PD-1076-14 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS March 24, 2015 AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 3/23/2015 8:10:04 AM Accepted 3/24/2015 8:56:04 AM ABEL ACOSTA IN THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS CLERK
RICARDO BELTRAN, § CCA No. PD-1076–14 APPELLANT § § V. § COA No. 05-12-01647-CR § THE STATE OF TEXAS, § APPELLEE § TC No. F10-56077-M
APPEALED FROM CAUSE NUMBER F10-56077-M IN THE 194 th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS; THE HONORABLE ERNEST WHITE, JUDGE PRESIDING; AFFIRMED BY THE HONORABLE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS IN CAUSE NUMBER 05-12-01647-CR.
§§§
STATE'S RESPONSE BRIEF ON APPELLANT BELTRAN’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
SUSAN HAWK Criminal District Attorney Dallas County, Texas
MICHAEL R. CASILLAS, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Appellate Division 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 19 Dallas, Texas 75207-4399 (214) 653-3600/FAX (214) 653-3643 State Bar No. 03967500 Michael.Casillas@dallascounty.org Mcasillas@dallascounty.org SUBJECT INDEX/TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ARGUMENT AND AU T H O R IT IE S
Factual Record’s Establishment Of Inapplicability Of Sudden Passion
The Fifth Court Of Appeals Did Not Err In Affirming The Trial Court’s Judgment Because Beltran’s Testimony Could In No Way Support A Finding Of Sudden Passion By A Rational Jury. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
CERTIFICATE/PROOF OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGES
Beltran v. State, No. 05-12-01647-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 7915 (Tex. App. – Dallas July 22, 2014, pet. granted)(not designated for publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,4,7,9,10,16
Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,11,12
Fry v. State, 915 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App. – Houston [14 th Dist.] 1995, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,12
Gonzales v. State, 717 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Henley v. State, No. 02-13-00178-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13562 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth December 18, 2014, no pet.)(not yet reported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Jones v. State, 687 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1985, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,12
Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,14
McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . 8,9,11,12
Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,12
Moye v. State, No. 05-94-00841-CR, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 1952 (Tex. App . – Dallas April 16, 1997, no pet.)(not designated for publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,12
Thompson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
iii Trevino v. State, 100 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Troncoso v. State, No. 06-03-00065-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 2578 (Tex. App. – Texarkana March 24, 2004, pet. ref’d)(not designated for publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,12
Wooten v. State, 400 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,11
ARTICLES, RULES, CODES, AND CONSTITUTIONS
Tex. Pen. Code §6.04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Tex. Pen. Code §7.01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Tex. Pen. Code §7.02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Tex. Pen. Code §19.02(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
iv IN THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
RICARDO BELTRAN, § CCA No. PD-1076–14 APPELLANT § § V. § COA No. 05-12-01647-CR § THE STATE OF TEXAS, § APPELLEE § TC No. F10-56077-M
APPEALED FROM CAUSE NUMBER F10-56077-M IN THE 194 th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS; THE HONORABLE ERNEST WHITE, JUDGE PRESIDING; AFFIRMED BY THE HONORABLE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS IN CAUSE NUMBER 05-12-01647-CR.
TO THE HONORABLE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
ST A T E M E N T REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The decision of the Fifth Court of Appeals is correct and deserving of this
Court’s approval. Even though the unique underlying substantive issues involved in
the instant case and the potential ramifications of this Court’s decision relative thereto
could have far reaching consequences for the jurisprudence of the State of Texas, the
instant case is one in which this Court has already declined to extend to the parties the
privilege of presenting oral argument. Based on the state of the record and the nature
of the legal issues involved, the State finds itself in complete agreement as to this
Court’s previous decision that refused to grant the parties the privilege of presenting
oral argument.
1 P R E L IM IN ARY STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant/Petitioner (hereinafter “Beltran”) was charged via indictment with
capital murder for his role in having killed Sheldon McKnight. (CR-O: 13).1 Beltran
testified in his own defense not only during guilt-innocence, but also punishment.
(RR-7: 64-170; RR-9: 43-68). As the Fifth Court noted, “The sole witness to testify
as to the circumstances surrounding McKnight’s death was Beltran.” Beltran v. State,
No. 05-12-01647-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 7915, at *2 (Tex. App. – Dallas July
22, 2014, pet. granted)(not designated for publication).
Beltran testified that he had gone to McKnight’s apartment with Victor Ramos
and, after having used drugs, had fallen asleep on a bed in McKnight’s residence –
only to be awakened by the sensation of having his anus licked by McKnight. (RR-7:
103; RR-9: 59). Beltran testified that he panicked and screamed and then felt
McKnight – who outweighed Beltran by a substantial amount – jump on Beltran’s
back and then start pushing Beltran’s face into a pillow. (RR-7: 103-06).
In response to Beltran’s screams, Ramos came into the room and hit McKnight
in the head, which caused McKnight to fall on top of Beltran. (RR-7: 106). When
1 The appellate record in this case includes an original Clerk’s Record and two supplemental Clerk’s Records. The abbreviation “CR-O” refers to the original Clerk’s Record and the abbreviation “CR-S” followed by a 1 or a 2 refers to the first or second volume of the supplemental Clerk’s Record.
2 McKnight moved to grab Ramos, Beltran grabbed McKnight from behind. (RR-7:
107, 151-52). Beltran expressly testified, “Once I grabbed him [i.e., McKnight], I was
telling [Ramos], get some help.” (RR-7: 107). According to Beltran, Ramos grabbed
McKnight’s leg and McKnight and Beltran fell back on McKnight’s bed. (RR-7: 107-
08). Beltran made clear that he continued to hold McKnight and continued to tell
Ramos to get some help and that he was screaming, “Get some help” to Ramos. (RR-
7: 107-08).
Beltran asserted that it was only at this point in the events that he saw Ramos
produce a knife and proceed to stab McKnight with the knife. (RR-7: 108). Even
though McKnight started to flail around and attempted to go after Ramos, Beltran
continued to hold McKnight as he was kicking and continued to tell Ramos, “Get some
help.” (RR-7: 108). Beltran had the presence of mind to tell Ramos not only to get
some help, but also to stop stabbing McKnight even after having seen Ramos stab
McKnight in the face. (RR-7: 150-51). After having seen Ramos stab McKnight in
the face, Beltran eventually released his grip on McKnight and got out from under
McKnight, only to see Ramos stab McKnight to death. (RR-7: 108-10, 154). Beltran
made clear that he had not held McKnight for the purpose of helping Ramos stab
McKnight, but had held McKnight for his own defense and for the defense of Ramos.
(RR-7: 110).
3 While the trial court’s guilt-innocence charge contained an instruction on self-
defense, the jury rejected Beltran’s self-defense claim and found Beltran guilty of the
lesser included offense of murder. (CR-O: 51, 54-60; CR-S-1: 4-18). At punishment,
the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the defensive issue of sudden passion.
(RR-9: 70-71). The trial court explained that the defensive issue was not being
submitted because Beltran had repeatedly denied having killed McKnight and because
Beltran had admitted that, before he grabbed McKnight, McKnight had been getting
off of Beltran and moving toward Ramos. (RR-9: 70-71).
The Fifth Court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on sudden
passion, noting that Beltran had been “consciously aware of the danger McKnight
[had] posed, [had] tried to get control of the situation, and [had] acted with thought,
not in an excited and agitated state.” Beltran, No. 05-12-01647-CR, 2014 Tex. App.
LEXIS 7915, at *8. Accordingly, the Fifth Court wrote, “On this record, we conclude
there is no evidence Beltran caused McKnight’s death under the immediate influence
of sudden passion. Accordingly, the record does not ‘minimally support’ a causal
connection between the provocation and homicide.” Beltran, No. 05-12-01647-CR,
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 7915, at *9.
