Bell v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Bell v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission

473 So. 2d 23, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1801

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJuly 24, 1985

DocketNo. 85-1079

StatusPublished

This text of 473 So. 2d 23 (Bell v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Bell v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission, 473 So. 2d 23, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1801 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985).

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Opinion

HERSEY, Chief Judge.

Johnny Lee Bell petitions alternatively for writ of habeas corpus or writ of mandamus. Because immediate release is sought we treat the petition as one for habeas corpus. Shannon v. Mitchell, 460 So.2d 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

The petition is denied because (1) the challenge of the thirty-two-month aggravation is time-barred, section 947.173(1), Florida Statutes (1983), Myers v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 423 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); and (2) the record contains substantial competent evidence to support the sixty-month extension as being based upon institutional conduct and new information not available at the time of the initial interview. § 947.16(4), Fla.Stat. (1983).

GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ., concur.

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HERSEY, Chief Judge.

Johnny Lee Bell petitions alternatively for writ of habeas corpus or writ of mandamus. Because immediate release is sought we treat the petition as one for habeas corpus. Shannon v. Mitchell, 460 So.2d 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

The petition is denied because (1) the challenge of the thirty-two-month aggravation is time-barred, section 947.173(1), Florida Statutes (1983), Myers v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 423 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); and (2) the record contains substantial competent evidence to support the sixty-month extension as being based upon institutional conduct and new information not available at the time of the initial interview. § 947.16(4), Fla.Stat. (1983).

GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ., concur.

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473 So. 2d 23, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1801, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bell-v-florida-parole-probation-commission-fladistctapp-1985.

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