SHANNON, Chief Justice.
Appellants
filed a declaratory judgment suit in the district court of Travis County pursuant to the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 6252-13a § 12 (Supp.1984). The objective of that suit was to obtain a declaration from the court as to the validity of certain rules promulgated by appellee Texas Board of Nurse Examiners. Appellants filed motions for summary judgment, as did appellee. The district court granted appellee’s amended motion for summary judgment and denied those of appellants. Because the judgment rendered by the district court failed to declare the rights of the parties, this Court will set aside the judgment of the district court, abate the appeal, and order the district court to render judgment declaring the rights of the parties.
The judgment of the district court simply orders that appellee’s motion for summary judgment be granted and that appellants’ motions for summary judgment be denied. The judgment, however, does recite that appellee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all issues set out in appellee’s amended motion for summary judgment and recites further that appellants “could not succeed on any of the issues, theories, or causes of action pled [sic] by [them].”
The administrative rule at issue is appel-lee’s rule 388.06.00, which concerns “Advanced Nurse Practitioners.” Rule 388.06.-00 is set out in the margin.
In their trial petition, appellants sought a declaration from the district court that:
(1) there is no authority, express or implied, under the statutes relating to the practice of professional nursing for the appellee Board to create or regulate specialty practice such as advanced nurse practitioners and, accordingly, the Board was without authority to promulgate rule 388.06.00;
(2) rule 388.06.00 is not reasonably related to or necessarily referable to any specific statutory provision relating to the practice of professional nursing;
(3) the Board does not have statutory authority to enlarge the scope of practice of professional nursing beyond Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat. art. 4518;
(4) rule 388.06.00 attempts to place restraints and proscriptions upon professional nurses and provide for disciplinary action for violation of such rules;
(5) rule 388.06.00 is vague and indefinite and fails to give fair notice as to what nursing conduct is permitted and what is proscribed, thereby violating appellants’ due process rights. Specifically in this context, the appellants requested a declaration by the court of the rights, duties, and responsibilities of advanced nurse practitioners and other duly licensed nurses and physicians with respect to:
(a) rule 388.06.006(d)(3).
(b) rule 388.06.006(d)(10).
(c) rule 388.06.006(a).
(d) rule 388.06.006(r)(i).
(e) rule 388.06.004(d).
The judgment of the district court did not declare any rights of the parties with respect to rule 388.06.00. Instead, the judgment simply granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment and denied that of appellants. The judgment did recite that appellee Board was entitled to judgment upon the grounds enumerated in its amended motion for summary judgment. Examination of such amended motion shows that appellee Board claimed:
II.
As a matter of law, the Texas Board of Nurse Examiners does have the statutory authority to make and issue the rules made the subject of this suit. The Nurse Practice Act establishes that it is the intent of the Texas Legislature that the Defendant should have the authority to make the rules that the Plaintiffs seek to challenge. The rules are reasonably related to and referable to the provisions of the Nurse Practice Act.
III.
The Defendant has not enlarged the scope of the practice of professional nursing beyond that set forth in TEX. REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4518. The rules made the subject of this suit only authorize acts that come within the definition of professional nursing. Also, the rules reflect the clear legislative intent to distinguish between nurses on the basis of nursing education.
IV.
If any restrictions, burdens or conditions have been placed upon the Plaintiffs, such restraints have been within the statutory authority of the Defendant and have not exceeded the intent of the Texas Legislature and are not inconsistent with statutory provisions.
V.
The rules made the subject of this suit do not violate the due process rights of the Plaintiffs. These rules do not violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution. The Defendant’s rules are not unconstitutionally vague or indefinite.
VI.
The rules made the subject of this suit are not contrary to nor do they violate TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4518, sec. 5 and 6 and the sections of the Medical Practice Act of Texas a set forth in art. 4518, section 6.
Appellants point out in their briefs that these grounds were not sufficiently specific to provide them with adequate information for opposing the motion and to define the issues for the parties. Should this Court assume that the grounds asserted in the amended motion for summary judgment suffice, then the district court’s espousal of these genera] assertions fall short of meeting the declaratory relief requested in appellants’ petition.
