Benard Hubbard, II v. Nexion Health at Clinton, Inc. d/b/a Woodlands Rehabilitation and HealthCare Center, Minor Med Care P.A. and Timothy Duncan Estes, M.D.

• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Decided: May 28, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CP-00019-SCT
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2025-CP-00019-SCT

BENARD HUBBARD II

v.

NEXION HEALTH AT CLINTON INC. D/B/A WOODLANDS REHABILITATION AND HEALTHCARE CENTER, MINOR MED CARE P.A., AND TIMOTHY DUNCAN ESTES M.D.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/18/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ELEANOR JOHNSON PETERSON COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: BENARD HUBBARD II (PRO SE) ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: JOHN DENSON HOUSTON STEPHEN P. KRUGER WILLIAM EUGENE GRUBBS JAMES BRIAN MORRISON THURMAN LAVELLE BOYKIN III SENICA MANUEL TUBWELL NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 05/28/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2025-CP-00386-SCT

TIMOTHY ESTES M.D. AND NEXION HEALTH AT CLINTON, INC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/26/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ELEANOR JOHNSON PETERSON COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: BENARD HUBBARD II (PRO SE) ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: STEPHEN P. KRUGER JOHN DENSON HOUSTON WILLIAM EUGENE GRUBBS THURMAN LAVELLE BOYKIN III SENICA MANUEL TUBWELL JAMES BRIAN MORRISON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 05/28/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

EN BANC.

BRANNING, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Benard Hubbard II electronically signed an admissions agreement and a separate

arbitration agreement for his father’s admission to Woodlands Rehabilitation and Healthcare

Center (Woodlands Rehab) in Clinton, Mississippi. Two years later, Benard Hubbard Sr.

filed a medical-negligence claim against Nexion Health at Clinton, Inc. (Woodlands Rehab’s

parent company), Dr. Timothy Estes, and Minor Med Care, P.A., and the trial court granted

Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. This consolidated appeal resulted. Because we

find that insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s decision to order arbitration, we

reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On November 5, 2021, Hubbard Sr. was admitted to Woodlands Rehab. At that time,

Hubbard Sr. was reported to be competent and able to communicate with nursing staff. But

during the admissions process, Hubbard Sr.’s son Hubbard II electronically signed the

admissions packet, which included a stand-alone arbitration agreement. Two Nexion

employees countersigned the arbitration agreement on the same day.

2 ¶3. Then, on November 28, 2023, Hubbard Sr. filed a medical-negligence claim against

Nexion and Dr. Estes. On May 21, 2024, Nexion filed a motion to compel arbitration, which

Dr. Estes joined. In the motion, Nexion and Dr. Estes also requested that the trial court allow

“the parties [to] conduct limited discovery in order to properly inform the [trial court] of the

facts surrounding the execution of the arbitration agreement,” primarily to explore the nature

of the relationship between Hubbard Sr. and Hubbard II at the time of admission.

¶4. During the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration, counsel for both parties

conceded the absence of a power of attorney for Hubbard Sr. and further stipulated that the

subject arbitration agreement was a stand-alone agreement not affecting Hubbard Sr.’s

admission to Woodlands Rehab. Nexion specified that it was not reliant on the healthcare-

surrogate theory of authority but only that of an implied agency relationship between

Hubbard Sr. and Hubbard II stemming from Hubbard II’s service as Hubbard Sr.’s attorney.

¶5. No testimony or other evidence establishing express or implied agency was proffered

at the hearing in support of Nexion’s motion. Hubbard Sr.’s response to the motion to

compel arbitration included an affidavit from Hubbard II stating that he had signed the

admission agreement and arbitration agreement without consulting with or obtaining

authority from Hubbard Sr. to do so. No evidence was offer to refute this affidavit, and

Nexion restated its request for “arbitration agreement discovery.”

¶6. Following the hearing, the trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration in favor

of Nexion and later Dr. Estes. In its order, the trial court expressed “concern[] with the

arguments presented,” finding that the “relative-signatory who admitted his parent into the

3 Woodlands rehabilitation facility, now, takes issue with one of the contractual agreements

he signed on his parent’s behalf, i.e. the voidable arbitration agreement. The signatory’s

attempt to cherry-pick contracts presents issues of deceit[.]” The order did not specify any

factual basis to support the decision to grant arbitration, specifically Hubbard II’s authority

to execute the arbitration agreement. Additionally, the order did not address Nexion’s

request for additional discovery. Hubbard Sr. timely appealed.1

¶7. On appeal, neither Nexion nor Dr. Estes filed a brief on the merits but instead filed

a “Concession of Error (Partial)” in which they conceded that the limited factual record

currently before this Court is likely insufficient for this Court to affirm the trial court’s

judgment. They request that this Court remand the case to the trial court for “specific

requisite findings” on the motion to compel arbitration.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8. This Court reviews the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to compel

arbitration de novo.2 Wellness, Inc. v. Pearl River Cnty. Hosp., 178 So. 3d 1287, 1290

(Miss. 2015) (citing Caplin Enters., Inc. v. Arrington, 145 So. 3d 608, 612 (Miss. 2014);

Compere’s Nursing Home, Inc. v. Est. of Farish ex rel. Lewis, 982 So. 2d 382, 383 (Miss.

2008)).