Beltran then filed his Petition for Discretionary Review, which this Court
4 granted.2 In his sole ground for review, Beltran contended that some evidence that
Beltran acted in self-defense did not negate all the evidence that he acted in sudden
passion.3
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
Beltran’s ground for review contends that the logic of the Fifth Court’s analysis
was flawed because any evidence that Beltran acted in self-defense failed to negate the
evidence that Beltran acted while under the influence of sudden passion. Thus, Beltran
contends that this Court should reverse the judgment of the Fifth Court and remand the
case to the Fifth Court for the Fifth Court to conduct a harm analysis of whether
Beltran was harmed by the trial court’s refusal to submit the sudden passion
instruction.4
Regarding Beltran’s ground for review, a sudden passion instruction may not be
provided unless the record contains evidence from which a jury could rationally
conclude that the defendant on trial committed the offense while he was under the
influence of sudden passion that had rendered him incapable of cool reflection. Since
the record was undisputed regarding how Beltran’s own testimony had showed that he
2 See Beltran’s Petition For Discretionary Review (“PDR”), at pp. 1-19. 3 See Beltran’s PDR, at pp. 1-19. 4 See Beltran’s PDR, at p. 20.
5 had never been rendered incapable of cool reflection and since the Fifth Court
expressly relied on that very testimony of Beltran’s, Beltran was not entitled to the
submission of a sudden passion instruction because the record was such that no
rational jury could have found that Beltran had acted while in the throes of sudden
passion. Accordingly, this Court’s opinion should not only affirm the judgment of the
Fifth Court, but also should reiterate that a sudden passion instruction may not be
provided when the record is such that a rational jury could not find that the defendant
had acted while in the throes of sudden passion.
For all the aforementioned reasons, this Court should either deem the granting
of Beltran’s petition for discretionary review improvident or should issue an opinion
that affirms the judgment of the Fifth Court by reiterating that a sudden passion
instruction may not be provided when the record is such that no rational jury could
make a finding a sudden passion based on that record.
6 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
In substance, Beltran contends that the Fifth Court erred by concluding that
Beltran’s testimony that he had acted in self-defense negated Beltran’s testimony that
he had acted while under the influence of sudden passion.5 While Beltran’s argument
asserts that the Fifth Court’s opinion concluded that evidence of Beltran’s having acted
in self-defense negated Beltran’s testimony that Beltran had acted while under the
influence of sudden passion, the Fifth Court’s opinion actually stated that Beltran’s
`testimony had shown that Beltran had “acted with thought, . . .” Beltran, No. 05-12-
01647-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 7915, at *8. Since this Court’s jurisprudence is
clear regarding how the evidence must show that the defendant actually acted under
an influence so great that it caused him to lose his capacity for cool reflection and that
a sudden passion instruction should be provided only when the record is such that a
rational jury could find that the defendant had acted while under the influence of
sudden passion, the Fifth Court did not err in affirming the trial court’s judgment of
conviction because Beltran’s own testimony repeatedly demonstrated that Beltran had
never been rendered incapable of cool reflection. Accordingly, a finding of sudden
passion was not one that a rational jury could have made on the record in the instant
case.
5 See Beltran’s Merit Brief, at pp. 1-21.
7 Factual Record’s Establishment Of Inapplicability Of Sudden Passion
The Fifth Court Of Appeals Did Not Err In Affirming The Trial Court’s Judgment Because Beltran’s Testimony Could In No Way Support A Finding Of Sudden Passion By A Rational Jury.
A finding that a defendant committed a murder while under the immediate
influence of sudden passion can render the murder committed a second degree felony
instead of a first degree felony. See, e.g., Trevino v. State, 100 S.W.3d 232, 237 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003). The defendant bears the burden of proving sudden passion by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Tex. Pen. Code §19.02(d); Trevino, 100 S.W.3d
at 237.
In order for sudden passion to be an issue that should be submitted to the jury,
there must be evidence that the defendant on trial “actually acted under the influence
of a fear so great that it caused him to lose his capacity for cool reflection.” Wooten
v. State, 400 S.W.3d 601, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). While the evidence that
entitles a defendant to submission of the sudden passion instruction may be strong,
weak, contradicted, unimpeached, or unbelievable, the evidence “cannot be so weak,
contested, or incredible that it could not support such a finding by a rational jury.”
McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Moore v. State, 969
S.W.2d 4, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). When the evidence shows that the defendant
had not been rendered incapable of cool reflection, the issue of sudden passion should
8 not be submitted because an essential element of the issue has been refuted, especially
in those situations where it is the defendant’s own testimony that demonstrates that he
or she had not been deprived of his capacity to exercise cool reflection. See, e.g.,
McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 570; Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983); Fry v. State, 915 S.W.2d 554, 558 (Tex. App. – Houston [14 th Dist.]
1995, no pet.); see also, e.g., Troncoso v. State, No. 06-03-00065-CR, 2004 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2578, at *23-24 (Tex. App. – Texarkana March 24, 2004, pet. ref’d)(not
designated for publication); Moye v. State, No. 05-94-00841-CR, 1997 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1952, at *31-32 (Tex. App . – Dallas April 16, 1997, no pet.)(not designated
for publication), citing Jones v. State, 687 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1985,
pet. ref’d).
In the instant case, the Fifth Court expressly noted how the evidence had shown
that Beltran had been “consciously aware of the danger McKnight [had] posed, [had]
tried to get control of the situation, and [had] acted with thought, not in an excited and
agitated state.” Beltran, No. 05-12-01647-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 7915, at *8.
Accordingly, the Fifth Court wrote, “On this record, we conclude there is no evidence
Beltran caused McKnight’s death under the immediate influence of sudden passion.
Accordingly, the record does not ‘minimally support’ a causal connection between the
provocation and homicide.” Beltran, No. 05-12-01647-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS
9 7915, at *9. As such, the opinion of the Fifth Court leaves no doubt that the Fifth
Court’s conclusion that there had been no evidence that Beltran had acted while under
the influence of sudden passion was based on the evidence that showed that Beltran
had never been rendered incapable of cool reflection, but actually had “acted with
thought.” Beltran, No. 05-12-01647-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 7915, at *8.
A review of the record reveals the correct nature of the Fifth Court’s conclusion.
While Beltran claimed more than once that he had panicked, Beltran repeatedly
claimed that he had grabbed and held McKnight and that he had told Ramos to seek
help. (RR-7: 104-10, 145-52). According to the record, Beltran also admitted that,
while Ramos was in the act of stabbing McKnight, Beltran told Ramos to stop. (RR-7:
150-51).
Beltran repeatedly made clear, however, that he had not even moved to grab
McKnight until after McKnight had moved to go after Ramos. (RR-7: 107, 151).
According to Beltran’s own testimony, Beltran grabbed McKnight and told Ramos to
go get help not only before Beltran had even noticed that Ramos had a knife, but also
during the time that McKnight was flailing around (while being stabbed by Ramos)
and even after having seen McKnight get stabbed in the face by Ramos. (RR-7: 104-
10, 150).
As such, the record makes clear that Beltran always had the presence of mind
10 not only to urge Ramos to go and get help, but also to tell Ramos to stop stabbing
McKnight. (RR-7: 150-51). If anything, Beltran’s own testimony demonstrates that
Beltran was not entitled to sudden passion because Beltran’s actions were not
“emotional responses to provocation,” but were “deliberate and done with
forethought.” McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 571. Stated differently, Beltran was not
entitled to sudden passion because Beltran’s testimony establishing the deliberate
nature of the combination of his conduct and thought processes meant that Beltran had
not “actually acted under the influence of a fear so great that it [had] caused him to lose
his capacity for cool reflection.” Wooten, 400 S.W.3d at 609.
Under this Court’s own long-standing precedent, Beltran’s testimony showing
that he had never been rendered incapable of cool reflection negated sudden passion
as an issue on which the jury should be instructed. In Daniels, Daniels testified that
he had shot the victim because he had been in fear that the victim was going to kill
him. Daniels, 645 S.W.2d at 461. However, Daniels’ testimony on cross-examination
showed that Daniels had never lacked the ability for cool reflection. Daniels, 645
S.W.2d at 461. Accordingly, this Court concluded that Daniels’ own assessment of
the situation had refuted one of the essential elements required to raise the issue of
sudden passion, that the actor had been rendered incapable of cool reflection. Daniels,
645 S.W.2d at 461.
11 Moreover, the Daniels opinion is no way constitutes the only time that this Court
has concluded that sudden passion was not applicable because the record had shown
that the defendant on trial had not been rendered incapable of cool reflection. See, e.g.,
McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 550-71; Gonzales v. State, 717 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986). Likewise, Texas jurisprudence contains other examples from the
intermediate appellate courts that are entirely consistent with this Court’s
aforementioned jurisprudence regarding how a jury should not be instructed on sudden
passion when the defendant on trial was not rendered incapable of cool reflection. See,
e.g., Fry, 915 S.W.2d at 558; Jones, 687 S.W.2d at 428; see also, e.g., Troncoso, No.
