Bengard v. Bengard

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Bengard v. Bengard

30 A.D.3d 552, 816 N.Y.S.2d 384

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 20, 2006

StatusPublished

This text of 30 A.D.3d 552 (Bengard v. Bengard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bengard v. Bengard, 30 A.D.3d 552, 816 N.Y.S.2d 384 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006).

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Opinion

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated October 14, 2004, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Panepinto, J.), dated November 23, 2004, which denied his motion, in effect, to vacate so much of the judgment of divorce as, in effect, “released” the defendant’s attorney “from any and all claims arising from” his distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the former marital residence.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs to the nonparty respondent.

The plaintiff failed to establish that some basis existed for vacating the provision of the judgment of divorce which, in effect, “released” the defendant’s attorney “from any and all claims arising from” his distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the former marital residence (see CPLR 5015 [a] [3]; Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 68 [2003]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly denied his motion, in effect, to vacate that provision. Florio, J.P, Santucci, Rivera and Fisher, JJ., concur.

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In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated October 14, 2004, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Panepinto, J.), dated November 23, 2004, which denied his motion, in effect, to vacate so much of the judgment of divorce as, in effect, “released” the defendant’s attorney “from any and all claims arising from” his distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the former marital residence.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs to the nonparty respondent.

The plaintiff failed to establish that some basis existed for vacating the provision of the judgment of divorce which, in effect, “released” the defendant’s attorney “from any and all claims arising from” his distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the former marital residence (see CPLR 5015 [a] [3]; Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 68 [2003]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly denied his motion, in effect, to vacate that provision. Florio, J.P, Santucci, Rivera and Fisher, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

30 A.D.3d 552, 816 N.Y.S.2d 384, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bengard-v-bengard-nyappdiv-2006.

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