1 Following Hubbard Sr.’s death on January 16, 2025, this Court allowed Hubbard II to be substituted as the proper party in the place of Hubbard Sr. for this appeal. 2 This Court reviews “the trial judge’s factual findings under an abuse-of-discretion standard,” but the Court reviews all legal conclusions de novo. Virgil v. S. Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 296 So. 3d 53, 59 (Miss. 2020) (quoting Smith v. Express Check Advance of Miss., LLC, 153 So. 3d 601, 605-06 (Miss. 2014). The trial-court orders in this case, however, contain very few (if any) factual findings.

4 ¶9. “When determining whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, we employ ordinary

principles of contract law.” Harrison Cnty. Com. Lot, LLC v. H. Gordon Myrick, Inc., 107

So. 3d 943, 950 (Miss. 2013) (citing Terminix Int’l, Inc. v. Rice, 904 So. 2d 1051, 1055

(Miss. 2004)). “[T]his Court ought and generally will affirm a trial court sitting without a

jury on a question of fact unless, based upon substantial evidence, the court must be

manifestly wrong.” Transocean Enter., Inc. v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 33 So. 3d 459,

(Miss. 2010) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Yarbrough

v. Camphor, 645 So. 2d 867, 869 (Miss. 1994)). “The word ‘manifest,’ as defined in this

context, means ‘unmistakable, clear, plain, or indisputable.’” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Singley v. Singley, 846 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Miss. 2002)).

DISCUSSION

¶10. On appeal, Hubbard II raises several issues: (1) whether the arbitration agreement was

valid, and (2) whether Nexion waived its discovery motion by neglecting to secure a trial-

court ruling on the motion.

¶11. This Court applies a two-pronged analysis to determine whether a party is bound to

arbitration. Belhaven Senior Care, LLC v. Smith, 359 So. 3d 612, 616 (Miss. 2023) (citing

E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 713 (Miss. 2002)). First, the Court must decide

whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, and, if so, the Court must then determine

whether the parties’ dispute falls within the scope of the agreement. Id. (quoting Taylor, 826

So. 2d at 713). Under the second prong, this Court then determines “whether legal

constraints external to the parties’ agreement foreclosed arbitration of those claims.” Id.

5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Taylor, 826 So. 2d at 713). Additionally, this

Court has held that “[t]he burden of establishing the existence of an arbitration agreement,

in line with the burden of establishing the existence of a contract, rests on the party seeking

to invoke it.” KPMG, LLP v. Singing River Health Sys., 283 So. 3d 662, 674 (Miss. 2018)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wellness, Inc., 178 So. 3d at 1292).

¶12. Neither Nexion nor Dr. Estes filed a brief on the merits but instead filed a

“Concession of Error (Partial)” stating that “the limited factual record currently before the

Court is likely insufficient to allow this Court to adequately review the Circuit Court’s

decision.” In this event, the Court may either “accept appellant’s brief as confessed and .

. . reverse[,]” May v. May, 297 So. 2d 912, 913 (Miss. 1974), or “disregard the appellees’

error and affirm[] . . . when the record can be conveniently examined and . . . the judgment

may be safely affirmed.’” Stratton v. McKey, 298 So. 3d 999, 1003 (Miss. 2020) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting May, 297 So.2d at 913).

¶13. Nexion called no witnesses and presented no evidence to establish an agency

relationship supporting its motion to compel arbitration. Hubbard II’s affidavit stated that

he lacked authority to sign the arbitration agreement on behalf of Hubbard Sr., and Nexion

failed to produced evidence refuting it. The trial court did not specify what, if any, factual

basis existed for its order compelling arbitration. Therefore, we find the evidence

insufficient to support the trial court’s order compelling arbitration; the judgment cannot be

affirmed.

¶14. Second, in its concession, Nexion and Dr. Estes ask this Court to remand the matter

6 to the trial court for the purpose of conducting limited discovery, but they failed to cite legal

authority. Additionally, the request comes before this Court after either party failed to obtain

a ruling from the trial court on the motion for limited discovery.

¶15. But “[t]his Court has repeatedly held that ‘it is the responsibility of the movant to

obtain a ruling from the court on motions . . . and failure to do so constitutes a waiver.’ WBL

SPO I, LLC v. W. Town Bank & Tr., 359 So. 3d 1069, 1077 (Miss. 2023) (second alteration

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 708

(Miss, 1997)); see also Ramsey v. Auburn Univ., 191 So. 3d 102, 112 (Miss. 2016)

(“Because [the movant] failed to obtain a ruling on his motion to compel discovery, he

abandoned his discovery argument.”); Cossitt v. Alfa Ins. Corp., 726 So. 2d 132, 134 (Miss.

1998) (“‘[T]he affirmative duty rests upon the party filing the motion to follow up his action

by bringing it to the attention of the trial court.’ A motion that is not ruled upon is presumed

abandoned.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). Therefore, we find the discovery

motion abandoned.

CONCLUSION

¶16. Because the record contains insufficient evidence to establish Hubbard II’s legal

authority to bind his father to arbitration, as conceded by Nexion and Dr. Estes, we find that

the trial court erroneously granted the motion to compel arbitration. Additionally, because

Nexion and Dr. Estes failed to obtain a trial court ruling on the request for additional

discovery, this issue has been abandoned for appellate review. For these reasons, we now

reverse the trial court’s decision granting arbitration and remand the case for further

7 proceedings on the merits consistent with this opinion.

¶17. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

RANDOLPH, C.J., KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ., ISHEE, GRIFFIS AND SULLIVAN, JJ., CONCUR.