Bembry v. Pugh

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Bembry v. Pugh

366 S.E.2d 812, 186 Ga. App. 144, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 269

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedMarch 1, 1988

Docket75777

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 366 S.E.2d 812 (Bembry v. Pugh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bembry v. Pugh, 366 S.E.2d 812, 186 Ga. App. 144, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 269 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).

Pincite

Opinion

Carley, Judge.

Appellee-plaintiff initiated this dispossessory action against appellant-defendant. Appellant was not present at the trial of the action due to his incarceration on unrelated criminal charges. Appellant’s counsel, however, elected to proceed without him. Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial.

Appellant’s sole enumeration is that his absence from the trial of the action necessitates that a new trial be conducted. Where, as here, “[c]ounsel goes to trial without the presence of the defendant, but makes no motion for a continuance and does not suggest [her] desire to have [her] client present at the trial, it will not require the granting of a new trial. This is true even though the defendant contends he possesses evidence which would have brought the trial to a different conclusion. . . . The trial judge did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial. [Cits.]” Burkhalter v. Durrence, 93 Ga. App. 374, 374-375 (91 SE2d 774) (1956).

Judgment affirmed.

Banke, P. J., and Benham, J., concur. Sidney L. Moore, Jr., for appellant. William F. C. Skinner, Jr., for appellee.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Carley, Judge.

Appellee-plaintiff initiated this dispossessory action against appellant-defendant. Appellant was not present at the trial of the action due to his incarceration on unrelated criminal charges. Appellant’s counsel, however, elected to proceed without him. Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial.

Appellant’s sole enumeration is that his absence from the trial of the action necessitates that a new trial be conducted. Where, as here, “[c]ounsel goes to trial without the presence of the defendant, but makes no motion for a continuance and does not suggest [her] desire to have [her] client present at the trial, it will not require the granting of a new trial. This is true even though the defendant contends he possesses evidence which would have brought the trial to a different conclusion. . . . The trial judge did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial. [Cits.]” Burkhalter v. Durrence, 93 Ga. App. 374, 374-375 (91 SE2d 774) (1956).

Judgment affirmed.

Banke, P. J., and Benham, J., concur. Sidney L. Moore, Jr., for appellant. William F. C. Skinner, Jr., for appellee.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

366 S.E.2d 812, 186 Ga. App. 144, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 269, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bembry-v-pugh-gactapp-1988.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack