Bell v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedAugust 17, 2022
Docket6:20-cv-01229-AR
StatusUnknown

This text of Bell v. Commissioner Social Security Administration (Bell v. Commissioner Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bell v. Commissioner Social Security Administration, (D. Or. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

CRYSTAL L. B., Ca se No. 6:20-cv-01229-AR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant. _____________________________________

ARMISTEAD, Magistrate Judge

In this judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying Social Security benefits, Crystal (her last name omitted for privacy) challenges the Administrative Law Judge’s partial rejection of examining physician Dr. Blattner’s opinion concerning her reaching limitations. Crystal asserts that the ALJ rejected Dr. Blattner’s opinion regarding her reaching limitations solely on the basis that it was “nonspecific.” Non-examining physician, Dr. Berner, opined that Crystal could “occasionally reach overhead bilaterally.” Her challenge to the ALJ’s

Page 1 – OPINION AND ORDER rejection of Dr. Blattner’s opinion turns on the requirement that an ALJ must provide “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence” when rejecting an examining doctor’s opinion if it is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (2014) (so stating). That is, Crystal argues that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Blattner’s opinion—on the basis that it was nonspecific—failed to meet that requirement. As the court will explain, the ALJ did not err. The court affirms. ALJ’S DECISION In denying Crystal’s application for Title II and Tile XVI disability benefits, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process.1 Critical to the court’s review is the ALJ’s

assessment of Crystal’s residual-functional-capacity (RFC) determination (an intermediate step between steps three and four, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945). Reviewing all the evidence in the record, the ALJ determined that Crystal has the RFC to perform light work, except that she can occasionally push/pull with the bilateral upper extremities; can never kneel, crawl, climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; can occasionally stoop, crouch, and climb stairs and ramps; can occasionally reach overhead bilaterally; can frequently handle, finger, and feel bilaterally; must avoid concentrated exposure to vibrations and hazards; can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; can have occasional superficial interaction with the public; and can have occasional contact with co-workers. Tr. 20. In light of her RFC, the ALJ found at step five that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Crystal can perform, including

1 To determine a claimant’s disability, the ALJ must apply a five-step evaluation. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If the ALJ finds that a claimant is either disabled or not disabled at any step, the ALJ does not continue to the next step. Id.; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746–47 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the five-step evaluation in detail).

Page 2 – OPINION AND ORDER such representative occupations as electronic accessories assembler, routing clerk, and document preparer. Tr. 33. STANDARD OF REVIEW The district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if the Commissioner applied proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla” and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotation and citation omitted). To determine whether substantial evidence exists, the court must

weigh all the evidence, whether it supports or detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1009. DISCUSSION The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical record, including conflicts among physicians’ opinions. Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). In general, the opinion of a treating physician is given more weight than the opinion of an examining physician, and the opinion of an examining physician is afforded more weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2014).2 If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, it must be rejected by specific and legitimate reasons. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. To meet this

burden, the ALJ must set out a “detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting

2 The hierarchical treatment of medical opinions has been supplanted by new rules— 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a)—as of March 27, 2017. This case proceeds under the old rules.

Page 3 – OPINION AND ORDER clinical evidence, stating [the ALJ’s] his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). When evaluating conflicting opinions, an ALJ is not required to accept an opinion that is not supported by clinical findings, or is brief or conclusory. Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154; Bray v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009). Crystal challenges only the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Blattner’s opinion concerning her reaching limitations. Dr. Blattner opined that Crystal can perform “activities that involve pulling, pushing, and reaching” “occasionally.” Tr. 666. Crystal asserts that when Dr. Blattner used the terms “reaching,” he was using those terms as they are defined by the Social Security

Administration’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles and its companion the Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles (SCO). The SCO defines “reaching” as extending hands and arms in any direction. SCO Appendix C-3. Crystal argues that because “reaching” means any direction, the ALJ erred by “looking for additional specificity that not even the Social Security Administration itself bothers to require.” Pl.’s Opening Br. at 5, ECF NO. 14. Crystal contends that rejecting Dr. Blattner’s reaching limitation as “nonspecific” falls short of the “specific and legitimate” rationale required. According to Crystal, the ALJ’s error is harmful because when occasional reaching in any direction is added to the RFC and the attendant hypothetical question is posed to the vocational expert, all jobs identified by the vocational expert and adopted by the ALJ are

eliminated, resulting in error at step five. Pl.’s Br. at 5. Crystal argues that a remand for further administrative proceedings is required because it is not clear that all work is precluded when her RFC is properly formulated.

Page 4 – OPINION AND ORDER The Commissioner responds that the ALJ largely agreed with Dr. Blattner’s opinion, highlighting that the ALJ rejected only that portion relating to occasional reaching.

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Bell v. Commissioner Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bell-v-commissioner-social-security-administration-ord-2022.