NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
RIAN B. BELL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
HOLLY A. BELL N/K/A HOLLY A. FEGER : No. 177 MDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered January 6, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County Civil Division at No(s):
FC-2020-34-P
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and NEUMAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY NEUMAN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 15, 2026 Appellant, Rian B. Bell, appeals pro se from the trial court’s order finding him in civil contempt.1 We affirm.
Background
A divorce decree was entered for Appellant and Appellee, Holly A. Bell n/k/a Holly A. Feger, on December 30, 2022.2 On the same day, an equitable distribution order was separately entered by the trial court. Among other
things, the December 30, 2022 order stated, in relevant part:
AND NOW, this 30th day of December, 2022, the [c]ourt finds the Master erred in the valuation of the Chevy Tahoe by subtracting the loan from the net value instead of the gross value. The [c]ourt further finds that the Master committed no further errors and it is
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1 Any references to “Husband” herein relate to Appellant.
2 Any references to “Wife” herein relate to Ms. Feger.
therefore ORDERED AND DECREED, in accordance with the Master’s Report, as follows:
A. DIVORCE. The parties have filed their Affidavits of Consent and Waivers and the Divorce Decree is being signed contemporaneously herewith.
B. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION. The marital portion of Husband’s Pension … shall be divided equally between the parties and Husband shall bear the costs associated with the preparation of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) to facilitate the division of his pension.
The remaining net marital assets and liabilities shall be divided 40% to Husband and 60% to [W]ife in the manner hereinafter set forth:
1. [The] Creek Road[ Property] – Marital Residence. The marital real estate proceeds … shall be distributed to Husband.
2. [The] Spring Road[ Property], Shermans Dale. The real estate situate[d] at … Spring Road, Shermans Dale[,] … shall be distributed to Wife. Wife shall refinance the current mortgage/line of credits associated with the real estate for the purpose of removing Husband’s name within 90 days of the date of the final equitable distribution order. While the refinancing is pending, Wife shall be responsible for the following costs: mortgage, taxes, insurance[,] and repairs.
In the event Wife fails to refinance said mortgages within 90 days of the date of the final equitable distribution order, the real estate shall be listed for sale with a reputable real estate agent chosen by Wife and sold. At the time of settlement of the real estate, the mortgage/lines of credit shall be satisfied and the net proceeds after the payment of normal settlement costs shall be divided 60% to Wife and 40% to Husband. While the real estate is listed and pending sale, Wife shall be responsible for the following costs: mortgage, taxes, insurance[,] and repairs.
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3. [The] Forest Drive[ Property], Ulysses, PA. The real estate located at … Forest Drive, Ulysses, PA[,] with a stipulated value of $82,000 shall be distributed to Wife.[3]
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19. Debts not previously assigned to assets.
a. Bank of Landisburg Consolidation loan. The Bank of Landisburg Consolidation loan totaling $37,574 shall be paid by Husband.
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D. ENFORCEMENT.
1. Husband and Wife shall sign whatever documents are necessary to effectuate said transfers within sixty (60) days of the date of this order unless otherwise stated in the Master’s Report.
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3. Upon the finding of a breach by the [c]ourt, the breaching party shall be responsible for the non-breaching party’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
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5. The [c]ourt shall retain continuing jurisdiction over this matter for purposes of enforcement.
Order, 12/30/22, at 1-4.
Subsequently, on March 10, 2023, Ms. Feger filed a petition for contempt against Appellant.4 Ms. Feger complained, inter alia, that Appellant — pursuant to Paragraph (B)(19)(a) of the December 30, 2022 order — failed to pay or refinance the Bank of Landisburg Consolidation loan (hereinafter
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3 The real estate on Forest Drive is sometimes referred to as the Potter County property. See, e.g., N.T., 1/5/26, at 12, 41. 4 Ms. Feger has been represented by counsel during all times pertinent to this appeal.
