Belinda Muhammad v. Bretanniyia Jenkins

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BELINDA C. MUHAMMAD, No. 23-55287

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-07970-JAK-PVC v.

BRETANNIYIA JENKINS, Bus Driver for MEMORANDUM* LACMTA, individual and official capacity,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; PHILLIP A. WASHINGTON; JANE DOE; DOES, 1-10,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 13, 2026**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: O’SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Belinda C. Muhammad appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

after a jury trial in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Bretanniyia Jenkins

called 911 in retaliation for Muhammad’s exercise of First Amendment rights

when Muhammad was a passenger on a Los Angeles County Metropolitan

Transportation Authority (MTA) bus driven by Jenkins. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Duran v. City of

Maywood, 221 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (evidentiary rulings);

Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (denial of motion to appoint

counsel). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Muhammad’s

motions in limine to exclude evidence of her misdemeanor conviction for

possession of brass knuckles at the time of the incident and her dismissed charge

for resisting arrest. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (setting forth purposes for which

evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible); Duran, 221 F.3d at

1132-33 (setting forth the standard for admission of “other act” evidence). Even if

we assume error in admitting evidence of the brass knuckles discovered after the

encounter, any error would be harmless under the circumstances. See Fogel v.

Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that a “true threat,” an

2 23-55287 expression of an intent to inflict injury on another, is not protected by the First

Amendment).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to appoint counsel

for Muhammad. See Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (explaining that there is no

constitutional right to counsel in civil actions, but court may appoint counsel for

indigent civil litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) under “exceptional

circumstances,” taking into account the likelihood of success on the merits and the

petitioner’s ability to articulate their claims in light of the complexity of the legal

issues involved).

AFFIRMED.

3 23-55287