Benge v. Office Depot, LLC

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 CHRISTOPHER BENGE, No. 2:24-cv-00749-DJC-SCR 11 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 OFFICE DEPOT, LLC, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff Christopher Benge brings his Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint 19 against his former employers, Defendants Office Depot, LLC, Office Depot, Inc., and 20 the ODP Corporation, alleging that Defendants violated various California Labor Code 21 provisions and California’s Unfair Competition Law by requiring him to work off the 22 clock without compensation and denying him meal and rest breaks. The Court 23 previously granted dismissal of these claims but gave Plaintiff a final chance to amend 24 his complaint. Defendants now seek dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims without leave 25 to amend, arguing Plaintiff has once again failed to adequately plead his claims. 26 For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently 27 complied with the Court’s prior guidance and that his claims are now sufficiently pled. 28 Accordingly, the Cort declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint. 1 BACKGROUND 2 I. Factual Background 3 Plaintiff worked for Defendants as an hourly-paid, non-exempt Sales Advisor 4 and Service Advisor from April 2022 to April 2023. (See Fourth Am. Class Action 5 Compl. (“FAC”) (ECF No. 39) ¶¶ 5, 21.) Defendants are retailers in the business of 6 operating and providing products and services through their retail stores and online 7 platforms to sell office related services and supplies. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges that 8 Defendants violated California’s Labor Code and various Wage Orders of the 9 Industrial Welfare Commission by: (1) failing to pay overtime; (2) failing to provide 10 meal breaks; (3) failing to provide rest breaks; (4) failing to pay the minimum wage; 11 (5) failing to pay all unpaid wages upon discharge; and (6) failing to provide accurate 12 wage statements. (Id. ¶¶ 58–115.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated 13 California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) based on the predicate Labor Code 14 violations. (Id. ¶¶ 116–22.) 15 II. Procedural Background 16 Plaintiff first filed his Class Action Complaint in Placer County Superior Court. 17 (See ECF No. 1.) Following removal to this Court, Defendants filed a motion to 18 dismiss. (See ECF No. 8.) Prior to any ruling on that motion, Plaintiff filed his First 19 Amended Class Action Complaint (ECF No. 12), which was replaced by his Second 20 Amended Class Action Complaint following the Parties’ joint stipulation (see ECF Nos. 21 13–14, 16). 22 Defendants again moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF No. 17.) The Court 23 granted dismissal, finding Plaintiff had not adequately met the pleading standard set 24 forth in Landers v. Quality Communications, Inc., 771 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2014), as 25 amended (Jan. 26, 2015), but granted Plaintiff leave to amend his claims. (ECF No. 26 25.) Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Class Action Complaint on September 3, 2024. 27 (ECF No. 26.) 28 //// 1 Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended claims on September 24, 2 2024, arguing Plaintiff had failed to adequately plead his claims pursuant to the 3 Court’s guidance in its prior dismissal order. (ECF No. 29.) The Court agreed, 4 granting dismissal on February 3, 2025. (Dismissal Order (ECF No. 36).) However, the 5 Court found that, “given Plaintiff’s efforts thus far to meet the concerns expressed in 6 the Court’s prior order, the Court will grant Plaintiff one final chance to sufficiently 7 state a claim . . . .” (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff was ordered to file an amended complaint within 8 30 days. (Id. at 13.) 9 Plaintiff filed his operative Fourth Amended Complaint on March 6, 2025. 10 Defendants filed a Motion to Strike or Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint 11 on March 20, 2025, arguing Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint was filed after the 12 30-day deadline imposed by the Court, and that Plaintiff’s claims were still 13 inadequately pled. (Mot. Strike or Dismiss (ECF No. 40).) The matter was submitted 14 without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g) on May 23, 2025. (ECF No. 44.) 15 LEGAL STANDARD 16 I. Motion to Strike 17 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a court may strike “any insufficient 18 defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. 