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Landisburg Loan). Petition for Contempt, 3/10/23, at ¶¶ 10-11.5 Ms. Feger averred that she consequently had to make a payment on the Landisburg Loan, which paused a foreclosure action. See id. at ¶¶ 12-13. She requested, among other things, the trial court find Appellant in contempt and award her reimbursement for the payment she made, fees that have incurred due to nonpayment, and attorney’s fees. Id. at 3 (unnumbered). Appellant thereafter filed a petition for contempt against Ms. Feger.6
On April 18, 2023, the trial court entered the following order:
AND NOW, April 14, 2023, after [a] hearing this date, the court does not find [Ms. Feger] in contempt. The court does find [Appellant] in contempt for not paying the … Landisburg … [L]oan as previously ordered. The court does not find that [Appellant] is in contempt for any other issues raised in [Ms. Feger’s] petition for contempt.
The court finds that [Ms. Feger] had owed [Appellant] $8,390.40, in accordance with paragraph (B)(20)[]of this court’s order dated December 30, 2022.[7] The court finds that [Appellant] shall reimburse [Ms. Feger] for payments made to the Bank of Landisburg in the amount of $8,616.88.
The court further finds that [Appellant] shall reimburse [Ms.
Feger’s] attorney’s fees….
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5 The record indicates the Landisburg Loan was secured by the real estate located on Forest Drive, mentioned in paragraph (B)(3) of the December 30, 2022 order. See N.T., 1/5/26, at 5, 20, 41; see also Petition for Contempt, 3/10/23, at ¶¶ 10-13.
6 Appellant was represented by counsel at this time.
7 Under paragraph (B)(20) — which is not at issue herein — Ms. Feger had to
make a payment to Appellant to effectuate the 60/40 equitable distribution split of the assets and liabilities excluding Appellant’s pension.
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After offsetting the amount [Ms. Feger] owes [Appellant] in accordance with paragraph (B)(20) of the order dated December 30, 2022, and adding in the remaining balance owed as a result of [Ms. Feger’s] payments to the Bank of Landisburg and for attorney’s fees, it is hereby ORDERED and DIRECTED that [Appellant] pay [Ms. Feger] in the amount of $1,881.48. Said amount shall be paid in full within 120 days of today’s date.
Order, 4/18/23, at 1-2 (unnumbered; unnecessary capitalization omitted).8 On December 1, 2025, Ms. Feger filed another petition for contempt against Appellant. Therein, she alleged, inter alia, Appellant still had not paid off the Landisburg Loan. See Petition for Contempt, 12/1/25, at ¶ 4. According to Ms. Feger, Appellant also had not refinanced the Landisburg Loan and removed Ms. Feger from it, and she remained listed as a responsible party. See id. at ¶¶ 4-5. In October 2025, Ms. Feger claimed Appellant was late in paying the Landisburg Loan, which impacted Ms. Feger’s credit score. Id. at ¶ 6. On October 31, 2025, Ms. Feger stated her counsel sent a letter to Appellant, directing him to pay off the Landisburg Loan or complete the refinancing of the Landisburg Loan in his name only. See id. at ¶ 7. In response, Ms. Feger said Appellant indicated he would not remove Ms. Feger from the Landisburg Loan and that she would have to proceed with filing enforcement proceedings. Id. at ¶ 8. Ms. Feger therefore requested the trial court enforce the December 30, 2022 order requiring Appellant to pay off the remaining balance of the Landisburg Loan or refinance it solely in his name. Id. at ¶ 9. Pursuant to paragraph (D)(3) of the December 30, 2022 order,
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8 This order was dated April 14, 2023, but not entered on the docket until April 18, 2023.
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she also sought attorney’s fees for the cost of ensuring Appellant complies with the December 30, 2022 order. Id. at ¶ 10.
Appellant thereafter filed a pro se response. Among other things, Appellant denied the December 30, 2022 order required him to transfer, refinance, or otherwise take any action beyond payment on the Landisburg Loan. Response to Petition for Contempt, 12/17/25, at ¶ 3; see also id. at ¶ 11 (Appellant’s denying he was ever ordered to pay-in-full or refinance the Landisburg Loan). He also denied Ms. Feger’s credit score has been impacted and claimed he has made regular monthly payments on the Landisburg Loan, submitting payments on the due date or within the contractual grace period, despite undergoing substantial medical care for the treatment of cancer. See id. at ¶¶ 4, 6.
The trial court held a hearing on January 5, 2026. Following the hearing,
the trial court entered the following order:
AND NOW, January 5, 2026, after [a] hearing this date on [Ms.
Feger’s] petition for contempt…, the court hereby finds [Appellant]
is in contempt for failure to transfer the [Landisburg Loan] out of [Ms. Feger’s] name within 60 days of the order. [The] court further notes that due to this failure, the … Forest Grove, Ulysses, PA real estate is still [e]ncumbered and, therefore, [Ms. Feger]
cannot have full enjoyment and use of said property.
It is hereby ORDERED AND DIRECTED that [Appellant] shall have 90 days from today’s date to transfer the [Landisburg Loan] in his name, pay off the loan, or take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that [Ms. Feger] is no longer on the loan or liable for said loan. It is also ORDERED AND DIRECTED that said transfer shall ensure that the Potter County property is no longer encumbered.
[Appellant] shall pay [Ms. Feger’s] attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,000 within 120 days of today’s date. Said attorney’s fees shall be paid directly to counsel for [Ms. Feger].
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Order, 1/6/26, at 1 (unnumbered; some capitalization modified).9 Appellant, pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal, and timely complied with the trial court’s directive to file a concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).10 The trial court later issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Issues
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law in adjudicating Appellant in civil contempt where the underlying December 30, 2022 equitable distribution order was not clear, definite, and specific as to the obligations allegedly violated.
2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by using contempt proceedings to impose new and expanded substantive obligations not expressly set forth in the December 30, 2022 equitable distribution order, rather than proceeding through proper modification or clarification procedures.
3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in imposing coercive civil contempt sanctions without making findings regarding Appellant’s present ability to comply, where undisputed testimony established Appellant was undergoing extensive cancer treatment and was on disability at the time of the contempt hearing.
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9 While this order was dated January 5, 2026, it was not docketed until January 6, 2026.
10 “[A] contempt order is final and appealable if the order contains (1) a present finding of contempt and (2) an imposition of sanctions.” Hanbicki v. Leader, 294 A.3d 1234, 1239 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted); see also id. at 1238 (noting this Court may sua sponte consider the appealability of an order). “This Court has determined that an award of attorney’s fees is a sufficient sanction to render the order appealable.” Id. at 1239 (citation omitted). Here, the trial court’s order finds Appellant in contempt. It also imposed sanctions by ordering Appellant to pay Ms. Feger’s attorney’s fees. Thus, we consider the trial court’s January 6, 2026 order to be final and appealable.
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4. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt violated Appellant’s due process rights by imposing contempt sanctions without adequate notice of the conduct alleged to constitute contempt and without affording Appellant a meaningful opportunity to be heard on newly imposed or reinterpreted obligations.
5. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and committed errors of law in requiring reversal or vacatur of the January [6], 2026 contempt order.
Appellant’s Brief at 7-9 (emphasis omitted).
Analysis
Mootness
Prior to addressing Appellant’s issues, we initially consider whether this appeal is moot.11 Ms. Feger indicates in her brief that Appellant has complied with the trial court’s January 6, 2026 order. See Ms. Feger’s Brief at 11 (“Appellant fully complied with the [January 6, 2026] order, and paid [Ms. Feger’s] attorney’s fees as instructed.”); see also id. at 6. Appellant has not filed a reply brief disputing this assertion.
With respect to the doctrine of mootness, this Court has observed, as a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot.
An issue can become moot during the pendency of an appeal due to an intervening change in the facts of the case or due to an intervening change in the applicable law. In that case, an opinion of this Court is rendered advisory in nature. An issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect.
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11 “[W]e may sua sponte raise the issue of mootness, as we generally cannot
decide moot or abstract questions, nor can we enter a judgment or decree to which effect cannot be given.” E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d 451, 461 (Pa. Super. 2019) (cleaned up).
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Santander Bank, N.A. v. Ansorge, 327 A.3d 259, 263 (Pa. Super. 2024) (cleaned up).
Here, assuming arguendo Appellant has complied with the trial court’s January 6, 2026 order as alleged by Ms. Feger, this appeal is not moot. Even if Appellant paid off the Landisburg Loan, or took other action to ensure Ms. Feger is no longer liable for it and the Potter County property is no longer encumbered, we are still able to enter an order that has legal force or effect by considering whether the trial court improperly awarded attorney’s fees to Ms. Feger upon finding Appellant in contempt and reversing that award if warranted. Thus, we proceed to review Appellant’s issues.
