BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. ITC Deltacom Communications, Inc.

190 F.R.D. 693, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19045, 1999 WL 1457333
District Court, M.D. Alabama·Decided December 3, 1999·No. Civ.A. Nos. 99-D-287-N, 99-D-747-N·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court are two separate Motions For Disbursement Of Funds, filed by Defendant KMC Telecommunications, Inc. (“KMC”) and Defendant ITCA DeltaCom (“ITC”) on November 16,1999.

Also before the court is Plaintiff BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.’s (“BellSouth”) Motion To Maintain Funds In Court Registry And Approve Or Set Supersedeas Bond. (“BellSouth Mot.”) On November 22, 1999, KMC filed an Opposition To BellSouth Telecommunication, Inc.’s Motion, which the court construes as a Response (“KMC Resp.”). Also on November 22, 1999, ITC and Defendant Intermedia Communications, Inc. (“Intermedia”) filed an Opposition To BellSouth’s Motion, which the court construes as a Response (“ITC Resp.”). On December 1, 1999, BellSouth filed a Response to KMC’s And ITC’s Opposition, which the court construes as a Reply.

After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that: (1) BellSouth’s Motion is due to be granted; (2) KMC’s Motion is due to be denied; and (3) ITC’s Motion is due to be denied.

BACKGROUND

On March 22, 1999, BellSouth commenced the above-styled action by filing a Petition For Judicial Review And Complaint For Declaratory Judgment And Other Relief against Defendants KMC, ITC, ICG Telecom Group, Inc., Intermedia, e.spire Communications, Inc., Hyperion Telecommunications, Inc., and the Alabama Public Service Commission (“APSC”). BellSouth sought the following relief: (1) judicial review of the March 4 Order of the APSC (“March 4 Order”); (2) “a judgment declaring that the telecommunications traffic in question is interstate — not local — in nature, and therefore not subject to the reciprocal compensation provisions of the Interconnection Agreements” (March 22 Pet. at 11); and (3) injunctive relief “enjoin[ing] the [APSC] from ordering BellSouth to pay reciprocal compensation for termination of calls delivered to ISP end users, because those calls are interstate in nature.” (Id. at 12.)

Also on March 22, 1999, BellSouth filed an Emergency Motion To Pay Into Court Amounts Owed Under The APSC Order (“Emergency Mot.”), wherein BellSouth moved the court for leave to deposit into the court sums due to ITC, KMC and Intermedia under the APSC Order. (Emergency Mot. at 3.) On that same date, BellSouth filed a Motion To Stay, wherein BellSouth moved the court to stay the APSC Order. (Mot. To Stay at 2.) The court held a hearing in Chambers on March 23, 1999 and granted both BellSouth’s Motion To Stay and Emergency Motion by Order entered March 23, 1999.

Finally, on November 15, 1999, the court entered a judgment denying BellSouth’s March 22,1999, Petition. In a Memorandum Opinion And Order the court affirmed an August 18, 1999 Order and stayed the disbursement of the funds which were deposited by BellSouth, pending an appropriate motion by Defendants. ITC and KMC have now made those motions, which the court addresses below.

DISCUSSION

In its Motion, BellSouth asks the court to stay the disbursement of the funds pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil. Procedure 62(d). (BellSouth Mot. H5.) BellSouth argues that such a stay is a matter of right if the moving party posts a supersedeas bond. (Id.) Because the court finds that the subject of BellSouth’s requested stay is an order to pay money, the court finds that BellSouth is enti-[695]*695tied to a stay as a matter of right under Rule 62(d).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62 governs application for stays of judgment of the district court.1 See Fed.R.Civ.P. 62; U.S. v. Wylie, 730 F.2d 1401, 1402 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1984). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) allows for a stay pending appeal if the appellant files a supersedeas bond. The stay is a matter of right.” Wylie, 730 F.2d at 1402 n. 2. “With respect to a case arising in the federal system it seems to be accepted that a party taking an appeal from the District Court is entitled to a stay of a money judgment as a matter of right if he posts a bond in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(d).” American Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 87 S.Ct. 1, 3, 17 L.Ed.2d 37 (1966) (Harlan, J., as Circuit Justice). However, when the underlying judgment is one concerning an injunction, a receivership action, or the infringement of a patent, for example, the stay is not available unless otherwise ordered by the court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 62.

Here, Defendants KMC and ITC argue that the court has not entered a money judgment (KMC Resp. at 6; ITC Resp. H2) because KMC, ITC, and Intermedia do not have a sum certain upon which to execute. (KMC Resp. at 7.) Therefore, KMC asserts that BellSouth is not a judgment debtor and that Rule 62 does not apply. (Id.)

While the court agrees that the amount BellSouth owes to KMC and ITC is not a sum certain, the court finds that this fact is not dispositive of the application of Rule 62(d). The APSC clearly ordered BellSouth to “pay all reciprocal compensation amounts withheld for ISP traffic under [the] interconnection agreements” with KMC and ITC. (March 4 Order at 26.) Therefore, the court finds that BellSouth is subject to a money judgment.

Additionally, it is true, as KMC asserts, that the sum BellSouth owes to Defendants cannot be determined by the APSC’s Order or this court’s November 15 Order. Regardless, the APSC’s March 4 Order is monetary in nature, and “not otherwise excepted under Rule 62(a).” Hebert v. Exxon Corp., 953 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir.1992). Thus, the court finds that the language of Rule 62(d) provides for a stay under the current facts.

Further, the underlying purpose of Rule 62 is to “to protect the interests of the judgment creditor who is being stayed from execution pending the outcome of the appeal.” 12 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 62.03 (3d. ed.1996). The posting of a “supersedeas bond preserves the status quo while protecting the non-appealing party’s rights pending appeal.” Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Boyd, 781 F.2d 1494,1496 (11th Cir.1986). “Courts have restricted the application of Rule 62(d)’s automatic stay to judgments for money because a bond may not adequately compensate a non-appealing party for loss incurred as a result of the stay of a non-money judgment.” Hebert, 953 F.2d at 938. In the present case, BellSouth is not a judgment debtor in a traditional sense. That is, KMC, ITC, and Intermedia cannot obtain a lien upon any of BellSouth’s assets as a result of this court’s decision. (KMC Resp. at 7.) However, Bell-South has been ordered to pay a monetary judgment. (March 4 Order at 26.) Indeed, KMC and ITC fail to point out any non-monetary loss which will occur as a result of the stay of this court’s judgment.

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BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. ITC Deltacom Communications, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 693, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19045, 1999 WL 1457333 (M.D. Ala. 1999).

190 F.R.D. 693 (BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. ITC Deltacom Communications, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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