19 Civ. P. 12(f). “Motions to strike are generally regarded with disfavor because of the 20 limited importance of pleading in federal practice, and because they are often used as 21 a delaying tactic.” Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F. 22 Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002). When considering a motion to strike, the court 23 views the pleading in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and will 24 “resolve[ ] any doubt as to the relevance of the challenged allegations or sufficiency of 25 a defense” in the nonmoving party’s favor. Id. Ultimately, the decision as to whether 26 to strike allegations “lies within the sound discretion of the district court.” Id. 27 //// 28 //// 1 II. Motion to Dismiss 2 A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can 3 be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted if the complaint 4 lacks a “cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations do not support a 5 cognizable legal theory. Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th 6 Cir. 2019) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). 7 The court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the light 8 most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 9 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 10 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). If the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give rise to 11 an entitlement to relief[,]” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 12 679 (2009). 13 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim 14 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed 15 factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule 16 demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the 17 claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or 18 formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. See id. This evaluation of 19 plausibility is a context-specific task drawing on “judicial experience and common 20 sense.” Id. at 679. 21 ANALYSIS 22 I. Motion to Strike 23 Defendants seek to strike Plaintiff’s entire Fourth Amended Complaint on the 24 basis that it was filed on March 6, 2025, a day later than the 30-day deadline imposed 25 in the Court’s prior Dismissal Order. (Mot. Strike or Dismiss at 9–11 (explaining 26 Plaintiff’s deadline to file an amended complaint was March 5, 2025).) Defendants do 27 not present any other basis to strike the Fourth Amended Complaint. 28 //// 1 The Court does not find any reasonable basis to strike Plaintiff’s claims here 2 given that Defendants’ request is based not on the merits or relevance of the 3 allegations of the Fourth Amended Complaint, but solely on the timeliness of the 4 filing, and Defendants have not shown any prejudice from the late filing. Accordingly, 5 the Court declines to strike the Fourth Amended Complaint. 6 II. Motion to Dismiss 7 This Court has previously set forth the pleading standards for Plaintiff’s claims in 8 detail. (See Dismissal Order at 3–12.) For the sake of judicial economy, the Court 9 incorporates that discussion here and will only retread those standards as needed. 10 Having reviewed the allegations in Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint, the 11 Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently amended his claims to comply with Landers and 12 this Court’s prior guidance. Accordingly, as discussed further below, the Court 13 declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. 14 A. Plaintiff’s Unpaid Overtime Claim is Adequately Pled 15 As this Court previously explained, “[c]onsistent with Landers, to state a claim 16 for overtime wages, a plaintiff must sufficiently identify tasks for which they were not 17 paid and plausibly allege that they worked for more than the statutory period without 18 compensation.” (Dismissal Order at 6.) The Court previously found the allegations in 19 Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint insufficient under this standard, reasoning: 20 Plaintiff alleges the type of work he performed off-the-clock, that he was required to perform this work on an 21 approximately daily basis, that he worked approximately 5 22 days a week, and that he worked approximately 45–73 hours per two-week pay period. Plaintiff also generally 23 alleges he worked over 8 hours a day and 40 hours a week 24 during his employment with Defendants. However, these allegations fail to provide sufficient detail to infer that 25 Plaintiff is owed overtime wages for his time worked off-the- clock. For example, assuming based on Plaintiff’s 26 allegations that he worked for 73 hours over 10 days in 2- 27 week period, Plaintiff would have only worked an average of 7.3 hours a day or 36.5 hours a week. Accordingly, if 28 Plaintiff was only required to perform a few minutes of off- 1 the-clock work each day, Plaintiff would not necessarily be entitled to overtime wages. 2 3 (Id. at 6–7 (citations omitted).) In particular, the Court noted that Plaintiff neither 4 “provide[d] details regarding his typical work schedule,” nor “provide[d] an estimate 5 of the amount of time he spent on uncompensated tasks.” (Id. at 7–8.) Without these 6 details, the Court held that it could not “plausibly infer Plaintiff experienced overtime 7 wage violations.” (Id. at 8.) 8 Plaintiff has remedied these faults in his Fourth Amended Complaint. Plaintiff 9 now alleges his approximate work schedule for each of the pay periods he worked 10 during his period of employment, April 2022 through April 2023, and estimates that 11 he spent approximately 5–10 minutes per day performing work off-the-clock. (FAC ¶¶ 12 33, 45.) Plaintiff also alleges he was: 13 [R]equired to work in excess of eight (8) hours per day 14 and/or forty (40) hours per week as a result of performing off-the-clock work, including but not limited to on the 15 following dates and/or pay periods: June 19, 2022; August 5, 2022; August 24, 2022; December 22, 2022; December 16 23, 2022, and December 24, 2022. On or about those 17 dates, Plaintiff worked in excess of eight (8) hours in a day or approximately five (5) to ten (10) minutes short of 8 18 hours. Therefore, Plaintiff was not compensated overtime at least on these dates for the 5-10 minutes of off-the-clock 19 work performed. 20 21 (Id. ¶ 63.) 22 The Court finds that these allegations comply with the standard set forth in 23 Landers, which provides that, “in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff 24 asserting a claim to overtime payments must allege that [he] worked more than forty 25 hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the overtime hours worked 26 during that workweek.” 771 F.3d at 644–45 (collecting cases). For example, Plaintiff 27 alleges that, from July 31, 2022, through August 13, 2022, he “worked a total of 28 approximately 10 shifts,” and “[f]or each of these shifts, [he] was scheduled to work, 1 and did work, in excess of approximately 5 to 7-8 hours per day.” (FAC ¶ 45(h).) In 2 particular, he alleges that on August 5, 2022, he worked in excess of 8 hours and was 3 not compensated for the 5–10 minutes of off-the-clock work he performed. (Id. ¶ 63.) 4 Construing these allegations in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court can reasonably infer that 5 Plaintiff worked over 8 hours in a day and/or 40 hours in a week during that pay 6 period, entitling him to overtime wages. 7 Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for overtime wages. 8 B. Plaintiff’s Minimum Wage Claim is Adequately Pled 9 Concerning Plaintiff’s minimum wage claim, the Court previously held that, “[t]o 10 allege a minimum wage claim under Landers, a plaintiff must, at minimum, allege their 11 hourly wages paid and the amount of off-the-clock work required in order to 12 demonstrate their wages paid fell below the applicable minimum wage.” (Dismissal 13 Order at 8.) The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim finding that, “although Plaintiff has 14 alleged information regarding his hourly pay rates, and has alleged the applicable 15 minimum wage rates from 2020 through 2024, he has not estimated the amount of 16 time spent on his off-the-clock tasks” which was “insufficient to support a conclusion 17 that Plaintiff was paid less than the minimum wage in violation of California law.” (Id. 18 at 9 (citations omitted).) 19 As with Plaintiff’s overtime claim, Plaintiff has amended this claim in light of the 20 Court’s guidance to now allege his work schedule for each of the applicable pay 21 periods and allege that he spent approximately 5–10 minutes per day performing 22 work off-the-clock. (FAC ¶¶ 39, 45.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that for each of his 23 shifts, he and other employees were “paid zero wages for at least approximately 5–10 24 minutes . . . for their time assisting customers while off-the-clock, including but not 25 limited to, while entering and/or exiting the building, before clocking in, or after 26 clocking out.” (Id. ¶ 45(z).) Plaintiff further alleges he was “informed that he could not 27 clock out later than his scheduled shift time unless he received pre-approval from a 28 supervisor as it could result in disciplinary action, up to and including, termination of 1 employment” and was required to clock out during meal and rest breaks, but was “not 2 compensated for work performed after his scheduled hours, during his meal breaks, 3 and/or or during his unpaid rest breaks, including but not limited to, helping 4 customers or responding to work related inquiries from managers/supervisors . . . .” 