Filed 9/11/26 Bell v. Louie CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
B343209
SANDRA BELL, (Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No.
23STCV15396)
v.
NETANEL LOUIE et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Rupert A. Byrdsong, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Pease & Ijadi, Bryan W. Pease; Law Offices of G. David Tenenbaum and G. David Tenenbaum, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
First Liberty Institute, Stephanie N. Taub; Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr and Leah M. Fugere, for Defendants and Respondents.
Dechert, Jay Bhimani and Gary Dreyer for The Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Sandra Bell appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained a demurrer by Rabbi Netanel Louie and the Hebrew Discovery Center (HDC) to her second amended complaint without leave to amend. Bell sued Rabbi Louie and HDC for civil rights violations and several torts after Rabbi Louie allegedly destroyed Bell’s protest signs to prevent her from peacefully protesting Kapparot, an Orthodox Jewish atonement ritual that involves slaughtering a chicken. We conclude the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend to Bell’s causes of action under the Bane Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 52.1,1 and the Ralph Civil Rights Act, section 51.7. We also conclude that, while the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to Bell’s cause of action for civil conspiracy, the court should have given Bell leave to amend to allege her conspiracy allegations in an appropriate cause of action. Therefore, we reverse.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Bell Protests HDC’s Kapparot Ritual In October 2022, when Bell was 77 years old, she protested HDC’s Kapparot ritual on the sidewalk in front of HDC.2 Rabbi Louie runs HDC and organized the Kapparot ritual. Bell protested with signs that stated: “CHICKENS Cannot Atone for YOUR Sins—Primitive, Cruel Nonsense” and “bloody cruel senseless useless—ANIMAL SACRIFICE done here!”
Bell alleged that, when she put her signs down on a bush beside her, Rabbi Louie came outside, saw the signs, went behind Bell, and ripped up her signs, rendering them unusable. Bell alleged that, when Rabbi Louie destroyed her signs, he intended to intimidate and coerce her, interfere with her First Amendment
2 While Bell’s second amended complaint describes the practice as a “chicken killing ritual,” Kapparot is a Jewish ritual practiced by some orthodox communities in the days immediately preceding Yom Kippur. Adherents of Kapparot believe that it is “required by religious law and that it brings atonement and redemption. The ritual entails grasping a live chicken and swinging the bird three times overhead while saying a prayer that symbolically asks God to transfer the practitioners’ sins to the birds.” (Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos v. New York City Police Dept. (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) 152 A.D.3d 113, 115; see United Poultry Concerns v. Chabad of Irvine (9th Cir. 2018) 743 Fed.Appx. 130, fn. 1 [“Kapparot is an atonement ritual that involves recitation of prayer and results in the Kosher killing of chickens.”].) When the prayer is complete, “the chicken is killed in accordance with the kosher dietary laws, by slitting the chicken’s throat. Its meat is . . . donated to the poor and others in the community.” (Alliance, at p. 115.)
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right to protest, and destroy the medium on which Bell displayed her “message of compassion.”
Bell alleged Israel Shamoni (who is not a party to this appeal), an employee of HDC and Rabbi Louie, approached her, screamed at her, and spat saliva and mucus on her face and sweater. Bell alleged Shamoni worked with Rabbi Louie to “intimidate, threaten, ridicule, and interfere with [Bell] and other protesters’ . . . rights to peaceful[ly] protest.” Bell alleged Shamoni, rather than joining the other Kapparot participants, stood next to Rabbi Louie, “laughing at and mocking the protesters.”
Bell also alleged that Rabbi Louie employed and supervised Shamoni and was thus vicariously liable for Shamoni’s actions and that HDC was vicariously liable for Shamoni’s and Rabbi Louie’s actions because they were acting in the “course and scope of their employment when they engaged in these violent acts.” Bell also alleged Shamoni and Rabbi Louie acted in concert as “accomplices” to “disrupt and antagonize” Bell and other protesters.
B. Bell Files This Action, and the Trial Court Sustains a Demurrer by Rabbi Louie and HDC Without Leave To Amend
Bell sued Rabbi Louie, HDC, and Shamoni, alleging in her operative second amended complaint five causes of action: (1) violation of the Bane Act, (2) violation of the Ralph Act, (3) assault and battery, (4) abuse of an elder person in violation of Welfare & Institutions Code section 15610.63, and (5) civil conspiracy to commit a tort. Rabbi Louie and HDC demurred, arguing Bell did not state causes of action for violation of the
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Bane Act, violation of the Ralph Act, assault and battery against HDC, or conspiracy against Rabbi Louie. They also argued Bell could not attribute Shamoni’s conduct to Rabbi Louie or HDC under a vicarious liability or accomplice theory.3 The trial court sustained the demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend, and Bell timely appealed from the ensuing judgment. Bell challenges the court’s order sustaining the demurrer to her causes of action for violation of the Bane Act, violation of the Ralph Act, and conspiracy. She does not challenge the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer to her causes of action for assault and battery and for elder abuse.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review “‘We independently review the ruling on a demurrer and determine de novo whether the pleading alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action.’” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 776; see Allied Anesthesia Medical Group, Inc. v. Inland Empire Health Plan (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 794, 801-802.) “On appeal, ‘[w]hen a demurrer [has been] sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to
3 Rabbi Louie and HDC apparently also filed a motion to strike, but the record on appeal does not include that motion. The trial court took a motion to strike off calendar, and the court’s order does not indicate what allegations Rabbi Louie and HDC moved to strike.
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amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse.’ [Citations.] We follow the well-settled rule that ‘[w]hen reviewing a judgment dismissing a complaint after the granting of a demurrer without leave to amend, courts must assume the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations.’ [Citation.] On the other hand, the reviewing court ‘does not . . . assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.’” (Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1100; see Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; City of Norwalk v. City of Cerritos (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 977, 985.)
B. Bell Is Entitled To Amend Her Bane Act Cause of Action To Cure a Defect Rabbi Louie and HDC Assert for the First Time on Appeal Section 52.1, known as the Bane Civil Rights Act, provides:
“Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as described in subdivision (b), may institute and prosecute in their own name and on their own behalf a civil action for damages . . . .” (§ 52.1, subd. (c).) “To plead a cause of action under the Bane Act, the plaintiff must show ‘(1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion.’” (Wiley v. Kern High School Dist. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 765, 774; see Animal Protection & Rescue
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League, Inc. v. County of Riverside (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 914, 920; Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 67.)
Bell alleged Rabbi Louie intentionally interfered with her First Amendment right to protest, satisfying the first element of a cause of action under the Bane Act. Bell alleged Rabbi Louie intended to render her signs unusable when he destroyed them. Bell also alleged that Rabbi Louie’s “coercive, destructive act” physically prevented her from “using the protest signs for the rest of the night” and that Rabbi Louie’s actions had “the effect of physically preventing [Bell] and similarly situated individuals from using the protest signs to continue protesting animal cruelty on a public sidewalk.” Assuming, as we must on demurrer, these allegations are true (Morgan v. Ygrene Energy Fund, Inc. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1061, 1071), Bell sufficiently alleged the first element of a cause of action for violation of the Bane Act. (See Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550 [“the complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts”]; Yalung v. State of California (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 71, 80 [California’s “fact-pleading requirement requires the plaintiff to allege ultimate facts that apprise the defendant of the claim’s factual basis”].)
Bell also sufficiently alleged the second element, that Rabbi Louie interfered with her rights through coercion. Bell alleged: “Louie’s act of ripping up [her] protest signs was . . . coercion carried out . . . to directly interfere with [her] First Amendment rights to peacefully protest, as she was literally using the signs at the time . . . Louie ripped them up in front of her.” At the pleading stage, Bell’s allegation Rabbi Louie’s act was coercive was sufficient. (See Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1098
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[plaintiff is “only required to plead ultimate facts”; whether the plaintiff “can produce at trial, or in response to a motion for summary judgment, evidence that will in fact support all or any of” the plaintiff’s allegations “is another matter”].)
Rabbi Louie and HDC assert Bell did not “allege, for example, that Louie attempted to touch her, that he threatened Bell either verbally or otherwise, that he intimidated her, that he knew the signs belonged to Bell, or that he even communicated with her at all.” The word “otherwise,” however, is doing a lot of work in their argument. Bell alleged violent physical conduct directed at her and at personal property in her possession. A reasonable person could find that kind of conduct threatening, intimidating, or coercive. Moreover, “speech alone” may constitute coercion if it threatens violence against persons “or their property.” (§ 52.1, subd. (k).) If a verbal threat to destroy property may constitute actionable coercion, so too does the actual, physical destruction of that property. Nor does the Bane Act require that the defendant physically touch or attempt to touch the plaintiff or that the plaintiff fear violence. (See § 52.1, subd. (b) [plaintiff may bring a cause of action under the Bane Act if the defendant “interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion” with the exercise or enjoyment of constitutional or legal rights].)
Rabbi Louie and HDC also argue that Bell did not sufficiently allege the signs were her property at the time Rabbi Louie tore them up and that her allegation she owned the signed was a “conclusion of law.” On demurrer, the court assumes the truth of all properly pleaded ultimate facts. (See C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012)
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53 Cal.4th 861, 872 [“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.”].) Bell alleged the sign was hers; that was enough. (See Peninsula Properties Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (1950) 34 Cal.2d 626, 629 [“[t]he allegation that [the plaintiff] is the owner of the described property pleads an ultimate fact, good against a general demurrer”]; Robinson v. City of Glendale (1920) 182 Cal. 211, 214 [“a general allegation of ownership is always recognized as an allegation of the ultimate fact, and a complaint containing it sufficiently pleads plaintiff’s ownership”]; Hughes v. Hughes (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 327, 329 [“An allegation of ownership of property is not a conclusion of law but is an averment of an ultimate fact.”].)
Next, citing section 52.1, subdivision (k), Rabbi Louie and HDC argue that, to state a Bane Act cause of action based on the destruction of property, Bell had to allege Rabbi Louie engaged in “threatening speech.” (Italics omitted.) Section 52.1, subdivision (k), provides: “Speech alone is not sufficient to support an action [under the Bane Act], except upon a showing that the speech itself threatens violence against a specific person or group of persons; and the person or group of persons against whom the threat is directed reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be committed against them or their property and that the person threatening violence had the apparent ability to carry out the threat.” (See, e.g., Animal Protection & Rescue League, Inc. v. County of Riverside, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 921 [plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for violation of the Bane Act where “the complaint allege[d] only a spoken threat,” and the defendant did not use “force of any kind”]; Wiley v. Kern
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High School Dist., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 777 [plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for violation of the Bane Act where she did not allege the defendant engaged in violence, but alleged only that the defendant painted her in an “uncharitable” light]; Julian v. Mission Community Hospital (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 395 [“[s]peech is insufficient to establish the requisite threat unless it includes threat of violence”].) But Bell alleged Rabbi Louie committed a physical act of violence against her property; the alleged coercion did not involve “speech alone.” Section 52.1, subdivision (k), does not apply.
