Bell v. Foutch

21 Iowa 119
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedJune 28, 1866
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 21 Iowa 119 (Bell v. Foutch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bell v. Foutch, 21 Iowa 119 (iowa 1866).

Opinion

Dillon, J.

I. Bridges : Krdof supervisors. The important questions made in this case open into an interesting field of legal inquiry concerning the respective powers and jurisdictions of the county and city in respect to highways, streets aQq bridges. This field has been well explored by counsel whose researches have materially abridged our labors. The questions are essentially statutory, and adjudged cases in other States afford little aid, except to teach and illustrate the principles which should be applied in the construction of our various statute provisions upon the subject of roads and bridges, and the rights and powers of municipal corporations in respect thereto.

The contemplated bridge is to be a free and not a toll-bridge. It is designed to cross the Des Moines river, a large stream, several hundred miles in length, bisecting the county of Polk. The city of Des Moines also lies on [126]*126either side of the river. To span the stream requires a structure six hundred and five feet in length, and one which, to be securely built, will involve the expenditure of several thousand dollars. The proposed bridge will, according to the contract, cost the sum of $26,000. It is not, strictly speaking, a bridge on the streets of the city, but a-bridge at the foot of Walnut street. This street, on the west side (the original town), terminates-at the river. On the east side and directly opposite, the same street, or a street of the same name, also terminates at the river. It is alleged in the answer, and presumed to be substantially true, that Walnut “is the main street and most public highway through the city, east and west, and that the bridge, when completed, will be the one over which most, if not all, the travel east and west will pass, on the State and county roads leading east and west through said city.”

In other words, the- street connects with State or county roads; and the bridge will accommodate, not simply the citizens of Des Moines, but, being upon or connecting with lines of highways running into and through the county,, it will accommodate all the citizens of the county, and the traveling public at large. •

These circumstances show that the benefits of the bridge in question will not alone be enjoyed by the city, and in view of our statutes on the subject of roads and bridges, these facts seemed necessary to be stated, that the questions decided should be properly understood.

The present case is brought to test the legality of the appropriation of $2,000, by the board of supervisors, out of the bridge fund, and the plaintiff’s argument against its legality is, in substance, this: That the fee of the streets is in the city; that-the city authorities have the sole control of the streets of the city; that the county has no power over the streets, and no duties in respect to them ; in other words, the county has no right to build a bridge of any [127]*127character inside the limits of the municipal corporation, and therefore no power to aid others in building such a bridge. Some of these propositions may be well founded, and yet they would not authorize the conclusion contended for. We remark that the city of' Des Moines is organized under the general incorporation act, as a city of the second class. Rev., ch. 51.

It is only necessary to discuss the question whether, under the general statutes of the State, taken in connection •with the general incorporation act just referred to, the county authorities have the power to erect or aid in the erection of a bridge over the Des Moines river, at the point above described, within the limits of the city corporation. That the county authorities have this power, may be clearly shown by an examination of the statute.

No enlightened State will fail to provide a mode or system for the laying out, improvement, and keeping in repair, highways and bridges. What system has been adopted in this State? This it is necessary briefly to examine. The State, instead of undertaking this work directly, has committed it to various local or subordinate auxiliaries of government. And the provisions in respect to roads and in respect to bridges, are not in all respects the same. The county authorities alone have the power to establish highways and are invested with the general supervision thereof, including bridges. Rev. §§ 819-823; 312, 327, subd. 13,17.

For- ordinary road and ordinary bridge purposes the county is, as to their construction, amendment and repair, divided into road districts, each with its supervisor, with power to require a certain limited amount of work from all the able-bodied residents, and with power in the township trustees to levy a township road and bridge tax, to a limited amount, payable partly in money and partly in labor; the money thus realized to be expended in the [128]*128particular road district from, which it is collected and not elsewhere. Rev., ch. 46, art. 3, Acts of T862, 190.

Now this is the provision made by law for ordinary road and bridge purposes. But if this were all, it is evident that the law would be very inadequate, so far as concerns bridges requiring an extraordinary expenditure to construct or repair them. The State is traversed by numerous water-courses or streams of considerable size, of which the Des Moines is one.

Now, if the above were the only provisions of the statute, the particular road district on the river, in which a bridge was needed, would have to bear the whole expense of its construction, or -else leave the river unbridged. This the law makers have anticipated and carefully provided for, as we shall now proceed to show, making bridges essentially a matter pertaining to the duties of the county organization.

Thus the county supervisors have express power “ To provide for the erection of all bridges which may be necessary, and which the public convenience may require within their respective counties and to keep the same in repair.” Rev., §§ 312, subd., 18; 313 (last part) 327, 819.

To enable the county to execute this duty, the statute (Rev., ch. 45, § 710) provides “ that the board of supervisors in each county, shall annually levy the following taxes upon the assessed value of the taxable property of the county: 1. For State revenue, &c. * * * * 4, For malting and repairing bridges, not more than one mill on the dollar, whenever the board of supervisors shall deem it necessary." This tax of one mill was found to be inadequate in many of the counties traversed by large streams, and hence the power was recently enlarged so as to give the right to levy a three mill bridge tax. Acts 1866, p. 80.

No such provision is made for the levy by the county of a county road tax, for the reason it may be supposed, that [129]*129the powers above referred to, conferred upon the township trustees, would be sufficient to meet the public wants with respect to roads. It is thus seen that special provision is made to enable boards of supervisors to “ erect all bridges which may be necessary, and which the public convenience may require, within their respective counties.” Bev., § 312.

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Bluebook (online)
21 Iowa 119, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bell-v-foutch-iowa-1866.