1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LEE W. BENDER, Case No.: 24-cv-1090-AJB-MMP CDCR # BV8773, 12 ORDER DISMISSING FIRST Plaintiff, 13 AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR vs. FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 14 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ MARTINEZ, Deputy Sheriff; 15 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b) UNKNOWN, Deputy Sheriff, 16 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 Plaintiff Lee W. Bender (“Plaintiff” or “Bender”) is an inmate who is proceeding 22 pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Doc. No. 1.) On 23 December 2, 2024, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis 24 (“IFP”), dismissed his original complaint without prejudice, and granted him leave to 25 amend. (Doc. No. 6.) Bender has now filed a timely First Amendment Complaint (“FAC”). 26 (Doc. No. 7.) In it, he alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to 27 prevent him from injuring his hand on a broken cell door handle. (Id. at 2–3.) For the 28 reasons discussed below, the Court DISMISSES the FAC for failure to state a claim. 1 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) 2 A. Legal Standards 3 Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court must screen his FAC pursuant to 28 4 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), and sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that it is 5 frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 6 immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. 7 Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). “The standard for determining whether 8 Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 9 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for 10 failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 11 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim 12 to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 13 quotation marks omitted). While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare 14 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do 15 not suffice” to state a claim. Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the 16 defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 17 standard. Id. 18 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “both (1) deprivation 19 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 20 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert 21 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 22 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 23 In his FAC, Bender states that while he was detained at South Bay Regional 24 Detention Facility (“SBRDF”), he noticed that his cell door did not have a doorknob or 25 handle. (Doc. No. 7 at 2.) In May of 2023, Bender told Deputy Martinez about the missing 26 door handle, and Martinez responded that none of the doors in the unit had handles or 27 knobs. (Id.) Martinez also told Bender he knew of other detainees who had also hurt their 28 hands on broken cell doors (including a detainee who “broke” his hand). (Id.) 1 On July 7, 2023, Bender “mashed” his finger his cell door, causing “excruciating 2 pain.” (Id.) Bender received medical care from an unnamed nurse, who told him he was 3 “the fourth person that she knew [who had] had his hand smashed.” (Id.) “Unknown 4 Deputy”1 was on duty at the time of Bender’s injury, after which he told Bender that “three 5 other inmates [had] smash[ed] their hands in the door, because there was no door handle 6 on the door, and two of them broke numerous fingers.” (Id.) As a result of his injury, 7 Plaintiff’s finger was “put in a cas[t].” (Id. at 3.) Bender alleges Martinez knew other 8 inmates had hurt themselves using the defective door handle but ignored the “obvious 9 danger” and failed to have it repaired promptly. (Id.) 10 C. Discussion 11 In his FAC, Bender alleges Martinez and Unknown Defendant violated his 12 Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from injury caused by the 13 “defective” doors. (Id. at 4.) 14 As discussed in this Court’s previous screening order, because it appears Plaintiff 15 was a pretrial detainee2 at the time of the incident, his claim arises under the Due Process 16 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 17 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[P]retrial detainees are accorded no rights under the Eighth Amendment. 18 Instead, their rights arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) 19 (internal citations omitted); Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2018). 20 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee alleging a failure-to-protect 21 claim must show the defendant(s) acted with “more than negligence but less than subjective 22 intent––something akin to reckless disregard.” Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 23 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Specifically, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) the 24 defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the 25 26 1 Plaintiff describes this deputy as “black[,] . . . bald[-]head[ed with a] stocky build.” (Doc. No. 7 27 at 2.) 2 Bender states he was transferred to the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 28 1 [detainee] was confined; (2) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering 2 serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that 3 risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high 4 degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; 5 and (4) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. 6 Here, Bender fails to state a claim against Martinez or Unknown Deputy. A “mere 7 lack of due care by a state official” does not “‘deprive’ an individual of life, liberty, or 8 property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 9 (1986) (holding that negligent actions or omissions by state officials are not actionable 10 under § 1983); see also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (same). Bender states 11 that approximately two months before his injury, he mentioned to Martinez that his cell did 12 not have a door handle. Martinez responded that “none of the door[s]” on the unit “ha[d] 13 [a] doorknob or handle” and acknowledged he knew of “detainees hurting their hands.” 14 (Doc. No.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LEE W. BENDER, Case No.: 24-cv-1090-AJB-MMP CDCR # BV8773, 12 ORDER DISMISSING FIRST Plaintiff, 13 AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR vs. FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 14 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ MARTINEZ, Deputy Sheriff; 15 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b) UNKNOWN, Deputy Sheriff, 16 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 Plaintiff Lee W. Bender (“Plaintiff” or “Bender”) is an inmate who is proceeding 22 pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Doc. No. 1.) On 23 December 2, 2024, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis 24 (“IFP”), dismissed his original complaint without prejudice, and granted him leave to 25 amend. (Doc. No. 6.) Bender has now filed a timely First Amendment Complaint (“FAC”). 26 (Doc. No. 7.) In it, he alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to 27 prevent him from injuring his hand on a broken cell door handle. (Id. at 2–3.) For the 28 reasons discussed below, the Court DISMISSES the FAC for failure to state a claim. 