Bell v. City of Des Moines

412 N.W.2d 585, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1729, 1987 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1268
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedSeptember 23, 1987
Docket86-1048
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 412 N.W.2d 585 (Bell v. City of Des Moines) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bell v. City of Des Moines, 412 N.W.2d 585, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1729, 1987 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1268 (iowa 1987).

Opinion

LARSON, Justice.

When William Argumedo committed suicide in Des Moines in 1986, several observers were present, including Des Moines police officers and television reporters from WHO-TV and two other Des Moines stations. Portions of the videotapes made at the scene were aired as a part of the stations’ regular newscasts. The plaintiffs, to whom we will refer collectively as Bells, contemplated a suit against the city based on the police officers’ handling of the threatened suicide, and they applied to the district court for an order to “perpetuate” the testimony of Dennis Kendall, WHO-TV’s news director, for possible use in that suit. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 159-66.

As a part of their requested deposition of Kendall, Bells also asked that the station be ordered to preserve its videotape of the suicide, alleging that the videotape represented “the best and most competent evidence in support of [Bells’] claims” against the city, and unless the court ordered the station to preserve the videotape, it would be destroyed in the normal course of its business.

WHO-TV did not receive notice of the application to perpetuate testimony and did not appear at the initial hearing on it. However, its interest was piqued, to put it mildly, when Kendall was ordered to appear for the deposition and “to have in his possession and make available ... for re *587 view and/or copying any and all videotape” of the Argumedo suicide. 1

WHO-TV agreed to furnish copies of all footage which had been aired on its newscasts, but it moved to quash the order insofar as it required production of “raw footage,” or videotapes which were retained in its files. It contended that these tapes were presumptively privileged and that Bells had failed to rebut that presumption. See Lamberto v. Bown, 326 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Iowa 1982); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847, 849-52 (Iowa 1977). Following a hearing on the station’s motion to quash, the court reaffirmed its prior order, and WHO-TV appealed. We reverse and remand.

We need not elaborate on the competing interests at stake in these cases. It is the general rule that a litigant is entitled to “every person’s evidence.” Lamberto, 326 N.W.2d at 306-07; 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). On the other hand, there is a countervailing interest in maintaining a free press under the first amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Iowa Constitution, which has given rise to our recognition of a “qualified” reporter’s privilege. See, e.g., Lamberto, 326 N.W.2d at 306-07; Winegard, 258 N.W.2d at 849-52.

In weighing these interests, the scale has generally tilted toward requiring disclosure of the disputed evidence if the case involves a criminal charge, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3109, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 1066 (1974), or a grand jury proceeding, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2658, 33 L.Ed.2d 626, 642 (1972). Also, in a civil case, a claim of privilege is frequently subordinated when the party claiming the privilege is involved as a party. A libel case is perhaps the best example. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 155-58, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1638-39, 60 L.Ed.2d 115, 121-23 (1979). See generally Lamberto, 326 N.W.2d at 307. The present case, of course, falls outside these categories.

The test for evaluating a claim of reporter privilege was stated in Lamberto:

[A] determination must be made whether the resisting party falls within the class of persons qualifying for the privilege. If that preliminary showing is made, the material is to be treated as presumptively privileged, and the burden falls on the requesting party to satisfy the court by a preponderance of the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, that (1) there is a probability or likelihood that the evidence is necessary and (2) it cannot be secured from any less obtrusive source. If the court is so satisfied, an in-eamera examination of the evidence should be ordered.

326 N.W.2d at 309. Under this test, a reporter falling within the “class of persons qualifying for the privilege” is presumptively entitled to its protection. Once this presumptive status is established, the party seeking access to the evidence must show the necessity for it and the unavailability of other sources.

I. In connection with the threshold showing that WHO-TV falls within the protected class, the parties stipulated that

WHO-TV is a television station, and as part of that function it employs a full-time news staff whose function is to gather and edit and disseminate the news, and further, that Mr. Kendall is the news director of WHO-TV.

Bells argue that WHO-TV’s status as a news gatherer, standing alone, does not cloak it or its reporter with a presumptive privilege and, if Lamberto may be so read, it should be modified. The test of Lamberto for establishment-of a presump *588 tive privilege is clear, and we reaffirm that test here: if the resisting party falls within the class of persons qualified for the privilege, such as a reporter, and the information in question is obtained in the news gathering process, it is presumptively privileged. This, of course, does not mean that a reporter may raise the privilege to avoid testifying, as any other citizen, to observations made as an eyewitness. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 686-86, 92 S.Ct. at 2658-59, 33 L.Ed.2d at 642 (testimony before grand jury).

In the present case, the district court said:

The court notes that it is the manager of the TV station who’s being subpoenaed, and not any reporter. That no notes or script of mental impressions of a reporter is asked for, nor any research requested, nor explanation of why cameras were located where they were, nor any confidential informants sought, nor is anyone asked to produce any information obtained from any private source. What is asked for is something that was open for the whole world to see, and is now fixed in time on the videotape. The court questions whether under these circumstances the raw videotape footage is confidential.

The court thus applied its own test in assessing WHO-TV’s claim of presumptive privilege, one which appears to turn on a perceived lack of editorial judgment, the absence of confidential informants, and the fact that the event was “open for the whole world to see.” In rejecting the claim of presumptive privilege on these grounds, the court failed to apply the proper test which, as we have previously discussed, turns simply on whether the resisting party is a member of the protected class engaged in the news gathering process.

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412 N.W.2d 585, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1729, 1987 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1268, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bell-v-city-of-des-moines-iowa-1987.