Belle View Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n v. Drytech, Inc.

65 Va. Cir. 169
CourtFairfax County Circuit Court
DecidedJune 24, 2004
DocketCase No. (Chancery) 188072; Case No. (Chancery) 188235
StatusPublished

This text of 65 Va. Cir. 169 (Belle View Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n v. Drytech, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Fairfax County Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Belle View Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n v. Drytech, Inc., 65 Va. Cir. 169 (Va. Super. Ct. 2004).

Opinion

By Judge R. Terrence Ney

This matter came before the Court on March 31, 2004, on Belle View Condominium Unit Owners’ Association’s (“ Belle View”) Petition to have three mechanic’s liens declared invalid and removed from the land records.

[170]*170 Facts

Three memoranda of mechanic’s liens in these consolidated matters were filed on December 29,2003, one by Respondent Drytech, Inc. (“ Drytech” ),1 and two by Respondent Topp Construction Services, Inc. (“ Topp” ).2

Belle View is a 980-unit condominium complex located in the Mount Vernon section of Fairfax County by Dykes Marsh and the Potomac River. Belle View consists of sixty-five separate brick buildings which are two to three stories in height. On September 19,2003, the basement floors of each of the sixty-five buildings flooded when Hurricane Isabel caused the Potomac River to crest over its banks and its waters overwhelm the dike system.

Belle View authorized Epic Design & Construction Co., Inc., t/a Purofirst of Metropolitan Washington (“ Purofirst” ) to provide temporary emergency assistance with disaster relief and recovery. Purofirst hired Drytech as a subcontractor, and Drytech, in turn, hired Topp as sub-subcontractor to assist with the temporary emergency services for Belle View.

After four days of service, Belle View terminated Purofirst’s contract. Belle View did not pay Purofirst for any of its work. In October 2003, Purofirst filed a Motion for Judgment against Belle View seeking to recover for its services.3

Purofirst, having not been paid by Belle View, did not pay Drytech. Drytech, having not been paid by Purofirst, did not pay Topp. Shortly thereafter, Drytech and Topp filed their separate memoranda of mechanic’s liens, each claiming subcontractor liens on some or all of the Belle View property. Cumulatively, both claim liens in the amount of $644,179.34.

Procedural History

Belle View challenges the validity of each mechanic’s lien. On February 27, 2004, the Court, pursuant to Virginia Code § 43-17.1, granted Belle [171]*171View’s request for a hearing to challenge the validity of all three liens. On March 12, 2004, these two actions were consolidated.

Grounds for Review

Any party, having an interest in real property against which a lien has been filed, may, upon a showing of good cause, petition the court of equity having jurisdiction wherein the building, structure, other property, or railroad is located to hold a hearing to determine the validity of any perfected lien on the property. After reasonable notice to the lien claimant and any party to whom the benefit of the lien would inure and who has given notice as provided in § 43-18 of the Code of Virginia, the court shall hold a hearing and determine the validity of the lien. If the court finds that the lien is invalid, it shall forthwith order that the memorandum or notice of lien be removed from record.

Va. Code Ann. § 43-17.1 (2002).

Standard of Review

A mechanic’s lien is purely a creature of statute and is in derogation of the common law. See Rosser v. Cole, 237 Va. 572, 576, 379 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1989). As a result, where, as here, there are questions concerning the existence and perfection of such a lien, the mechanic’s lien statutes must be strictly construed. See Woodington Elec., Inc. v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 238 Va. 623, 630, 385 S.E.2d 872, 875 (1989). Substantial compliance with the statute is essential or the lien will be lost. See generally Wallace v. Brumnack, 177 Va. 36, 13 S.E.2d 801 (1941); see also Gilman v. Ryan, 95 Va. 494, 497, 28 S.E. 875, 876 (1898). “It is therefore incumbent upon the party asserting a lien under the statute to show that he has complied with every essential requirement of the statute; and unless such compliance is shown, his claim must be rejected.” 4

[172]*172At the same time, the mechanics lien act is remedial in nature and designed to provide a remedy to those persons furnishing labor or materials to others. It is against this background that the memoranda of mechanic’s liens involved here must be reviewed.

Analysis

The Belle View units are owned by hundreds of individual owners. Virtually all of the units are subject to liens that secure hundreds of purchase money mortgages. Drytech’s and Topp’s recorded memoranda of mechanic’s liens, by their veiy nature, impede and prevent these owners and lenders from the resale and refinance of the Belle View Units.

Belle View attacks all three liens collectively and individually. First, Belle View claims that all of the mechanic’s liens are for services that are not afforded mechanic’s lien protection. Second, Belle View asserts that the liens impermissibly include public property and must fail in their entirety. Third, Belle View attacks Topp’s lien against the entire Belle View Unit Owners Association because it does not name or apportion the amounts to the individual owners at Belle View. Fourth, Belle View challenges Topp’s lien against 85 individual owners because the memorandum improperly and incorrectly names certain unit owners and also because the memorandum names unit owners who never received any services from Topp. Finally, Belle View challenges Drytech’s lien because it alleges that Drytech’s lien over-burdens units for which no services were provided. The Court will address each of these issues in turn.

A. Whether These Services Are Afforded Mechanic’s Lien Protection

Belle View notes that there are many kinds of work that are not protected by mechanic’s lien rights. Rosser, 237 Va. at 577, 379 S.E.2d at 326 (1989). For example, if the work does not constitute “construction, removal, repair, or improvements of any building or structure permanently annexed to the freehold,” then Belle View contends that no lien is available. See Va. Code Ann. § 43-3 (2002).

In support of its position, Belle View relies on a Pennsylvania decision which held that containment of ground water contamination pending remediation is not the type of service protected by Pennsylvania’s mechanic’s lien statute. See Todd Giddings and Assocs., Inc. v. Avery Chemical [173]*173Division-Avery Int’l, Inc., 8 Pa. D. & C. 4th 649 (1991). Belle View also asserts that Virginia’s mechanic’s lien statute must be strictly construed and that it does not protect persons who rent portable air conditioners or dehumidifiers or those who pump water from basements or operate fans to prevent the development of mold.

The Supreme Court decided Rosser v. Cole, 237 Va. 572, 576, 379 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1989), prior to the amendment to Va. Code § 43-3. The 2002 amendment added the words “including the reasonable rental or use value of equipment.” Va. Code Ann. § 43-3 (2002). Further, in Todd Giddings, the Pennsylvania Court held that the lien claimant did nothing more than assess the chemical contamination and prepare a report.

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Related

Jones v. Commonwealth
591 S.E.2d 72 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2004)
Rosser v. Cole
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385 S.E.2d 872 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1989)
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Manly Manufacturing Co. v. Broaddus
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Gilman v. Ryan
28 S.E. 875 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1898)
Phillips v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia
47 L.R.A. 284 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1899)
Cain v. Rea
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Weaver v. Harland Corp.
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Mumpower v. Housing Authority
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Wallace v. Brumback
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B. T. Electrical Enterprises, Inc. v. ADC Fairways Corp.
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Bluebook (online)
65 Va. Cir. 169, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/belle-view-condominium-unit-owners-assn-v-drytech-inc-vaccfairfax-2004.