1 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) 2 A. Legal Standards 3 Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court must screen his FAC pursuant to 28 4 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), and sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that it is 5 frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 6 immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. 7 Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). “The standard for determining whether 8 Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 9 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for 10 failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 11 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim 12 to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 13 quotation marks omitted). While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare 14 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do 15 not suffice” to state a claim. Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the 16 defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 17 standard. Id. 18 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “both (1) deprivation 19 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 20 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert 21 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 22 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 23 In his FAC, Bender states that while he was detained at South Bay Regional 24 Detention Facility (“SBRDF”), he noticed that his cell door did not have a doorknob or 25 handle. (Doc. No. 7 at 2.) In May of 2023, Bender told Deputy Martinez about the missing 26 door handle, and Martinez responded that none of the doors in the unit had handles or 27 knobs. (Id.) Martinez also told Bender he knew of other detainees who had also hurt their 28 hands on broken cell doors (including a detainee who “broke” his hand). (Id.) 1 On July 7, 2023, Bender “mashed” his finger his cell door, causing “excruciating 2 pain.” (Id.) Bender received medical care from an unnamed nurse, who told him he was 3 “the fourth person that she knew [who had] had his hand smashed.” (Id.) “Unknown 4 Deputy”1 was on duty at the time of Bender’s injury, after which he told Bender that “three 5 other inmates [had] smash[ed] their hands in the door, because there was no door handle 6 on the door, and two of them broke numerous fingers.” (Id.) As a result of his injury, 7 Plaintiff’s finger was “put in a cas[t].” (Id. at 3.) Bender alleges Martinez knew other 8 inmates had hurt themselves using the defective door handle but ignored the “obvious 9 danger” and failed to have it repaired promptly. (Id.) 10 C. Discussion 11 In his FAC, Bender alleges Martinez and Unknown Defendant violated his 12 Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from injury caused by the 13 “defective” doors. (Id. at 4.) 14 As discussed in this Court’s previous screening order, because it appears Plaintiff 15 was a pretrial detainee2 at the time of the incident, his claim arises under the Due Process 16 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 17 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[P]retrial detainees are accorded no rights under the Eighth Amendment. 18 Instead, their rights arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) 19 (internal citations omitted); Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2018). 20 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee alleging a failure-to-protect 21 claim must show the defendant(s) acted with “more than negligence but less than subjective 22 intent––something akin to reckless disregard.” Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 23 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Specifically, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) the 24 defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the 25 26 1 Plaintiff describes this deputy as “black[,] . . . bald[-]head[ed with a] stocky build.” (Doc. No. 7 27 at 2.) 2 Bender states he was transferred to the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 28 1 [detainee] was confined; (2) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering 2 serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that 3 risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high 4 degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; 5 and (4) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. 6 Here, Bender fails to state a claim against Martinez or Unknown Deputy. A “mere 7 lack of due care by a state official” does not “‘deprive’ an individual of life, liberty, or 8 property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 9 (1986) (holding that negligent actions or omissions by state officials are not actionable 10 under § 1983); see also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (same). Bender states 11 that approximately two months before his injury, he mentioned to Martinez that his cell did 12 not have a door handle. Martinez responded that “none of the door[s]” on the unit “ha[d] 13 [a] doorknob or handle” and acknowledged he knew of “detainees hurting their hands.” 14 (Doc. No. 7 at 2.) Plaintiff also states that shortly after he injured his hand on July 7, 2023, 15 Unknown Deputy told Bender he had heard of other detainees who had “hurt their hands.” 16 (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff, however, fails to allege any facts suggesting Martinez or Unknown 17 Deputy made “intentional decisions” about the matter which put Bender at “substantial 18 risk of serious harm.” See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (emphasis added). At worst, Bender 19 has alleged a mere lack of due care, which is insufficient to state a due process claim. See 20 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 (stating “inadvertent failure[s]” do not rise to the level 21 constitutional violation); see also Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. Therefore, Bender has failed 22 to state a Due Process claim against Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 23 1915A(b); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 24 D. No Leave to Amend 25 The Court previously provided Bender with a short and plain statement of his 26 pleading deficiencies, and an opportunity to amend his claims, to no avail. As such, the 27 Court finds granting further leave to amend would be futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned 28 Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘Futility of amendment can, by itself, 1 ||justify the denial of... leave to amend.’”); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 2 || F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted leave 3 ||to amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, [t]he 4 || district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend 1s particularly broad.” (internal quotation 5 ||marks omitted)). Thus, the FAC is dismissed without further leave to amend. 6 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 7 For above reasons, the Court DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte without 8 || further leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted, 9 || pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). 10 The Court further CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith 11 |/pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a final 12 ||judgment of dismissal and close the file. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: May 5, 2025 © □□ 15 Hon. Anthony J. attaglia 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5