Finally, Rabbi Louie and HDC argue that the First Amendment protects individuals only against state action and that Bell did not allege Rabbi Louie was a state actor or acted in concert with the state. Therefore, Rabbi Louie and HDC contend, Rabbi Louie could not have interfered with Bell’s First Amendment rights. Rabbi Louie and HDC, however, did not demur on this ground and, by not raising it in the trial court, forfeited the argument. (See Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 203 [grounds not asserted in a demurrer are forfeited]; Roman v. County of Los Angeles (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 316, 322, fn. 2 [defendant’s failure to assert contentions in its demurrer forfeited those contentions on appeal].) But as Rabbi Louie and HDC correctly point out, though “an issue not raised in the trial court is typically forfeited, we can reach a ground for demurrer not raised below if it presents a pure question of law and the parties have been given an opportunity to address it.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 732, fn. 2; see Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 [“we have discretion to consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal”].)
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We hesitate to exercise our discretion here. Though the parties had an opportunity to brief the state action issue on appeal, it would be unfair to Bell to affirm the dismissal of Bell’s Bane Act cause of action on the pleadings without allowing the trial court in the first instance to consider the merits of the argument and whether to grant Bell leave to amend. (See Jogani v. Jogani (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 823, 840 [“‘Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider.’”]; Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 556, 567 [same]; City of Scotts Valley v. County of Santa Cruz (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1, 28 [“theories not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,” a rule that is “a matter of fundamental fairness to both the trial court and opposing parties”].)
Rabbi Louie and HDC’s new argument, however, has some merit. A cause of action for violation of the Bane Act requires interference with a right or law, and Bell alleges Rabbi Louie and HDC interfered with her right under the First Amendment. Because the First Amendment protects only against government intrusion, and Bell did not allege Rabbi Louie was a state actor or acting in concert with the state, Rabbi Louie could not interfere with Bell’s First Amendment right. (See Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 337 [the Bane Act does not provide a remedy “for a private actor’s putative ‘violation’ of rights that apply only against the state or its agents”]; O’Toole v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 488, 504 [“by saying the Bane Act applies to all persons whether or not acting under color of law, the Legislature intended to apply its provisions to private actors as well as public officials (at least to the extent the alleged
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constitutional violation does not have a state action requirement).” (Italics added.)]; see also Animal Protection and Rescue League v. City of Los Angeles (C.D.Cal., Jan. 30, 2018, No. 8:17-cv-01581- AB(GJSx)) 2018 WL 11314968, p. 5 [“Hebrew Discovery Center presumably is privately owned.”].) But Bell may be able to state a cause of action under the Bane Act if she can allege that Rabbi Louie was acting at the direction of the state or that Rabbi Louie or HDC violated a right or law that (unlike the First Amendment’s guaranty of free speech) does not require state action.
In any event, though Bell did not allege state action (mostly because Rabbi Louie and HDC never argued in the trial court that she needed to), she is entitled to leave to amend her complaint, either to allege “the state played [a] role in causing” her injuries (Jones v. Kmart Corp., supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 333) under the First Amendment or to allege interference with a federal or state right or law that does not require state action. This is true even if (because Rabbi Louie and HDC did not raise this issue before) she did not ask the trial court or even this court for leave to make such an allegation. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 472c, subd. (a) [“When any court makes an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend the question as to whether or not such court abused its discretion in making such an order is open on appeal even though no request to amend such pleading was made.”]; City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 746-747 [“The issue of leave to amend is always open on appeal, even if not raised by the plaintiff,” and if “the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to amend the complaint in response to the demurrer, leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the complaint shows on its face that it is
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incapable of amendment.”]; Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 970-971 [“‘Where the complaint is defective, “[i]n the furtherance of justice great liberality should be exercised in permitting a plaintiff to amend his complaint, and it ordinarily constitutes an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.”’”]; City of Torrance v. Southern California Edison Co. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1091 [“A court’s denial of leave to amend is reviewable on appeal, ‘“even in the absence of a request for leave to amend” [citations], and even if the plaintiff does not claim on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend’”].)
C. Bell Alleged Sufficient Facts To Constitute a Cause of Action for Violation of the Ralph Act The Ralph Act provides that all persons in California “have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because of political affiliation . . .” (§ 51.7, subd. (b)(1).) To state a cause of action under the Ralph Act, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the plaintiff or their property, and a motivating reason for doing so was a prohibited discriminatory motive, or that the defendant aided, incited, or conspired in the denial of a protected right.” (Gabrielle A. v. County of Orange (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1291; see Ramirez v. Wong (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1486 [section 51.7 requires “violence or a threat of violence”].) “‘[T]here is no requirement that the violence be extreme or motivated by hate in the plain language of the sections, or in the
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cases construing them; there is also no requirement that the act constitute a crime.’” (Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 270.)
Bell sufficiently alleged Rabbi Louie committed a violent, destructive act by tearing apart her signs so that she could not use them to protest. The allegedly intentional, physical destruction of Bell’s personal property constituted a violent act within the meaning of the Ralph Act. (See § 51.7, subd. (b)(1) [prohibiting violence “committed against . . . property”].)
Bell also alleged Rabbi Louie’s “motivating reason for doing so was a prohibited discriminatory motive.” (Gabrielle A. v. County of Orange, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1291.) Bell alleged that Rabbi Louie “targeted” her because of her “identification as an animal rights activist who was opposed to the chicken killing ritual” and that he targeted her “due to her political beliefs stated on the signs.” (See Campbell v. Feld Entertainment, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2014) 75 F.Supp.3d 1193, 1210 [animal rights activism constitutes a “‘political affiliation’” under the Ralph Act]; Ennis v. City of Daly City (N.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 2011, No. C-09-05318-MHP) 2011 WL 672655, p. 8 [same].) Assuming Bell’s allegations are true, again as we must (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 866), we conclude Bell sufficiently pleaded Rabbi Louie’s motivating reason for ripping up her signs was her political affiliation as an animal rights activist.
Finally, to state a cause of action under the Ralph Act claim, Bell had to allege that she suffered harm and that the conduct of Rabbi Louie and HDC was a substantial factor in causing it. Bell alleged that, by “physically ripping up the signs so they could not be used to protest any longer,” Rabbi Louie
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“committed a destructive act against [her] property.” That allegation was sufficient.
Citing Ramirez v. Wong, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th 1480, Rabbi Louie and HDC argue Bell did not allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action under the Ralph Act because she did not allege Rabbi Louie and HDC committed a verbal or physical threat intended to injure her. Rabbi Louie and HDC misread Ramirez. In Ramirez the defendant, on duty as resident manager, entered the plaintiffs’ apartment, opened a dresser drawer, and sniffed their underwear without their permission or knowledge. (Id. at p. 1483.) The court held this conduct did not violate the plaintiffs’ right “‘to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence’” because the defendant did not express any intention, either by words or conduct, to inflict injury on the plaintiffs or their property. (Id. at pp. 1486-1487.) Significantly, the plaintiffs in Ramirez did not allege any actual violence or threat of violence against their persons or property. (Id. at p. 1486.) Unlike the plaintiffs in Ramirez, Bell alleged a destructive act against her property. Because the Ralph Act protects against “violence . . . or intimidation by threat of violence” (§ 51.7, subd. (b)(1), italics added), a plaintiff who alleges physical violence against property need not also allege a threat of violence.
Rabbi Louie and HDC also assert that, even if Bell can state a cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act based on violence to personal property, the “intent to injure or intimidate must be directed to the plaintiff.” (Italics omitted.) Bell, however, alleged Rabbi Louie ripped up her sign and targeted her because she (not her sign) was an animal rights activist. That allegation was sufficient at the pleading stage, even if, at trial or
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on summary judgment, the evidence shows Rabbi Louie did not intend to injure Bell when he destroyed her signs. (See Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd Dist. Agricultural Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 929, 936 [“‘a general demurrer admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint [citation]; . . . the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court’”]; Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 922 [same]; Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697, 709 [“‘“A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.”’”]
D. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the Demurrer to Bell’s Conspiracy Cause of Action, but the Court Should Have Given Her Leave To Amend Civil conspiracy is a doctrine of liability, not a cause of action. (Spencer v. Mowat (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1024, 1036.) “‘There is no separate tort of civil conspiracy and no action for conspiracy to commit a tort unless the underlying tort is committed and damage results therefrom.’” (Julian v. Mission Community Hospital, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 390; see Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 511 [“[s]tanding alone, a conspiracy does no harm and engenders no tort liability”; it “must be activated by the commission of an actual tort”]; Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com. v. Insomniac, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 803, 833 [same].) Conspiracy is “a form of vicarious liability by which one defendant can be held liable for the acts of another.”
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(IIG Wireless, Inc. v. Yi (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 630, 652; see Spencer v. Mowat, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1036.)
Because civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action, the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer by Rabbi Louie and HDC to Bell’s cause of action for conspiracy. But Bell can easily cure the defect by amending her complaint to include her conspiracy allegations, if appropriate, in her remaining cause(s) of action. (See Loeffler v. Target Corp., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1100.)
E. The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining Demurrers by Rabbi Louie and HDC to Causes of Action Against Them Based on Vicarious and Accomplice Liability As stated, Bell alleged that Rabbi Louie, as Shamoni’s “employer and superior,” was variously liable under the Bane Act and the Ralph Act for Shamoni’s actions and that HDC was vicariously liable for the actions of Rabbi Louie and Shamoni, who Bell alleged “were acting in the course and scope of their employment when they engaged in [the] violent acts.” Bell also alleged that Rabbi Louie and Shamoni “were acting as accomplices to each other, providing encouragement and assistance to each others’ [sic] actions” and that they “were working together, acting in concert to disrupt and antagonize [Bell] and other peaceful protesters at the time each engaged in the actions that they did.”
In their demurrer, Rabbi Louie and HDC argued Bell had not adequately alleged, in support of her vicarious liability claim against HDC, an employer-employee relationship or, in support of her accomplice liability claim against Rabbi Louie, that Rabbi Louie was Shamoni’s accomplice. Rabbi Louie and HDC argued
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that Bell had not alleged “the specific employer-employee relationship” or “what kind of employee Shamoni” was and that Bell alleged nothing more than a “personal dispute arising during the contentious circumstances during her protest outside HDC.” And regarding accomplice liability, they argued they were “unaware of reported authority showing that accomplice liability is available for the civil causes of action alleged here” where, “after investigating the alleged spitting, the police found no supporting evidence and the State brought no criminal charges.”
All fine arguments on summary judgment or at trial. The plaintiff, however, does not need to plead claims of vicarious or accomplice (or aiding and abetting) liability with specificity or particularity. Where the plaintiff alleges a conspiracy to commit fraud, the plaintiff must plead a conspiracy claim with particularity, because the plaintiff must plead fraud with particularity. (Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 189, 210-212.) But there is no particularity or specificity requirement for pleading vicarious or accomplice liability for the causes of action here. Bell alleged that Shamoni was Rabbi Louie’s employee and was acting in the course and scope of his employment and that Rabbi Louie and Shamoni were HDC’s employees and were acting in the course and scope of their employment. That was sufficient. (See Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 491 [“the venerable respondeat superior rule provides that ‘an employer may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the scope of employment’”]; Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296 [“The rule of respondeat superior is familiar and simply stated: an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of
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the employment.”]; Dones v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 665, 685 [“‘[a]n allegation of agency is an allegation of ultimate fact that must be accepted as true for purposes of ruling on a demurrer’”]; City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 212 [same].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer to Bell’s second amended complaint without leave to amend. The court is directed to enter a new order (1) overruling the demurrer to Bell’s cause of action under the Ralph Act; (2) sustaining the demurrer to Bell’s causes of action under the Bane Act and for conspiracy with leave to amend; and (3) sustaining the demurrer to Bell’s causes of action for assault and battery and for elder abuse without leave to amend. Bell is to recover her costs on appeal.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.