UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRANDON BELL CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-1032
TRAVIS DAY, WARDEN SECTION: “J”(1)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Brandon Bell, a state prisoner, filed this pro se and in forma pauperis civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bell sued Warden Travis Day. In his complaint, Bell’s statement of claim, without corrections to grammar or spelling, is as follows: “Mental Health told security to duck tape a helment on me while I was on extended suicide watch.” Rec. Doc. 4 at 3. Bell seeks monetary damages. Id. Federal law mandates that federal courts “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”1 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Regarding such lawsuits, federal law further requires: On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint –
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
1 “As used in this section, the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c). Additionally, with respect to actions filed in forma pauperis, such as the instant lawsuit, federal law similarly provides: Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action …
(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). When making that determination, the Court has “not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when the plaintiff does not “plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (footnote, citation, and quotation marks omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held: A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, even when Bell’s complaint is liberally construed,2 it is clear that it is frivolous and/or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Bell filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In pertinent part, that statute provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, “[t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Bell’s allegations fail on one or both of those prongs for the following reasons. Although Bell named Warden Day Travis as the sole defendant, he made no allegations against him. However, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held: “Plaintiffs suing governmental officials in their individual capacities ... must allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation. This standard requires more than conclusional assertions: The plaintiff must allege specific facts giving rise to the constitutional claims.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[p]ersonal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action,” Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983), and such involvement must be specifically alleged. As a result, Bell’s mere naming of Warden Day as the defendant without making any factual allegations connecting him to his claim does not suffice to
2 The Court must liberally construe a pro se civil rights complaint. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994). state a claim against him. See Tuley v. Heyd, 482 F.2d 590, 594 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that the mere inclusion of names and notations of office in the caption does not suffice to state a claim); Jones v. Ledet, No. 19-10969, 2019 WL 6040091, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 2019) (“Where ... a plaintiff has merely listed individuals as defendants in the complaint but made no factual
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRANDON BELL CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-1032
TRAVIS DAY, WARDEN SECTION: “J”(1)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Brandon Bell, a state prisoner, filed this pro se and in forma pauperis civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bell sued Warden Travis Day. In his complaint, Bell’s statement of claim, without corrections to grammar or spelling, is as follows: “Mental Health told security to duck tape a helment on me while I was on extended suicide watch.” Rec. Doc. 4 at 3. Bell seeks monetary damages. Id. Federal law mandates that federal courts “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”1 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Regarding such lawsuits, federal law further requires: On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint –
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
1 “As used in this section, the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c). Additionally, with respect to actions filed in forma pauperis, such as the instant lawsuit, federal law similarly provides: Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action …
(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). When making that determination, the Court has “not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when the plaintiff does not “plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (footnote, citation, and quotation marks omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held: A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, even when Bell’s complaint is liberally construed,2 it is clear that it is frivolous and/or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Bell filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In pertinent part, that statute provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, “[t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Bell’s allegations fail on one or both of those prongs for the following reasons. Although Bell named Warden Day Travis as the sole defendant, he made no allegations against him. However, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held: “Plaintiffs suing governmental officials in their individual capacities ... must allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation. This standard requires more than conclusional assertions: The plaintiff must allege specific facts giving rise to the constitutional claims.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[p]ersonal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action,” Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983), and such involvement must be specifically alleged. As a result, Bell’s mere naming of Warden Day as the defendant without making any factual allegations connecting him to his claim does not suffice to
2 The Court must liberally construe a pro se civil rights complaint. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994). state a claim against him. See Tuley v. Heyd, 482 F.2d 590, 594 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that the mere inclusion of names and notations of office in the caption does not suffice to state a claim); Jones v. Ledet, No. 19-10969, 2019 WL 6040091, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 2019) (“Where ... a plaintiff has merely listed individuals as defendants in the complaint but made no factual
allegations against them, no cognizable individual-capacity claim has been stated against those defendants.”), adopted, 2019 WL 6036706 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2019). Nor may Warden Day be held responsible under a theory of respondeat superior under § 1983, based on a claim that prison personnel under their supervision caused his injury. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1327 (5th Cir. 1996); accord Field v. Corr. Corp. of Am. Inc., 364 F. App’x 927, 929 (5th Cir. 2010). A supervisory official may be held liable for his subordinates’ actions under § 1983 only if the official implemented an unconstitutional policy that causally resulted in the injury. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978); Thompson v. Johnson, 348 F. App’x 919, 921 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Mouille v. City of Live Oak, 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Here, Bell does not allege that an official policy resulted in his injury. Furthermore, Fifth Circuit jurisprudence dictates that Warden Day is not a policymaker. Guillot ex rel. T.A.G. v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743, 750 (5th Cir. 2023) (“Official-capacity suits may be brought only against an official acting as a policymaker, such that his decisions represent the official policy of the local government unit ... [and] [i]n Louisiana, the sheriff [not the warden] is the final policymaker.”). Accordingly, Bell’s claims against Day should be dismissed. RECOMMENDATION It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Bell’s federal civil rights claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc). New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14th day of July, 2025.
Vow Moe vol JANIS VAN MEERVELD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE