[Cite as Bello v. Highland Pointe Health & Rehab Ctr., 2026-Ohio-265.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
KEITH BELLO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115326 v. :
HIGHLAND POINTE HEALTH & REHAB CENTER, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellants. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 29, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-25-115196
Appearances:
Eadie Law, William B. Eadie, Mike J. Callow, Tricia A. Scott, for appellee.
Marshall Dennehey P.C. and Leslie M. Jenny, for appellants.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
Defendants-appellants Highland Pointe Health & Rehab Center aka
High Pointe Health & Rehab Center LLC, Saber Healthcare Holdings, LLC, Saber
Governance LLC and SHG Management LLC (“Defendants”) appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to stay and enforce an arbitration agreement and
their request for an oral hearing pursuant to R.C. 2711.03. For the reasons that
follow, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter for an oral
hearing.
Procedural History
Appellee Keith Bello (“Bello”) filed suit against Defendants alleging
claims for medical negligence/recklessness, nursing home resident rights violation
pursuant to R.C. 3721.13 and inpatient rehabilitation facility negligence for
treatment he received at Highland Pointe Health & Rehab Center.
Defendants filed an answer and also a motion to stay and enforce an
arbitration agreement. In their motion, Defendants specifically requested an oral
hearing pursuant to R.C. 2711.03 and attached to the motion a healthcare power of
attorney signed by Bello’s daughter, Brittany Bello. Bello opposed the motion
alleging Defendants failed to attach the actual arbitration agreement and that the
power of attorney was invalid because it was not signed by Bello, that it did not
specifically convey the right to enter into an arbitration agreement and that it was
not effective at the time Bello entered Defendants’ facility. Defendants filed a reply
brief attaching the arbitration agreement, which was electronically signed by
Brittany Bello. Bello filed a surreply brief reiterating the same arguments which
were set forth in his brief in opposition.
The trial court issued a judgment entry finding that even in the
absence of Bello’s signature on the power of attorney, and assuming it was effective, that “the limitations on the decisions Brittany Bello would be permitted
to make, are material issues of fact precluding enforcement . . . of the arbitration
provision” and denied Defendants’ motion to stay and enforce arbitration.
It is from this denial that Defendants appeal, raising two
assignments of error for our review:
1. The trial court erred and abused its discretion by not holding a hearing regarding the enforcement of the arbitration agreement as required by O.R.C. 2711.
2. The trial court erred and abused its discretion by not staying the entire matter pending complete arbitration of all arbitrable claims as required by O.R.C. 2711.
Law and Analysis
Both of Defendants’ assignments of error concern the denial of their
motion to stay the case and enforce arbitration so they will be dealt with together.
In Defendants’ first assignment of error, they allege the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to hold an oral hearing before denying the motion
to enforce arbitration which they argue is required by R.C. 2711.03. Bello argues
that because the trial court “heard” the case via the written motions which were
filed, an oral hearing was not required.
We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to
compel arbitration or stay the proceedings under the abuse-of-discretion standard.
Costin v. Midwest Vision Partners, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-463, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing
U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Wilkens, 2012-Ohio-263, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.); Milling Away, L.L.C.
v. UGP Properties, L.L.C., 2011-Ohio-1103, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted way regarding a
matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-
3304, ¶ 35.
R.C. 2711.03, titled “Enforcing arbitration agreement,” governs
petitions to compel arbitration. “R.C. 2711.03 allows a party that claims to be
aggrieved by another party’s alleged failure to comply with an arbitration agreement
to petition a court of common pleas ‘for an order directing that the arbitration
proceed’ and states that the court ‘shall hear the parties.’” Maestle v. Best Buy Co.,
2003-Ohio-6465, ¶ 3, quoting R.C. 2711.03(A).
“[W]here a party has filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to
R.C. 2711.03, ‘the court must, in a hearing, make a determination as to the validity
of the arbitration clause.”’ Costin at ¶ 20, quoting Marks v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter Commercial Fin. Servs., 2008-Ohio-1820, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing Maestle at
¶ 18.
As stated in Costin:
Applying the foregoing principle, this court has consistently held that “a hearing is mandatory on a motion to compel arbitration in order to determine the validity of the arbitration clause.” [Marks] at ¶ 22, citing McDonough v. Thompson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82222, 2003-Ohio- 4655, ¶ 11. See also Post v. Procare Automotive Serv. Solutions, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87646, 2007-Ohio-2106; Benson v. Spitzer Mgmt. Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83558, 2004-Ohio-4751; Herman v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 81143 and 81272, 2002-Ohio-7251; Olah v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86132, 2006-Ohio-694; Samoly v. Landry, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89060, 2007-Ohio-5707.”