First Issue: Clear, Definite, and Specific Order In Appellant’s first issue, he argues the trial court erred in finding him in civil contempt where the underlying December 30, 2022 order was not clear, definite, and specific. Appellant’s Brief at 18. He contends the December 30, 2022 order only stated the Landisburg Loan shall be paid by Husband, and did not direct him to “refinance the loan, pay it off by a date certain, remove [Ms. Feger] from the loan, or ensure release of the encumbrance on the Potter County property.” Id. In contrast, Appellant says, “where the court intended to require refinancing elsewhere in the order, it did so expressly. … It shows the court knew how to impose a refinancing requirement when it intended to do so and did not do so here.” Id. at 20. Appellant also claims the trial court acknowledged at the January 5, 2026 hearing that the December 30, 2022 order did not say whether the Landisburg
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Loan should be paid in full or when that should occur, and admitted that it may not have known the Landisburg Loan encumbered the Potter County property at the time it entered the December 30, 2022 order. Id. at 21.
Courts have the inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt. Twp. of Honey Brook v. Les’s Auto Salvage, LLC, --- A.3d ----, 2026 WL 1875141, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed June
30, 2026). We recognize:
This Court’s review of a civil contempt order is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. If a trial court, in reaching its conclusion, overrides or misapplies the law or exercises judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, or reaches a conclusion that is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will as shown by the evidence of record, then discretion is abused.
Hanbicki, 294 A.3d at 1240 (citation omitted).
“In civil contempt cases, the complaining party has the burden of proving non-compliance with the court order by a preponderance of the evidence.” Mrozek v. James, 780 A.2d 670, 673 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation
omitted). Specifically, [t]o be punished for contempt, a party must not only have violated a court order, but that order must have been definite, clear, and specific-leaving no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the contemnor of the prohibited conduct. Because the order forming the basis for civil contempt must be strictly construed, any ambiguities or omissions in the order must be construed in favor of the defendant. In such cases, a contradictory order or an order whose specific terms have not been violated will not serve as the basis for a finding of contempt. To sustain a finding of civil contempt, the complainant must prove certain distinct elements:
(1) that the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree which he is alleged to have disobeyed; (2) that the act constituting the contemnor’s violation was volitional; and (3) that the
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contemnor acted with wrongful intent. A person may not be held in contempt of court for failing to obey an order that is too vague or that cannot be enforced.
In re Contempt of Cullen, 849 A.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Pa. Super. 2004) (cleaned up).
Here, in addressing Appellant’s claim the order was insufficiently clear,
definite, or specific, the trial court explained:
For a court to find a party in civil contempt, the underlying directive must be clear, definite, and specific. Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478, 489 (Pa. Super. 2006). Where the specificity of an order is in doubt, it must be construed in the light most favorable to the alleged contemnor. Id.
Here, however, there was no genuine uncertainty as to what Appellant was required to do. Even if the [December 30, 2022 e]quitable [d]istribution [order] itself required some clarification as to the precise steps necessary to effectuate its allocation of the … Landisburg [L]oan, that clarification was supplied by this [c]ourt’s April 1[8], 2023 contempt order. That order expressly directed Appellant to transfer or refinance the loan so as to remove [Ms. Feger’s] name from the obligation and to reimburse [Ms. Feger] for payments she made to prevent foreclosure. The December 30, 2022 [o]rder[] also contained an enforcement clause that included a provision to which the parties were directed to effectuate the transfers directed by the [e]quitable [d]istribution within 60 days of the order, which was considered in the issuance of either of the two contempt orders. By the time of the January 5, 2026 proceedings, Appellant had already been adjudged in contempt once and had been expressly informed of what is required to enter compliance.
The January [6], 2026 [o]rder was likewise clear and specific. It directed Appellant to remove [Ms. Fegers’s] name from the loan within [90] days. That directive left no uncertainty as to the conduct required. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that the order was insufficiently clear, definite, or specific is unsupported by the record.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/26, at 6-7.