The rule of law pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 2524-1 (1965), is that if a declaratory judgment will terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the law suit, the trial court is duty-bound to declare the rights of the parties as to those matters upon which the parties join issue.
Calvert v. Employees Retirement System of Texas,
648 S.W.2d 418 (Tex.App.1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Calvert,
Declaratory Judgments in Texas,
14 St. Mary’s L.J. 1 (1982). This Court perceives no reason why the same rule should not obtain in a declaratory judgment suit filed pursuant to Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-13a § 12 (Supp.1984).
It is the duty of the trial courts to make the Declaratory Judgment Act and § 12 of the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act useful tools in the solution of legal problems and controversies.
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SHANNON, Chief Justice.
Appellants
filed a declaratory judgment suit in the district court of Travis County pursuant to the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 6252-13a § 12 (Supp.1984). The objective of that suit was to obtain a declaration from the court as to the validity of certain rules promulgated by appellee Texas Board of Nurse Examiners. Appellants filed motions for summary judgment, as did appellee. The district court granted appellee’s amended motion for summary judgment and denied those of appellants. Because the judgment rendered by the district court failed to declare the rights of the parties, this Court will set aside the judgment of the district court, abate the appeal, and order the district court to render judgment declaring the rights of the parties.
The judgment of the district court simply orders that appellee’s motion for summary judgment be granted and that appellants’ motions for summary judgment be denied. The judgment, however, does recite that appellee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all issues set out in appellee’s amended motion for summary judgment and recites further that appellants “could not succeed on any of the issues, theories, or causes of action pled [sic] by [them].”
The administrative rule at issue is appel-lee’s rule 388.06.00, which concerns “Advanced Nurse Practitioners.” Rule 388.06.-00 is set out in the margin.
In their trial petition, appellants sought a declaration from the district court that:
(1) there is no authority, express or implied, under the statutes relating to the practice of professional nursing for the appellee Board to create or regulate specialty practice such as advanced nurse practitioners and, accordingly, the Board was without authority to promulgate rule 388.06.00;
(2) rule 388.06.00 is not reasonably related to or necessarily referable to any specific statutory provision relating to the practice of professional nursing;
(3) the Board does not have statutory authority to enlarge the scope of practice of professional nursing beyond Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat. art. 4518;
(4) rule 388.06.00 attempts to place restraints and proscriptions upon professional nurses and provide for disciplinary action for violation of such rules;
(5) rule 388.06.00 is vague and indefinite and fails to give fair notice as to what nursing conduct is permitted and what is proscribed, thereby violating appellants’ due process rights. Specifically in this context, the appellants requested a declaration by the court of the rights, duties, and responsibilities of advanced nurse practitioners and other duly licensed nurses and physicians with respect to:
(a) rule 388.06.006(d)(3).
(b) rule 388.06.006(d)(10).
(c) rule 388.06.006(a).
(d) rule 388.06.006(r)(i).
(e) rule 388.06.004(d).
The judgment of the district court did not declare any rights of the parties with respect to rule 388.06.00. Instead, the judgment simply granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment and denied that of appellants. The judgment did recite that appellee Board was entitled to judgment upon the grounds enumerated in its amended motion for summary judgment. Examination of such amended motion shows that appellee Board claimed:
II.
As a matter of law, the Texas Board of Nurse Examiners does have the statutory authority to make and issue the rules made the subject of this suit. The Nurse Practice Act establishes that it is the intent of the Texas Legislature that the Defendant should have the authority to make the rules that the Plaintiffs seek to challenge. The rules are reasonably related to and referable to the provisions of the Nurse Practice Act.
III.
The Defendant has not enlarged the scope of the practice of professional nursing beyond that set forth in TEX. REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4518. The rules made the subject of this suit only authorize acts that come within the definition of professional nursing. Also, the rules reflect the clear legislative intent to distinguish between nurses on the basis of nursing education.
IV.