06-03-00065-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 2578, at *23-24; Moye, No. 05-94-00841-
CR, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 1952, at *31-32.
Furthermore, this Court’s precedents require that a sudden passion instruction
is to be provided only if the record is such that a finding of sudden passion was one
that a rational jury could make. See McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 569; Moore, 969
S.W.2d at 11. Based on the legal requirements that a defendant must prove sudden
passion by a preponderance of the evidence and the record must be such that a rational
jury could have found that the defendant had been deprived or his or her ability to
engage in cool reflection because he or she had acted while under the immediate
influence of sudden passion, the State disagrees with Beltran’s contention that evidence
12 of acting in self-defense does not negate evidence of having acted under the influence
of sudden passion. While there may be some case with a highly unique set of facts that
would in theory support Beltran’s contention, sudden passion should not submitted if
the record is such that no rational jury could have made a finding of sudden passion
based thereon. If the factual record is such that it could not provide the basis for a
rational jury to find sudden passion, then evidence that supports self-defense may well
negate sudden passion, especially where – as here – the evidence fails to show that the
defendant was rendered incapable of cool reflection. See, e.g., Henley v. State, No.
02-13-00178-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13562, at *17 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth
December 18, 2014, no pet.)(not yet reported)(“Sudden passion is not an element of
self-defense or defense of another. The need for immediate action in defense of
another does not rest on sudden passion but, rather, on the need to act immediately to
protect the other person.”).
Regarding whether a record was sufficient for a rational jury to have made a
certain finding based thereon, this Court has – in the context of whether a lesser
included offense instruction should have been submitted – provided guidance as to
whether the defendant’s own testimony had been such that a rational jury could have
concluded therefrom that the defendant had been guilty only of the requested lesser
included offense. See Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
13 In Mathis, this Court assessed Mathis’ testimony and concluded – based on the
inconsistencies thereof and the physical evidence – that Mathis’ testimony had failed
to constitute evidence upon which a jury could have rationally found that Mathis’
actions towards the victim had been merely reckless. Mathis, 67 S.W.3d at 926.
In the instant case, the record was undisputed that Beltran lied repeatedly when
he was interviewed by the police and even initially gave the police a false name. (RR-
7: 135-37, 165-66). Beltran’s lies to the police included lies about having been at
McKnight’s apartment before (so as to explain the potential presence of Beltran’s DNA
and/or fingerprints) and lies about not having had anything to do with McKnight’s
death. (RR-7: 137, 165-66).
While Beltran’s demonstrated willingness to lie was so great that no rational jury
would be willing to give credence to anything Beltran had to say in his own favor, the
remainder of Beltran’s testimony provided further evidence from which no rational
jury could have ever found that Beltran had been rendered incapable of cool reflection.
Beltran admitted that – almost immediately upon McKnight’s death – Beltran himself
had taken McKnight’s shoes and some of McKnight’s clothing because Beltran’s own
clothing was bloody. (RR-7: 110, 126-27, 155-57). While Beltran tried to claim that
he had taken the clothes because he was in a panic, Beltran’s having taken the clothes
actually proves that Beltran was thinking clearly immediately after the death of
14 McKnight because Beltran’s taking of McKnight’s clothes solved the dilemma
presented by the bloody state of Beltran’s own clothes. (RR-7: 110-12).
While Beltran claimed that Ramos was also panicking, Beltran admitted that it
was Ramos who had suggested making the crime scene look like McKnight had been
the victim of a robbery, which actually seems like more deliberative planning (as
opposed to a panicked reaction that occurred without any cool reflection). (RR-7: 112-
14). Beltran also admitted that he donned a disguise while loading McKnight’s
property into McKnight’s vehicle, which was still more evidence that Beltran was fully
capable of engaging in deliberative conduct soon after the death of McKnight. (RR-7:
120).
While Beltran claimed that he had originally left his clothes and a bloody towel
in McKnight’s apartment, Beltran admitted the he had still had the presence of mind
not only to realize that he had left his clothes and the bloody towel at the crime scene,
but also that it was necessary to return to the crime scene and retrieve those items
because they could connect him to the crime. (RR-7: 113, 159). Clearly, Beltran’s
ability to assess accurately that he had left evidence at the crime scene that could
connect him thereto – and that he needed to retrieve that evidence – are in no way
consistent with a mind that had been rendered incapable of cool reflection.
Once Beltran and Ramos had a collision in McKnight’s vehicle, Beltran also
15 appreciated the potential benefits of taking McKnight’s television from the wrecked
vehicle. (RR-7: 130-35). Beltran explained that he thought he could use the television
either to barter for assistance (such as obtaining a ride or other aid from another
person) or as a prop to obscure his identity. (RR-7: 132-33, 143). Moreover, the logic
of Beltran’s plan was conclusively demonstrated by Beltran’s own testimony wherein
Beltran admitted that he had actually been able to use McKnight’s television in just the
way he had planned and had done so by trading it to a black male who offered to let
Beltran and Ramos hide in a nearby house to which the black male had access. (RR-7:
132-35). When the black male informed Beltran that he and Ramos needed to leave,
Beltran still had the presence of mind to ask the black male if leaving by the back door
would be acceptable. (RR-7: 133-34).
For all the aforementioned reasons, the Fifth Court in no way erred by
concluding that the trial court’s refusal to submit the sudden passion instruction
constituted no error whatsoever. Beltran, No. 05-12-01647-CR, 2014 Tex. App.
LEXIS 7915, at *8-9. However, the legal principles discussed so far herein are not the
only reasons why the judgment of the Fifth Court should be affirmed. Based on the
unique facts of the instant case, Beltran is in a very real sense arguing in effect for
recognition in the law that the concept of sudden passion should have some type of
component whereby the basis for the alleged sudden passion may be either transferred
16 to another or exercised vicariously.
Had Beltran claimed that he had grabbed McKnight and had then continued to
restrain McKnight even while Ramos was stabbing McKnight because Beltran himself
had been so enraged and terrified by McKnight’s conduct in sexually assaulting Beltran
and then trying to smother Beltran, then perhaps, Beltran’s testimony would have been
sufficient for a rational jury to have found sudden passion therefrom. However,
Beltran never asserted that his act of holding McKnight had been something that
Beltran had done as a result of having had his capacity to engage in cool reflection
overcome by his fear, terror, or rage.
Moreover, Beltran repeatedly claimed that he had never intended to harm
McKnight, that all he had done was hold McKnight while he himself was telling
Ramos to get help, and that he had never stabbed McKnight nor intended to assist or
facilitate Ramos’ stabbing of McKnight. (RR-7: 103-10, 119, 138, 145-51; RR-9: 67).
According to Beltran’s version of the events, only Ramos perpetrated any conduct
against McKnight that actually inflicted any killing blows to McKnight. As such,
Beltran seems to be claiming that Ramos could stab McKnight based on what
McKnight had done to Beltran and that Beltran should receive the sudden passion
instruction even though the record contains no evidence that anything was done to
Ramos that would have caused Ramos to act in sudden passion or that would have
17 justified Ramos’ having acted while under the influence of sudden passion.
While Beltran’s having been subjected to having his anus licked by McKnight
and having had his face pushed into a pillow might have been the type of conduct that
could have justified Beltran’s having been rendered incapable of cool reflection, the
record is devoid of any evidence that Ramos was subjected to those actions or that
Ramos had even known what had caused Beltran initially to scream. While Ramos
could well have been justified in attacking McKnight in an effort to defend Beltran, the
fact that Ramos might have been justified in acting in defense of Beltran would not
necessarily provide any grounds for a conclusion that Ramos’ actions had been
committed while Ramos was under the influence of sudden passion.
Finally, Beltran repeatedly testified to the effect that he had held McKnight for
the purpose of providing Ramos with an opportunity to obtain the help that Beltran was
telling Ramos to go get. (RR-7: 107-09, 150-52). While Beltran’s having held
McKnight undoubtedly facilitated Ramos’ stabbing of McKnight, Beltan never claimed
that his act of holding McKnight was conduct he had engaged in as a result of having
been rendered incapable of cool reflection. (RR-7: 64-170). As discussed earlier,
Beltran repeatedly demonstrated that he had never been rendered incapable of cool
reflection because he doggedly reiterated that he had held McKnight (while telling
Ramos to go get help) because he wanted Ramos to be able to go get help. (RR-7:
18 107-09, 150-52). Clearly, Beltran’s having held McKnight (after McKnight had
started moving toward Ramos) and Beltran’s having admitted having done so while
telling Ramos to go obtain help is more akin to acting in a deliberate manner because
Beltran’s act of holding McKnight is the type of act that would facilitate Ramos’ ability
to follow Beltran’s instructions to go get help by making certain that McKnight did not
interfere with Ramos’ ability to seek assistance from some other person.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Fifth Court should also be affirmed because
– on the record presented herein – a conclusion that Beltran was entitled to sudden
passion would amount to a conclusion that the sudden passion that might (under the
proper set of facts) pertain to the person who had merely held the victim could
somehow be attributed to the person who had actually inflicted the killing blows (even
though that person had not been subjected to the acts from which the sudden passion
might have arisen). While the State is aware that the law recognizes the concept of
transferred intent, the State has found no case recognizing that acting in the throes of
sudden passion may be accomplished vicariously or that the cause of sudden passion
that might exist as to one person may be transferred to another person who had not
experienced what may have inspired the sudden passion in the original person. See,
e.g., Tex. Pen. Code §6.04; Thompson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 787, 792 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). While the State is aware that one person can be legally responsible for the
19 actions of another person under a legal theory such as the law of parties liability, the
State has found no case establishing that a second person may been deemed to have
acted in sudden passion based on the actions that may have caused sudden passion to
exist in a different, original person, especially when there has been no showing that
the second person experienced whatever it was that could have caused sudden passion
to exist in the original person. See, e.g., Tex. Pen. Code §7.01; Tex. Pen. Code
§7.02; Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In light of the
State’s inability to find any case recognizing a legal doctrine of transferred or vicarious
sudden passion and based on the record in the instant case, the instant case fails to
constitute the type of case in which such a novel legal doctrine should be recognized
or promulgated by this Court.
For all the aforementioned reasons and based on all the legal authority cited in
support thereof and in conjunction therewith, the ultimate judgment of the Fifth Court
should remain unchanged, either through an outright affirmance thereof or through a
conclusion that Beltran’s petition for discretionary review was improvidently granted.
20 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
Since the record more than justified the trial court’s refusal to submit the sudden
passion instruction, this Court should affirm the judgment of the Fifth Court or dismiss
Beltran’s petition for discretionary review based on the conclusion that it was
improvidently granted.
For all the aforementioned reasons, the State prays that the ultimate judgment
of the Fifth Court will be affirmed. Alternatively, the State prays that this Court will
conclude that Beltran’s petition for discretionary review was improvidently granted.
Respectfully submitted,
_________________________________ MICHAEL R. CASILLAS, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Appellate Division 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 19 Dallas, Texas 75207-4399 (214) 653-3600/FAX (214) 653-3643 State Bar No. 03967500 Michael.Casillas@dallascounty.org Mcasillas@dallascounty.org
21 CERTIFICATE/PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that – no later than March 27, 2015 – a true, electronically-
formatted copy of the instant State's Response Brief has been served on opposing co-
counsel, the Hon. Robert N. Udashen and the Hon. Brett Ordiway, and has also been
served on the State’s Prosecuting Attorney, the Hon. Lisa McMinn, by use of the
electronic service function that accompanies the State’s filing of the instant State’s
Response Brief with this Court through the electronic filing service provider to which
the State subscribes.
____________________________________ MICHAEL R. CASILLAS
22 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
By affixing my signature below, I hereby certify – based on the word count
function of the word-processing software program that was used in connection with
the preparation of the instant State’s Response Brief – that the entirety of the body of
the instant State’s Response Brief is comprised of 4,630 words. Additionally, I hereby
certify that the relevant portions of the instant State’s Response Brief – as defined by
Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1) – are comprised of 3,423 words. Accordingly, I also hereby
certify that the number of words in the instant State’s Response Brief is in no way in
excess of the 15,000-word limit specified in Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(2)(B).