Costin at ¶ 20. The court went on to qualify that [a] “hearing,” however, does not necessarily require an oral evidentiary hearing as appellants’ suggest on appeal. “[A] ‘hearing’ means any confrontation, oral or otherwise, between an affected individual [and a decisionmaker] sufficient to allow the individual to present the case in a meaningful manner. Hearings may take many forms, including a ‘formal,’ trial-type proceeding, an ‘informal discuss(ion)’ . . ., or a ‘paper hearing,’ without any opportunity for oral exchange.”
Costin at ¶ 21, quoting Liese v. Kent State Univ., 2004-Ohio-5322, ¶ 38, fn. 6 (11th
Dist.), quoting Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 148, fn. 3 (D.C.Cir. 1980);
see also Nemec v. Morledge, 2021-Ohio-3361, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing Marks at ¶ 29,
quoting Liese.
This court has held that ‘“a trial court need not hold an oral or
evidentiary hearing regarding an R.C. 2711.03 motion absent a proper request.”’
Blue Technologies Smart Solutions, Inc. v. Ohio Collaborative Learning Solutions,
Inc., 2020-Ohio-806, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), quoting Chrysler Fin. Servs., Ams., L.L.C. v.
Henderson, 2011-Ohio-6813, ¶ 21. See also Church v. Fleishour Homes, Inc., 2007-
Ohio-1806, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.) (“While a party’s request for an oral hearing shall be
granted pursuant to R.C. 2711.03, an oral hearing is not mandatory absent a
request.”).
This court held recently in Lee v. Bath Manor Ltd. Partnership,
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[Cite as Bello v. Highland Pointe Health & Rehab Ctr., 2026-Ohio-265.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
KEITH BELLO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115326 v. :
HIGHLAND POINTE HEALTH & REHAB CENTER, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellants. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 29, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-25-115196
Appearances:
Eadie Law, William B. Eadie, Mike J. Callow, Tricia A. Scott, for appellee.
Marshall Dennehey P.C. and Leslie M. Jenny, for appellants.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
Defendants-appellants Highland Pointe Health & Rehab Center aka
High Pointe Health & Rehab Center LLC, Saber Healthcare Holdings, LLC, Saber
Governance LLC and SHG Management LLC (“Defendants”) appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to stay and enforce an arbitration agreement and
their request for an oral hearing pursuant to R.C. 2711.03. For the reasons that
follow, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the matter for an oral
hearing.
Procedural History
Appellee Keith Bello (“Bello”) filed suit against Defendants alleging
claims for medical negligence/recklessness, nursing home resident rights violation
pursuant to R.C. 3721.13 and inpatient rehabilitation facility negligence for
treatment he received at Highland Pointe Health & Rehab Center.
Defendants filed an answer and also a motion to stay and enforce an
arbitration agreement. In their motion, Defendants specifically requested an oral
hearing pursuant to R.C. 2711.03 and attached to the motion a healthcare power of
attorney signed by Bello’s daughter, Brittany Bello. Bello opposed the motion
alleging Defendants failed to attach the actual arbitration agreement and that the
power of attorney was invalid because it was not signed by Bello, that it did not
specifically convey the right to enter into an arbitration agreement and that it was
not effective at the time Bello entered Defendants’ facility. Defendants filed a reply
brief attaching the arbitration agreement, which was electronically signed by
Brittany Bello. Bello filed a surreply brief reiterating the same arguments which
were set forth in his brief in opposition.
The trial court issued a judgment entry finding that even in the
absence of Bello’s signature on the power of attorney, and assuming it was effective, that “the limitations on the decisions Brittany Bello would be permitted
to make, are material issues of fact precluding enforcement . . . of the arbitration
provision” and denied Defendants’ motion to stay and enforce arbitration.
It is from this denial that Defendants appeal, raising two
assignments of error for our review:
1. The trial court erred and abused its discretion by not holding a hearing regarding the enforcement of the arbitration agreement as required by O.R.C. 2711.
2. The trial court erred and abused its discretion by not staying the entire matter pending complete arbitration of all arbitrable claims as required by O.R.C. 2711.
Law and Analysis
Both of Defendants’ assignments of error concern the denial of their
motion to stay the case and enforce arbitration so they will be dealt with together.
In Defendants’ first assignment of error, they allege the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to hold an oral hearing before denying the motion
to enforce arbitration which they argue is required by R.C. 2711.03. Bello argues
that because the trial court “heard” the case via the written motions which were
filed, an oral hearing was not required.
We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to
compel arbitration or stay the proceedings under the abuse-of-discretion standard.
Costin v. Midwest Vision Partners, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-463, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing
U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Wilkens, 2012-Ohio-263, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.); Milling Away, L.L.C.
v. UGP Properties, L.L.C., 2011-Ohio-1103, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted way regarding a
matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-
3304, ¶ 35.
