Bell v. ICAO

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 12, 2024
• Docket: 24CA0793
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

24CA0793 Bell v ICAO 09-12-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0793

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado

DD No. 4561-2024

Katina Bell,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Centura Health,

Respondents.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V

Opinion by JUDGE LUM

Freyre and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced September 12, 2024

Katina Bell, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondents

1

¶ 1 In this unemployment benefits case, claimant, Katina Bell,

seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office

(Panel) dismissing as untimely her appeal of the hearing officer’s

decision that she was disqualified from receiving benefits. We

affirm the Panel’s order.

I. Background

¶ 2 Bell worked as a patient benefits counselor for Centura Health

for nearly a year, at which point she left for another job that had

better pay and working conditions. Bell applied for unemployment

benefits in connection with the termination of her Centura Health

job, but a deputy with the Division of Unemployment Insurance

(Division) determined she was disqualified from receiving benefits

under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(V), C.R.S. 2024 (precluding benefits for

claimants who quit one job in favor of another). Bell appealed the

Division’s decision to a hearing officer. After reviewing evidence

presented at the hearing, the hearing officer reached the same

conclusion as the Division. Accordingly, on March 12, 2024, the

hearing officer issued an order disqualifying Bell from receiving

benefits.

2

¶ 3 The hearing officer mailed that order to Bell the same day.

The order included an advisement regarding Bell’s right to appeal.

Specifically, it explained that Bell had the right to request a new

hearing or appellate review, so long as the Panel received such

request within twenty days of the date the decision was mailed — in

other words, by April 1, 2024.

¶ 4 Bell submitted a request for a new hearing on April 4, 2024 —

three days past the deadline. The Panel emailed Bell the following

day, asking when she received the hearing officer’s decision and

why she failed to timely file. On April 9, 2024, Bell responded that

she received the decision “around” March 20 and had experienced

difficulty accessing her Division file electronically. The Panel

determined no good cause excused Bell’s late filing, and it therefore

dismissed her request for a new hearing as untimely.

II. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 5 The Panel must receive a claimant’s appeal of a hearing

officer’s decision within twenty calendar days after the claimant is

notified of that decision. § 8-74-104(1), C.R.S. 2024. The Panel

may review an untimely appeal only upon finding good cause for the

3

late filing. Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Reg. 12.1.3.3, 7 Code Colo. Regs.

1101-2.

¶ 6 In determining whether a claimant has shown good cause, the

Panel considers (1) “whether the party acted in the manner that a

reasonably prudent individual would have acted under the same or

similar circumstances”; (2) whether the Division committed an

“administrative error”; (3) whether the claimant “exercised control

over the untimely action”; (4) the length of delay in filing;

(5) whether the delay prejudiced “any other interested party”; and

(6) “whether denying good cause would lead to a result that is

inconsistent with the law.” Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Reg. 12.1.8, 7

Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2. Generally, the Panel has discretion to

weigh the foregoing factors, and we will not disturb its ruling absent

an abuse of that discretion. Nguyen v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,

174 P.3d 847, 848-49 (Colo. App. 2007).

III. Analysis

¶ 7 Construed liberally, Bell’s brief raises two arguments — one

challenging the merits of the hearing officer’s decision and one

restating her alleged good cause for filing a late appeal. See People

v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 696-97 (Colo. 2010) (we construe pro se

4

filings liberally, giving effect to their substance rather than form).

At this stage in the proceedings, the merits of the hearing officer’s

decision are not properly before us because the Panel never reached

those issues. See § 8-74-107, C.R.S. 2024 (providing that the

Panel’s order may be set aside only upon limited grounds); People in

Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14 (an appellate court generally

reviews only matters ruled on in the order being appealed). We

review the sole issue the Panel addressed — whether Bell

demonstrated good cause to accept her late appeal. See M.B., ¶ 14.

¶ 8 Bell first contends, as she did below, that she had difficulty

accessing information in her electronic file. The Panel expressly

considered this argument and found that Bell received the hearing

officer’s decision by mail on March 20, that the decision contained

clear appeal instructions, and that any trouble Bell experienced

with respect to her electronic file made no difference to her ability to

timely file an appeal. Bell neither challenges these findings nor the

evidence the Panel cited to support its determination. Nor does she

otherwise explain how the difficulty accessing the electronic file

contributed to her untimely filing.

5

¶ 9 Bell also asserts that an agent “misled” her. As best we

understand her, this argument refers to a call she made on April 4,

2024, during which she says an agent told her that it wasn’t too

late to file her appeal with the Panel. But because the deadline had

already passed by the time Bell received this purported

misinformation, it isn’t a reason to set aside the Panel’s order.

¶ 10 Consequently, we will not disturb the Panel’s order on review.

IV. Disposition

¶ 11 We affirm the Panel’s order.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE GROVE concur.