from the charge of vagueness and uncertainty.

2. While the alleged frauds in respect to the several companies might have been charged in separate counts or in separate indictments consolidated for trial, as separate schemes, that course was not pursued; each of the 11 counts charges the identical scheme with identical allegations in respect thereto. If, nevertheless, it could be said, as in our judgment it cannot, that the verdict was necessarily based upon a finding against the defendants on the charges in [272]*272subdivisions (b) or (e), or that in respect to those specific charges the jury, under the evidence, could have reached no conclusion other than that announced by it, it would be unnecessary to consider certain alleged errors in the trial.

But, if the allegations of the introductory portions and of subdivision (a), standing alone, must be deemed too vague to support a conviction, and if the court held them sufficiently specific for that purpose, or misinterpreted their meaning to defendants’ detriment, then, inasmuch as, under the evidence introduced over objection in support thereof and under the charge, the jury might well have based their verdict thereon, regardless of subdivisions (b) or (c), the judgment of conviction would have to be re-, versed, and a new trial ordered. A consideration of those parts of the indictment, their alleged vagueness and interpretation, leads, in our judgment, to this éonelusion.

Manifestly and confessedly the form of the indictment was a source of difficulty and embarrassment throughout the trial. At one time, about halfway through the case, the trial judge stated:

“When the indictment was before me on a motion to quash and demur it was not argued orally, and there is where a mistake was made. I would have understood it better, when we entered into the trial, had oral arguments been made. I examined it far enough to satisfy myself that it charges an offense, and beyond that I did not go. In the earlier stages of this case I was impressed with the contention of the defendants that the indictment is a narrow one— much more narrow than I have concluded. That is due to the unusual form of the indictment. The books are fuE of cases which set forth indictments, there being no very great dissimilarity in .their general form; but this one is out of the usual form, and that makes rulings more difficult.”

Just before this the court gave an interpretation to the indictment in these words:

“This indictment does not limit the government to evidence on the Phcenix-Portland Cement Company, the International Note & Mortgage Company, and the'Dollings Company, and a fair interpretation of it, notwithstanding the matter quoted in certain paragraphs marked (a), (b), and (e), the indictment is so drawn that that is only in addition to what appears as having been represented by word of mouth, and by circulars, pamphlets, and the like of that; and the indictment on its face, when properly analyzed, is not restricted to those three companies at all. I have said aU the while, on different occasions, that the ruling ultimately to be made wiE depend upon the— at least I have elearly intimated — will depend upon the stocks that were sold of the different companies within the. three years preceding the filing of the indictment, and I have been assured all the while that, evidence of that kind wiE be produced. It ought to have been in early in the case, so that rulings could have been made aE the way through, which would not need any change. But I do not think that this indictment bears any such narrow construction as the defense seek to put upon it, and whenever that evidence is offered, I wiE take the matter up and dispose of it finally.”

While the broad interpretation given to it by the trial judge may weE be that actually intended by the draftsman and supported by the underlying facts of the case, we are unable, upon a careful study, to find that the allegations set forth therein are sufficient to justify that interpretation.

Apart from the facts set out in subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), we think it clear that the indictment would be too vague and indefinite to stand. “The stability, ’Safety, and soundness” of stocks would ordinarily be very largely a matter of opinion. While it is alleged that false and fraudulent representations were made in respect thereto, nowhere, apart from subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), is it pointed out wherein the stocks were not stable, safe and sound. Each of subdivisions (b) and (e) refers to a specific corporation. Furthermore, the subspeeifieation, under (a), that the companies were insolvent continuously from January 1, 1921, to November 9, 1923, if construed to mean that aE the companies named were insolvent during that entire period, is far too general as a basis for proof that some one or more of them was at some time within that period insolvent. Some of them were not even in existence on January 1, 1921. Such an aEegation fails fairly to inform the defendants of the specific charges against them, and cannot, therefore, be approved or sustained.

Under the court’s construction the jury might well have found fraud in the method pursued by defendants in carrying out the original nonfraudulent Dollings plan, entirely apart from the charges in subdivisions (a), (b), and (e). But, while an indictment doubtless could have been drawn detaiüng with particularity a fraudulent scheme in carrying out the general Dollings plan during the three-year period, the vague [273]*273and ambiguous references thereto in the present indictment are clearly insufficient for such purpose.

Subdivision (a) charges that the defendants fraudulently represented that the Bollings companies had charter provisions which had in the past established, and would in the future establish, a preferred stock dividend guaranty fund, and would thereby at all times insure payment of 7 per cent, per annum on the preferred stock.

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Benham v. United States, 7 F.2d 271, 4 Ohio Law. Abs. 207, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 3520 (6th Cir. 1925).

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