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The record does not support the trial court’s assertion the April 18, 2023 order expressly directed Appellant to transfer or refinance the Landisburg Loan so as to remove Ms. Feger’s name from it, as it only mandated Appellant to reimburse Ms. Feger for the payment she made on it. We also do not see how the clearness and specificity of the January 6, 2026 order is relevant to determining if Appellant is in contempt, given that the January 6, 2026 order was entered after the at-issue petition for contempt was filed. Notwithstanding, as the trial court noted, paragraph (D)(1) in the December 30, 2022 order clearly, definitively, and specifically required Appellant to transfer the obligations for the Landisburg Loan to himself. In particular, the December 30, 2022 order stated Appellant shall pay the Landisburg Loan, and ordered that the parties shall sign whatever documents are necessary to effectuate said transfers within 60 days of the date of the order unless otherwise stated in the Master’s Report. See Order, 12/30/22, at 3-4. While the December 30, 2022 order did not specifically direct how Appellant should transfer the Landisburg Loan to himself (i.e., whether by making payment in full thereby eliminating the debt, refinancing and removing Ms. Feger’s name from the loan, or using some other method), the order made clear such transfer was required. The fact that another provision in the December 30, 2022 order explicitly addressed refinancing for other real estate does not
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diminish the catch-all provision of paragraph (D)(1).12 Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion or error by the trial court, and no relief is due on Appellant’s first issue.
Second Issue: New or Expanded Obligations In Appellant’s second issue, he insists the trial court erred by using contempt proceedings to impose new or expanded substantive obligations not expressly set forth in the December 30, 2022 order. Appellant’s Brief at 22. He reiterates the December 30, 2022 order did not expressly require Appellant
to refinance the loan, pay it off within a fixed period, remove Ms. Feger from
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12 As the trial court explained at the hearing:
Now, [paragraph 19(a) of the December 30, 2022 order] doesn’t say whether [the Landisburg Loan] shall be paid at $50 a month;
it doesn’t say whether the loan should be paid on time; it doesn’t say whether it should be paid in full. But if we look down through every other thing in this [December 30, 2022] order except the Spring Road property, it doesn’t give any type of time frame. The stimulus payment, the Simply Country, the personal property, the timeshare, cattle proceeds, tractor sale proceeds — the tractor sale proceeds retained by [H]usband with a stipulated value of $20,000 shall be distributed to [H]usband — other Bank of Landisburg accounts, the ATV, you know, to [W]ife. Everything on there, it does not give any type of value -- the trucks, the timber. And that’s why at the end[,] there is a catch[-]all, and talks about [H]usband and [W]ife shall sign whatever documents are necessary to effectuate said transfers within 60 days of the date of this order unless otherwise stated in the Master’s [R]eport.
… The [Landisburg L]oan shall be transferred in your name or paid by you solely, however you wanted to take care of it, that shall be transferred to you. That’s a transfer. Even though it’s a debt, it’s still a transfer.
N.T. at 42-43.
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liability, or ensure the Potter County property was unencumbered. Id. Nevertheless, Appellant says the trial court used contempt proceedings to impose those obligations. Id. at 22-23. Where an order is incomplete or ambiguous, Appellant maintains the proper remedy is clarification or modification — not contempt. Id. at 23 (citations omitted).
No relief is due. For the reasons set forth in disposing of Appellant’s first issue, the trial court did not impose new or expanded substantive obligations on Appellant. Again, the December 30, 2022 order required the parties to sign whatever documents were necessary to effectuate the mandated transfers within 60 days of the date of the order unless otherwise stated in the Master’s Report. See Order, 12/30/22, at 4. Appellant failed to timely sign whatever documents were necessary to effectuate the transfer of the Landisburg Loan to himself. Accordingly, the trial court did not impose new or expanded substantive obligations on Appellant.
Third Issue: Present Ability to Comply In Appellant’s third issue, he claims the trial court erred in imposing coercive civil contempt sanctions without making findings regarding his present ability to comply. Appellant’s Brief at 27. Appellant claims the trial court made no finding regarding Appellant’s present financial or practical ability to refinance the Landisburg Loan, pay it off, or otherwise remove Ms. Feger from liability in 90 days, nor did it make findings on Appellant’s ability to pay the attorney’s fee award within 120 days. Id. at 28. Further, Appellant says he testified at the January 5, 2026 hearing that he has cancer, was
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undergoing chemotherapy, and was on disability. Id. at 29. He complains the trial court “imposed significant obligations — refinance, pay[]off, or removal of [Ms. Feger] from liability — without any inquiry into Appellant’s income, assets, borrowing capacity, disability-related limitations, or ability to complete the ordered relief within the deadline imposed.” Id.
Again, no relief is due. To begin, to the extent Appellant argues he did not have the present ability to comply with the December 30, 2022 order at the time of the January 5, 2026 hearing, the “present inability to comply is an affirmative defense to be proved by the contemnor.” Com. ex rel. Ermel v. Ermel, 469 A.2d 682, 683 (Pa. Super. 1983) (cleaned up). Our review of the January 5, 2026 hearing transcript does not show Appellant proffered evidence that he was unable to transfer the Landisburg Loan to himself either by way of paying it in full, refinancing, or some other method at the time of the hearing. While Appellant stated the kind of cancer he had and explained he made a late payment in October 2025 because he had chemotherapy on the day the payment was due and could not get on the Internet at that time, see N.T. at 23-25, Appellant provided no testimony about how his medical condition affected him financially or prohibited him from transferring the Landisburg Loan to himself.13 When asked by Ms. Feger’s counsel about his medical condition and if there was a possibility he may not be able to fully pay
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13 Although Appellant says he testified at the hearing that he was on disability,
he does not provide a cite for such testimony, and our review of the January 5, 2026 transcript does not uncover such testimony.
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off the Landisburg Loan, Appellant denied that possibility and stated his estate would be able to satisfy it if necessary. Id. at 26. Further, when Ms. Feger’s counsel asked if he refused to refinance the Landisburg Loan, Appellant did not mention a present inability to comply but instead answered, “In the court order[,] it states that it should be paid. It doesn’t say to be refinanced, such as the other section where there was a[n] … explicit definition of refinancing a loan.” Id. at 27.
Moreover, while Appellant vaguely mentioned that at the time of the divorce there was no collateral to refinance the Landisburg Loan as Ms. Feger received the Potter County property, he did not provide evidence that he remained unable to refinance the Landisburg Loan at the time of the hearing. Id. at 29 (Appellant’s testifying: “I was responsible to pay the [Landisburg L]oan, but there was no collateral for the loan, … the collateral would have gone to [Ms. Feger]; therefore, there is no collateral to refinance at that point.”); see also id. 33-34 (Appellant’s testifying: “[W]ith the property going to M[s.] Feger and the loan being assigned to me, there is no collateral in order for me to be able to refinance. I did not have the funds at the time [the December 30, 2022 order was entered] to refinance. So the order itself stated that the [H]usband shall pay, and that is what I’ve been doing.”). Additionally, he agreed with Ms. Feger’s counsel that, during the divorce matter, the parties sold a tractor for $20,000, and he did not put any of his share of the proceeds toward paying off the Landisburg Loan. See id. at 35-37.
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Appellant set forth no evidence about his current financial situation at the hearing. Further, in his closing argument at the hearing, he made no claim he could not presently comply with the December 30, 2022 order. See id. at 40-41. Accordingly, as Appellant provided no evidence he could not comply with the December 30, 2022 order at the time of the hearing, we discern no abuse of discretion or error by the trial court on this basis.
To the extent Appellant also argues the trial court imposed coercive civil contempt sanctions without making findings regarding Appellant’s ability to meet purge conditions, we discern no abuse of discretion or error in this
respect either. This Court has explained:
Sanctions for civil contempt can be imposed for one or both of two purposes: to compel or coerce obedience to a court order and/or to compensate the contemnor’s adversary for injuries resulting from the contemnor’s noncompliance with a court order.
Compensatory civil contempt sanctions, as the name suggests, involve an award of compensation that is paid to the party whom the contempt has harmed. The compensation, which is meant to reimburse the complainant for losses, such as attorneys’ fees and costs due to non-compliance, is viewed as an unconditional fine because it is a sum certain and beyond the contemnor’s ability to escape. The amount of the compensation or unconditional fine must be directly tied to the injured party’s losses.
Coercive civil contempt sanctions, on the other hand, are intended to coerce the contemnor into compliance with the court’s order through incarceration and/or monetary punishment. This type of sanction is typically in the form of a conditional fine payable to the court or a conditional term of imprisonment. [A] key characteristic of a coercive civil contempt sanction that takes it outside the realm of a punitive or criminal contempt sanction is the inclusion of a specific purge condition that the contemnor may satisfy to avoid the sanction. This purge condition must be within the contemnor’s power to perform or within his or her ability to pay, otherwise the sanction is considered to be punitive. When fashioning a coercive civil contempt sanction, the court must
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consider (1) the character and magnitude of the harm threatened by continued contumacy, and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired; and (2), in the case of imposing a conditional fine, the amount of the contemnor’s financial resources and the consequent seriousness of the burden to that particular contemnor. In imposing sanctions for coercive purposes, the court must exercise the least possible power to the end proposed.
Twp. of Honey Brook, 2026 WL 1875141, at *5-6 (cleaned up).
Here, the trial court did not impose a coercive civil contempt sanction on Appellant. Although it ordered Appellant to take certain actions in a specified timeframe, it did not impose sanctions — like a conditional fine or conditional term of imprisonment — to coerce Appellant into compliance. Instead, the trial court imposed a compensatory civil contempt sanction by ordering Appellant to pay Ms. Feger’s attorney’s fees. “[T]rial courts are not required to consider a contemnor’s ability to pay before imposing counsel fees in favor of the opposing party as a sanction.” In re Ruzacki, No. 660 WDA 2025, unpublished memorandum at 11-12 (Pa. Super. filed May 15, 2026) (citing, inter alia, Hopkins v. Byes, 954 A.2d 654, 659 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting there is no authority to support a finding that a party’s failure to comply with an order “mandates a determination of the contemnor’s ability to pay, prior to the imposition of a sanction in the form of attorney’s fees”) (footnote omitted)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing unpublished, non- precedential memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value). We also observe paragraph (D)(3) of the December 30, 2022 order specifically stated upon the finding of
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a breach by the court, the breaching party shall be responsible for the non- breaching party’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Order, 12/30/22, at 4. Based on the foregoing, this argument likewise does not warrant relief.
Fourth Issue: Due Process Rights In Appellant’s fourth issue, he asserts the trial court violated his due process rights by imposing contempt sanctions without adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Appellant’s Brief at 31. He argues due process requires notice of the specific conduct alleged to constitute contempt, notice of the sanctions sought, and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Id. According to Appellant, Ms. Feger’s petition for contempt alleged “Appellant had not paid off the loan, had not refinanced it into his sole name, and had made late payments affecting [Ms. Feger’s] credit[,]” but it failed to “identify any provision of the December 30, 2022 order expressly requiring refinance, removal of [Ms. Feger] from the loan, or payoff by a certain date.” Id. at 32. Consequently, Appellant says Ms. Feger requested the trial court require those things, which is not notice of a violation of an existing clear obligation, but instead notice of a request for new relief. Id. Appellant complains the hearing and ruling exceeded the scope of the noticed issues, id. at 32-33, and says due process does not permit a court to define the operative duty during the hearing and then punish the party for failing to comply with it. Id. at 33.
“The essential due process requisites for a finding of civil contempt are notice and an opportunity to be heard.” In re Contempt of Cullen, 849 A.2d at 1211 (cleaned up); see also In re Ruzacki, No. 660 WDA 2025,
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unpublished memorandum at 9-10 (discerning essential due process requisites were met). Here, Appellant had notice of the December 30, 2022 order and the violation alleged. Specifically, in Ms. Feger’s petition for contempt, she asserted the December 30, 2022 order states the Landisburg Loan shall be paid by Appellant, and that the parties were to sign whatever documents were necessary to effectuate the transfers set forth in the order within 60 days. Petition for Contempt, 12/1/25, at ¶¶ 2-3. At the time she filed the petition, Ms. Feger alleged she is still listed as a responsible party on the Landisburg Loan. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. The trial court subsequently held a hearing on January 5, 2026, where Appellant had the opportunity to be heard as to why Ms. Feger remained on the Landisburg Loan. Accordingly, no due process violation occurred here.
Fifth Issue: Cumulative Errors In Appellant’s fifth and final issue, he contends the trial court abused its discretion and committed errors of law requiring reversal or vacatur of the contempt order. Appellant’s Brief at 34. He says, based on the cumulative effect of the errors set forth in his previous issues, relief is warranted. See id.
As we have determined Appellant’s prior issues lack merit, this issue also fails. We affirm the trial court’s order.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/15/2026