If any restrictions, burdens or conditions have been placed upon the Plaintiffs, such restraints have been within the statutory authority of the Defendant and have not exceeded the intent of the Texas Legislature and are not inconsistent with statutory provisions.
V.
The rules made the subject of this suit do not violate the due process rights of the Plaintiffs. These rules do not violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution. The Defendant’s rules are not unconstitutionally vague or indefinite.
VI.
The rules made the subject of this suit are not contrary to nor do they violate TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4518, sec. 5 and 6 and the sections of the Medical Practice Act of Texas a set forth in art. 4518, section 6.
Appellants point out in their briefs that these grounds were not sufficiently specific to provide them with adequate information for opposing the motion and to define the issues for the parties. Should this Court assume that the grounds asserted in the amended motion for summary judgment suffice, then the district court’s espousal of these genera] assertions fall short of meeting the declaratory relief requested in appellants’ petition.
The rule of law pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 2524-1 (1965), is that if a declaratory judgment will terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the law suit, the trial court is duty-bound to declare the rights of the parties as to those matters upon which the parties join issue.
Calvert v. Employees Retirement System of Texas,
648 S.W.2d 418 (Tex.App.1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Calvert,
Declaratory Judgments in Texas,
14 St. Mary’s L.J. 1 (1982). This Court perceives no reason why the same rule should not obtain in a declaratory judgment suit filed pursuant to Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-13a § 12 (Supp.1984).
It is the duty of the trial courts to make the Declaratory Judgment Act and § 12 of the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act useful tools in the solution of legal problems and controversies. Neither the Declaratory Judgment Act nor § 12 was conceived as a device for use solely by the advocate to obtain a favorable declaration; rather, it was intended for use by the courts to make a correct declaration of the matters at issue, once jurisdiction has attached, whether the particular declaration given by the court is sought by one or several or none of the parties to the litigation. Calvert,
Declaratory Judgments in Texas, supra; see Guilliams v. Koonsman,
154 Tex. 401, 279 S.W.2d 579 (1955).
In
Robert T. Foley Co. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,
283 Md. 140, 389 A.2d 350 (1978), the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that certain sewage charges were unconstitutional and also sought a declaration that the resolutions imposing the charges were invalid as violating contractual rights. On appeal, the plaintiffs complained of the trial court’s failure to declare their rights with respect to the latter question. In responding to that complaint, the court of appeals wrote that “the circuit court did not deal with this question,” and added that the circuit court’s. decree recited “only that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted and the plaintiff’s motion was
denied.” The court then quoted from a prior opinion as follows:
While a declaratory decree need not be in any particular form, it must pass upon and adjudicate the issues raised in the proceeding, to the end that the rights of the parties are clearly delineated and the controversy terminated ...” In the instant case, it is clear' that the circuit court erred by failing to set forth in its judgment a declaration of the party’s rights with regard to the issues raised.
Having so held, the appellate court vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the cause for entry of a new judgment which would “include a declaration of the rights of the parties.”
The district court’s judgment in this appeal scarcely informed appellants of the matters resolved so that they could intelligibly prepare and present the issues on appeal. In the absence of a judgment declaring anything, the appellants were compelled to advance their entire argument to this Court just as they had done in district court.
Appellants were entitled to a judgment from the district court declaring the law with respect to the contentions asserted in their trial petition. The district court was not obligated to make a declaration favorable to appellants or appellee, but it was duty-bound to make declarations resolving the matters placed at issue by the declaratory judgment petition. The district court’s failure to do so was error.
Appellants pray that the judgment be reversed and “the cause remanded to the trial court.” This Court concludes that the proper disposition under this general prayer for relief is to set aside the judgment, abate the appeal, and order the district court to render judgment declaring the rights of the parties as to those matters upon which the parties joined issue.
The judgment shall then be filed with this Court by way of supplemental transcript, on or before April 3, 1985. The appellants will be allowed thirty days after the date the supplemental transcript is filed to file a brief and the appellee will be allowed twenty-five days after appellants’ brief is filed to file a reply brief. Additional oral argument will not be permitted.