5 (Id. ¶ 39.) 6 The Court finds these allegations minimally sufficient to state a claim, as Plaintiff 7 has now pled that he regularly performed work off-the-clock, explained what that work 8 was, estimated how much time he worked off-the-clock, provided his approximate 9 work schedule, and stated he was uncompensated for that time. As other courts have 10 held, under Landers, “plaintiffs are required to do more than present conclusory 11 statements that they, and class members, were paid less than minimum wage in 12 violation of California law. This burden may be met with allegations addressing as the 13 hourly wages paid and the amount of off-the-clock work required.” Barajas v. Blue 14 Diamond Growers Inc., No. 1:20-cv-0679-JLT-SKO, 2022 WL 1103841, at *12 (E.D. Cal. 15 Apr. 13, 2022). Plaintiff has met that burden here. See e.g., Brum v. MarketSource, 16 Inc., No. 2:17–cv–241–JAM–EFB, 2017 WL 2633414, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 2017) 17 (finding that allegations that plaintiff had to “perform between 10 to 15 minutes of off- 18 the-clock work during meal breaks, three to four times per week” were sufficient to 19 state minimum wage claim); cf. Tan v. GrubHub, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1008 (N.D. 20 Cal. 2016) (declining to conclude that plaintiffs’ minimum wage or overtime claims 21 were plausible without “basic facts,” where there were “no allegations about what 22 period of time or type of conduct [p]laintiffs are counting as hours worked”); Edwards 23 v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. EDCV21716MWFKKX, 2021 WL 3130043, at *5 (C.D. 24 Cal. July 23, 2021) (dismissing minimum wage claim because plaintiff provided “no 25 context regarding how many minutes or hours Plaintiff allegedly worked off the clock, 26 or how often it allegedly happened”). 27 //// 28 //// 1 Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because “Plaintiff alleges 2 that his base rate of pay was $16.00 per hour from April 2022 to July 2022 and $17.00 3 per hour from July 2022 to April 2023,” and “[d]uring that period, [the] minimum wage 4 was between $15.00 and $15.50,” indicating “Plaintiff has not [sufficiently] 5 demonstrated how the alleged off-the-clock work caused his hourly rate—admittedly 6 $1 to $2 above the minimum wage—to fall below the minimum wage.” (Mot. Strike or 7 Dismiss at 13.) However, having carefully reviewed the applicable law, the Court 8 notes that California law is more protective of minimum wage violations than federal 9 law appears to be. In particular, the “averaging method” allowed under the Fair Labor 10 Standards Act — which permits a court to average hours worked by the amount paid in 11 a pay period “to assess” whether there was a violation of the federal minimum wage 12 floor — is not allowed under California law. See Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal. 13 App. 4th 314, 323 (2005). Rather, “[c]ompliance with [California’s] minimum wage law 14 is determined by analyzing the compensation paid for each hour worked . . . .” 15 Sheppard v. N. Orange Cty. Reg’l Occupational Program, 191 Cal. App. 4th 289, 297 16 n.5 (2010). California courts decline to apply the FLSA’s averaging method because 17 “California’s labor statutes reflect a strong public policy in favor of full payment of 18 wages for all hours worked.” Armenta, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 324. In other words, 19 “California law does not permit employers to shift wages paid in one period to wages 20 paid in another period” such that “workers must receive the minimum wage for each 21 hour worked during the payroll period.” Rhea v. Gen. Atomics, 227 Cal. App. 4th 22 1560, 1574 (2014) (emphasis in original). Thus, Plaintiff may be entitled to recover 23 damages for his uncompensated hours, even in weeks where his total compensation 24 exceeds the number of hours worked times the minimum wage. See, e.g., Maravilla v. 25 Rosas Bros. Constr., 401 F. Supp. 3d 886, 898 (N.D. Cal. 2019). The Court declines to 26 dismiss the minimum wage claim on that basis at this stage. 27 Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to “plead any facts sufficient to 28 establish that Defendant had knowledge of the alleged off-the-clock work that 1 resulted in alleged unpaid wages,” an “essential element of an off-the-clock claim 2 under California law.” (Mot. Strike or Dismiss at 13–14.) It is true that, to ultimately 3 prevail on an off-the-clock claim, a plaintiff must prove that the employer knew of his 4 alleged off-the-clock work. See White v. Starbucks Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 5 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (granting summary judgment in favor of employer when plaintiff 6 failed to submit evidence that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge he 7 worked off-the-clock). Here, however, Plaintiff alleges that he was required to perform 8 off-the-clock work “at the instruction of managers’/supervisors’, and/or in order to 9 comply with Defendants’ policies.” (FAC ¶ 33.) The Court finds this sufficient at this 10 early stage to infer Defendants’ knowledge, particularly given that Defendants have 11 cited no authority suggesting Plaintiff is required to include allegations indicating 12 Defendants’ actual or constructive knowledge of his off-the-clock work at the 13 pleadings stage. 14 In short, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s minimum wage claim. 15 C. Plaintiff’s Meal and Rest Break Claims are Adequately Pled 16 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s meal and rest break claims, finding 17 that Plaintiff “failed to substantiate his allegations that he did not receive all required 18 meal and rest breaks” by “alleg[ing] the approximate frequency of missed breaks,” or 19 by “sufficiently plead[ing] a single instance in which he was required or pressured to 20 forgo his meal and rest breaks.” (Dismissal Order at 11.) The Court found that 21 “Plaintiff’s general allegations that Defendants ‘intentionally and willfully’ ‘failed to 22 authorize or permit’ or ‘impeded and discouraged’ Plaintiff and the other class 23 members from taking their meal and rest periods, fail[ed] to sufficiently allege how 24 Defendants prevented Plaintiff from taking the required breaks.” (Id.) The Court 25 further held that, “[w]hile Plaintiff need not allege each violation by Defendants, 26 consistent with Landers, Plaintiff must plausibly allege he was denied meal and rest 27 breaks in some specific instances.” (Id. at 11–12.) Thus, the Court found Plaintiff’s 28 claims lacking as he had “failed to state the approximate frequency of missed meal 1 and rest breaks, explain how he was impeded from taking his meal and rest breaks, or 2 allege facts specifically identifying an instance where [he] was deprived of a meal or 3 rest break.” (Id. at 12.) 4 Plaintiff has largely remedied these faults in his Fourth Amended Complaint. 5 Notably, Plaintiff now provides far more detail concerning his shift lengths and missed 6 meal and rest breaks during each of the pay periods, thereby identifying the 7 approximate frequency of missed meal and rest breaks as well as specific instances 8 when he was denied meal and rest breaks. (See FAC ¶ 45; see also id. ¶ 74 (listing 9 dates Plaintiff received insufficient meal breaks); id. ¶ 87 (listing dates Plaintiff 10 received insufficient rest breaks).) For example, between May 8, 2022, and May 21, 11 2022, Plaintiff alleges that he “worked a total of approximately nine (9) shifts, and for 12 “[a]pproximately 8 out of 9 shifts, [] was scheduled to work, and did work, in excess of 13 seven (7) hours per day.” (Id. ¶ 45(b).) However, Plaintiff alleges that, “[i]ncluding but 14 not limited to, on 5/9/22 and 5/21/22, Plaintiff was not provided, authorized, and/or 15 permitted to take a full, uninterrupted , off-duty thirty (30) minute meal breaks (e.g., 16 Plaintiff did not take and was not clocked out for a full 30 minutes despite working in 17 excess of a 7 hour shift and 6.5 hour shift respectively)” and “did not receive any meal 18 or rest premium payments during this pay period.” (Id.) This added level of detail 19 lends far more plausibility to Plaintiff’s claims and puts Defendants on fair notice of 20 Plaintiff’s allegedly insufficient breaks. 21 In addition, while Plaintiff does not add substantial detail addressing how he 22 was prevented from taking his breaks, he now alleges he was “required to clock in and 23 out for the start of his shift, the end of his shift, and [for] his meal and rest breaks 24 located in the back of the building” and “was required to speak to and assist 25 customers before he clocked in or after he clocked out.” (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff alleges 26 this off-the-clock work occurred “regularly before his scheduled shifts, after his shifts, 27 and during his meal and rest breaks” and that he was “not compensated for work 28 performed after his scheduled hours, during his meal breaks, and/or or during his 1 unpaid rest breaks, including but not limited to, helping customers or responding to 2 work related inquiries from managers/supervisors.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges he 3 “was informed that he could not clock out later than his scheduled shift time unless he 4 received pre-approval from a supervisor as it could result in disciplinary action, up to 5 and including, termination of employment.” (Id.) While somewhat conclusory, the 6 Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations that he was “required” to perform off-the-clock work 7 assisting customers and responding to supervisors’ queries, and was threatened with 8 disciplinary action if he did not clock out in a timely manner, are minimally sufficient to 9 demonstrate how and why Plaintiff was impeded from taking his breaks. 10 Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s meal and rest break claims. 11 D. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims are Adequately Pled 12 As previously noted, Plaintiffs claims for failing to pay timely wages upon 13 discharge (i.e., waiting time penalties), failing to provide accurate wage statements, 14 and unfair competition are derivative of Plaintiff’s overtime wage, minimum wage, and 15 meal and rest break claims. (See Dismissal Order at 4; ECF No. 25 at 7–9.) Thus, to 16 the extent these remaining claims are predicated on those underlying violations, they 17 are sufficiently pled. 18 In addition, Defendants challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations 19 concerning their failure to pay timely wages and failure to provide accurate wage 20 statements. (Mot. Dismiss or Strike at 18–20.) However, Plaintiff has pled he was not 21 timely paid his final wages when he was discharged in April 2023. (FAC ¶ 103.) 22 Plaintiff has also pled he and other employees were provided with incomplete and 23 inaccurate wage statements given that the wage statements did not accurately reflect 24 the number of hours worked and wages earned. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 111.) Plaintiff further 25 alleges that Defendants “implemented an unlawful time-rounding policy and practice 26 which rounded down and reduced the actual working hours recorded by Plaintiff and 27 the other class members,” and that such “rounded time entries were inputted into 28 Defendants’ payroll system from which wage statements were created intended to pay 1 | Plaintiff and the other class members less than their actual hours worked.” □□□□ 2 | 4 45(aa).) These allegations, coupled with the allegations discussed above 3 | concerning Defendants’ failure to pay all regular and/or overtimes wages, are 4 | sufficient at this stage. Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff's waiting time 5 | penalty and wage statement claims at this juncture. 6 Finally, Defendants argue Plaintiff's claim under the California UCL should be 7 | dismissed because Plaintiff does not adequately plead that he lacks an adequate legal 8 || remedy under Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corporation, 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020). 9 | (Mot. Dismiss or Strike at 20-24.) As this Court has previously explained, while 10 | “[clourts have differed somewhat as to what Sonner mandates at the pleading stage,” 11 | “[mJost district courts applying Sonner in the Ninth Circuit have ‘understood it to 12 | require that a plaintiff must, at a minimum, plead that she lacks adequate remedies at 13 | law if she seeks equitable relief."” Watson v. Crumb!I LLC, 736 F. Supp. 3d 827, 839-40 14 | (E.D. Cal. 2024) (quoting Guthrie v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 3d 869, 15 | 875(N.D. Cal. 2021)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he and the “other class members 16 | have been personally injured by Defendants’ unlawful business acts and practices as 17 | alleged herein, including but not necessarily limited to the loss of money and/or 18 | property.” (FAC 9121.) This is sufficient at this stage under Sonner. 19 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's waiting time penalty, wage 20 | statement, and UCL claims are sufficiently pled. 21 CONCLUSION 22 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Strike or 23 | Dismiss (ECF No. 40) is DENIED. Defendants are ordered to file an answer or other 24 | responsive pleading within twenty-one (21) days of this Order. 25 . 2 Dated: June 3, 2025 Boniek CL brett 57 THE HONORA DANIEL J. CALABRETTA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28