R.C. 2711.03, titled “Enforcing arbitration agreement,” governs
petitions to compel arbitration. “R.C. 2711.03 allows a party that claims to be
aggrieved by another party’s alleged failure to comply with an arbitration agreement
to petition a court of common pleas ‘for an order directing that the arbitration
proceed’ and states that the court ‘shall hear the parties.’” Maestle v. Best Buy Co.,
2003-Ohio-6465, ¶ 3, quoting R.C. 2711.03(A).
“[W]here a party has filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to
R.C. 2711.03, ‘the court must, in a hearing, make a determination as to the validity
of the arbitration clause.”’ Costin at ¶ 20, quoting Marks v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter Commercial Fin. Servs., 2008-Ohio-1820, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing Maestle at
¶ 18.
As stated in Costin:
Applying the foregoing principle, this court has consistently held that “a hearing is mandatory on a motion to compel arbitration in order to determine the validity of the arbitration clause.” [Marks] at ¶ 22, citing McDonough v. Thompson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82222, 2003-Ohio- 4655, ¶ 11. See also Post v. Procare Automotive Serv. Solutions, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87646, 2007-Ohio-2106; Benson v. Spitzer Mgmt. Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83558, 2004-Ohio-4751; Herman v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 81143 and 81272, 2002-Ohio-7251; Olah v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86132, 2006-Ohio-694; Samoly v. Landry, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89060, 2007-Ohio-5707.”
Costin at ¶ 20. The court went on to qualify that [a] “hearing,” however, does not necessarily require an oral evidentiary hearing as appellants’ suggest on appeal. “[A] ‘hearing’ means any confrontation, oral or otherwise, between an affected individual [and a decisionmaker] sufficient to allow the individual to present the case in a meaningful manner. Hearings may take many forms, including a ‘formal,’ trial-type proceeding, an ‘informal discuss(ion)’ . . ., or a ‘paper hearing,’ without any opportunity for oral exchange.”
Costin at ¶ 21, quoting Liese v. Kent State Univ., 2004-Ohio-5322, ¶ 38, fn. 6 (11th
Dist.), quoting Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 148, fn. 3 (D.C.Cir. 1980);
see also Nemec v. Morledge, 2021-Ohio-3361, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing Marks at ¶ 29,
quoting Liese.
This court has held that ‘“a trial court need not hold an oral or
evidentiary hearing regarding an R.C. 2711.03 motion absent a proper request.”’
Blue Technologies Smart Solutions, Inc. v. Ohio Collaborative Learning Solutions,
Inc., 2020-Ohio-806, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), quoting Chrysler Fin. Servs., Ams., L.L.C. v.
Henderson, 2011-Ohio-6813, ¶ 21. See also Church v. Fleishour Homes, Inc., 2007-
Ohio-1806, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.) (“While a party’s request for an oral hearing shall be
granted pursuant to R.C. 2711.03, an oral hearing is not mandatory absent a
request.”).
This court held recently in Lee v. Bath Manor Ltd. Partnership,
2023-Ohio-816, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), that the trial court erred when it failed to hold an
oral hearing to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement prior to ruling
on the motion to compel arbitration because a party specifically and unequivocally
requested an oral hearing pursuant to R.C. 2711.03 in its motion to compel
arbitration. As such, while an oral hearing is not always required to satisfy the
“hearing” mandate of R.C. 2711.03, an oral hearing is required and shall be granted
when specifically and unequivocally requested by a party pursuant to R.C. 2711.03
to determine whether the validity of the arbitration agreement is at issue prior to
ruling on the motion to compel arbitration.
We find Defendants specifically and unequivocally requested an oral
hearing pursuant to R.C. 2711.03 in their motion to stay and enforce the arbitration
agreement: “Defendants request an oral hearing pursuant to Ohio Revised Code
§2711.03.” Similarly, the motion’s caption contained a “request for evidentiary
hearing pursuant to R.C. 2711.03.”
Because an oral hearing shall be granted when requested pursuant
to R.C. 2711.03 and an oral hearing was requested here, we find the trial court
abused its discretion by denying Defendants’ motion to stay and enforce
arbitration before conducting an oral hearing to determine whether the validity of
the arbitration agreement is at issue.
Defendants’ first assignment of error is sustained.
Furthermore, we find our disposition of Defendants’ first
assignment of error renders the second assignment of error moot. See App.R.
12(A)(1)(c).
Judgment reversed and remanded to the trial court to conduct an oral
hearing to determine whether the validity of the arbitration agreement is at issue.
It is ordered that appellants recover from appellee costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
____________________________ EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR