Ben Har Holding Corp. v. Fox

147 Misc. 300, 263 N.Y.S. 695, 1933 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1075
CourtCity of New York Municipal Court
DecidedApril 14, 1933
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 147 Misc. 300 (Ben Har Holding Corp. v. Fox) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering City of New York Municipal Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ben Har Holding Corp. v. Fox, 147 Misc. 300, 263 N.Y.S. 695, 1933 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1075 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1933).

Opinion

Pette, J.

This is an action to recover the sum of $135 as rent for an apartment on the first floor of the building No. 215-37 Lawrence boulevard, Bayside, N. Y., for the months of October, November and December, 1932, under a written lease entered into between the parties on December 31, 1931.

Upon the trial the defendant stipulated that the only defense to be passed upon by the court was that of constructive eviction. Therefore, the initial question of whether the defendant is hable for the October rent is resolved against him, since he admits that he [301]*301occupied the premises until October twenty-fifth, the rent having become due on October first.

In support of said defense, the defendant contends that he was compelled to move because the apartment was infested with crickets; that they caused annoyance and discomfort to him and his family. His wife testified that she became ill and nervous by reason of the presence of these insects, which were described by her and other witnesses as being black, green and silver in color, about an inch and a half long, and that they caused sleeplessness. One witness testified that she saw them crawling up the wall, and that they resembled beetles. It was testified that several of these insects were found in defendant’s bed.

The landlord submitted, in rebuttal, that although complaints had been made of the existence of insects, an investigation by its exterminator had revealed the presence of only three dead crickets. An interesting letter sent by the landlord to the tenant, as far as material, reads as follows: “You mention in your letter the existence of a plague of insects which has become unbearable. The insects you complain of are crickets and no doubt found in most of the houses and apartments in Bayside. They are harmless and many people enjoy their chirping. In fact, there was a poem dedicated to the Cricket on the Hearth, and in China they put them in cages to hear them sing. The little creatures enter the house through the doors as people enter so that if they are unwelcome they are removed by the tenant, which also removes the dust tracked in on one’s feet. However, as you know we had the exterminator attend to your apartment and as a result you found three dead crickets so we thought that ended the matter. If it is your desire to give up the apartment on some other account you should not blame it on the crickets or call them a plague of insects.”

It is well settled that eviction discharges the duty to pa> rent. (Sully v. Schmitt, 147 N. Y. 248.) The law of constructive eviction is of comparatively modern origin. The early common law did not recognize constructive eviction, actual eviction being necessary to relieve the tenant from the liability for rent. (Hunt v. Cope, 1 Cowp. 242; 98 Eng. Rep. 1065 [1775].) The cases seem confused as to what facts may constitute a constructive eviction. However, it is generally held that if there be (a) an injurious interference with the tenant’s possession; (b) a substantial deprivation of the tenant’s beneficial use of the premises or some part thereof, or (c) a material impairment of the tenant’s beneficial enjoyment of the premises so that he is compelled to vacate, then constructive eviction is thereby constituted. But the underlying, essential element which must be present is an affirmative act or omission on the [302]*302part of the landlord. If the landlord is under any duty in regard to the leased premises, the violation of which amounts to a tort, and a breach of this duty makes the premises untenantable, there will be an-eviction. (Daly v. Wise, 132 N. Y. 306; Madden v. Bullock, 115 N. Y. Supp. 723.)

In this situation, it becomes the duty of the court to determine whether the presence of crickets amounted to a constructive eviction. It has been held that “An eviction depends upon the materiality of the deprivation. If trifling, and producing no substantial discomfort or serious inconvenience, it will be disregarded and will not afford cause for the termination of the relation of landlord and tenant.” (Seaboard Realty Co. v. Fuller, 33 Misc. Rep. 109, at p. no.)

That rule makes it a question of fact as to whether the deprivation be material. Cases there are in which the peculiar facts were held to justify abandonment. Thus, in Streep v. Simpson (80 Misc. 666) the Appellate Term, Second Department, ruled that bedbugs, which infested every nook and corner of the apartment, due to conditions in another part of the building over which the tenant had no control, despite efforts to exterminate them, and which “ continued to increase, befouling the walls, emitting odors, and biting the occupants, and exhibiting in their migration a tendency to abide in defendant’s flat,” amounted to an insufferable nuisance, not attributable to the tenant, causing discomfort and distress.

A similar situation also existed in Hancock Construction Co. v. Bassinger (198 N. Y. Supp. 614, not officially reported), where the Appellate Term, First Department, held that bedbugs which came from behind the moulding on the wall, out of the cracks, and from behind the wooden panels, so numerous that they got into defendant’s clothes and habitually accompanied him to his business office downtown where “ an inquisitive bedbug would come forth from some secret place, much to defendant’s embarrassment; ” and that “ after each visit of the exterminators, there would be relief for a day of two, but then the reenforced army would come forth again with renewed vigor, and the defendant and his family would spend sleepless nights as they were unable to get a resting place in the apartment where solitude and sleep could be enjoyed,” was such an aggravated condition, “ evidently the result of negligence ” on the part of the landlord in not properly caring for its property, and subjected the defendant to such a “ disgusting experience of being overwhelmed by an army of vermin,” as to make out a constructive eviction. The decision in favor of the defendant in that case rested upon the proposition that the defendant could not pull [303]*303down the walls of the apartment to destroy the vermin. However, the court recognized that the defense of constructive eviction will not avail where the premises may be rid of the nuisance by some attention on the part of the tenant. The court said: “ It may well be that the presence of bugs and ants in an apartment, can, within certain limits, be controlled and remedied by the tenant, and which would not warrant the claim that the condition amounted to a constructive eviction, as was held in the case of Jacobs v. Morand (59 Misc. Rep. 200).” (Hancock Construction Co. v. Bassinger, supra.)

Indeed, in the Jacobs v. Morand case, referred to in the above quotation, the Appellate Term, First Department, held that the presence of the water bugs and bedbugs did not constitute eviction, citing some earlier cases. The court refers to Vanderbilt v. Persse (3 E. D. Smith, 428), in which a bad smell in the pantry, the kitchen being too hot with the stove in it, bad smells from the front window, a stagnant pond of water near the place, bad smell from fish, and vermin in the bedrooms, were held merely to be matters that might have given some trouble to eradicate, but none of them can be held sufficient to relieve the tenant from his liability, or to come within the rule that defines an eviction.” And, too, in Pomeroy v. Tyler (9 N. Y. St. Repr.

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Bluebook (online)
147 Misc. 300, 263 N.Y.S. 695, 1933 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1075, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ben-har-holding-corp-v-fox-nynyccityct-1933.